월남전 때 월맹의 국방장관이었던 보 구엔 지압 장군은 1911년생이다. 올해 96세로서 아직도 하노이 근교에서 살고 있다. 기자는 그를 1996년 봄에 인터뷰한 적이 있었다. 하노이 근교 山中 별장에서 만났다. 그는 키가 작고 눈빛이 형형한 잘 늙은 노인이었다. 건강 비결을 물었더니 간단하게 대답했다.
'아침마다 맨손체조를 합니다. 그리고 항상 남을 생각합니다'

맨손체조는 육체적 건강을 위한 가장 효율적이고 돈이 안드는 건강법이다. 항상 남을 생각하는 사람들은 정신이 건강할 수밖에 없다. 정신이상의 거의 전부는 자신을 너무 많이 생각하고 사랑한 탓이다. 아침에 일어나자말자 맨손 체조를 하고 남을 걱정하는 일을 시작한다. 옛 부하들은 잘 있는지, 오늘은 옛 동지 누구의 忌日(기일)인데 유족들이 잘 하고 있는지, 정부의 요직에 임명된 과거의 내 부하에게는 오늘 무슨 충고를 해줄까 등등 이런 식으로 생각하기 시작하면 스트레스가 쌓일 일이 없다.
사도바울은 갈라디아서 5장에서 '율법 전체를 한 문장으로 요약하면 '너 이웃을 너의 몸처럼 사랑하라'이다'라고 말했다. 지압의 말과 일맥상통한다.

지압 장군은 프랑스가 월남을 식민지로 지배하고 있을 때 민족해방운동의 일환으로 공산당원이 되었다. 그는 독립운동의 기관지로서 신문사를 만들고 편집국장으로 일하기도 했다. 그는 자신이 기자였음을 자랑했다. 지압 장군은 작전을 지휘할 때 기자생활 때 배웠던 기사작성, 편집의 과정을 적용하기도 했었다고 실토한 적이 있다.

그는 두 차례의 세계사적인 결전을 승리로 이끌었다. 1950년대엔 디엔비에푸 포위전을 지휘하여 프랑스의 1만5000 병력을 섬멸시켜 프랑스군을 철수하게 만들었다. 1960~70년대 월남전 때는 국방장관이었다. 그는 1968년 舊正공세를 지휘했다. 전투에선 미군이 이겼으나 언론을 통한 심리전에서 지압이 이겼다. 월남전의 진정한 전선은 미국 가정의 TV였다. 이 TV가 전한 舊正공세의 생생한 전투장면들은 미국인의 전쟁의지를 꺾어버렸다. 여론의 변화를 실감한 존슨 대통령은 재출마를 포기했고 월맹과 평화협상을 시작하도록 만들었다.

지압 장군은 1996년 5월 미국 CNN과 인터뷰하면서 '미국이 진 이유는 미국의 지도부가 다 똑똑한 사람들이었지만 그들은 월남의 역사와 문화를 몰랐고 월남사람들의 전략을 이해하지 못했기 때문이다'고 말했다. 똑 같은 敗因을 내어놓은 사람이 로버트 맥나마라 당시 미국 국방장관이었다. 1994년 그는 회고록에서 '월남의 역사와 문화를 모르고 전쟁을 벌였기 때문에 우리는 졌다'라고 했다. 미국의 지도부가 갖고 있던 '도미노 이론'이 敗因의 근원이란 주장도 있다. 도미노 이론은 동남아시아에서 어느 한 나라가 공산화되면 다른 인접국가들도 잇따라 넘어지고 만다는 논리였다. 월남이 赤化되었지만 태국 등 인접국가는 넘어가지 않았다. 도미노 이론은 유럽 국가들이 히틀러의 공갈에 굴복하여 오스트리아, 체코를 내어주다가 2차세계대전을 부르고 만 데서 생긴 반작용의 논리였다.

부시 대통령이 이라크 전쟁을 시작하면서 그 목표를 이라크의 민주화에 둔 것이 월남전의 敗因을 되풀이한 셈이다. 기독교 국가가 물리적 수단으로 이슬람 국가를 민주화시킨다는 것은 불가능하다. 이슬람 국가는 종교의 도전으로 해서 근대 국가체제를 유지하는 데도 힘이 부치는데 그런 취약한 국가를 민주화 한다는 것은 탁상공론이다. 미국의 보수 원리주의자들은 '민주화는 좋은 것이다. 좋은 것은 반드시 이뤄진다'는 당위론으로 전쟁을 시작했다가 이슬람의 고질적인 내분을 폭발시켜 국가체제마저 유지하기가 곤란한 내전상황을 조성하고 말았다.

미국인들은 1등의 논리에 도취하다가 보니 다른 나라의 사정을 이해하려는 노력이 부족하다. 자신의 방식이 최선이고 2등 이하의 나라들은 무조건 1등을 따라와야 한다는 자기중심의 사고방식에서 벗어나지 못한다. 이런 자기 중심주의가 미국의 리더십을 약화시키고 있다.

동양의 대전략가는 지압 장군처럼 학자풍의 장군이 많다. 김유신, 이순신, 박정희, 제갈량이 그랬고 호지명 모택동까지도 많은 독서의 축적이 있었다. 공산주의자라도 김일성, 김정일 같은 不學無識한 자가 북한을 다스렸다는 것이 비극중의 비극이다. 무식만큼 무서운 것은 없다. 무식자는 자신이 무식하다는 것을 모르니까 무서운 것이다. 이런 자들은 자신이 망할 때가 되기 전에는 절대로 정신을 차리지 못한다. 미친 개에겐 몽둥이뿐이란 박정희의 말이 그래서 명언인 것이다.

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*1996년 5월 CNN의 지압장군 인터뷰 全文

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap is perhaps the most important figure in the early history of communist Vietnam -- with the exception of Ho Chi Minh. At the end of World War II, Ho named Giap commander in chief of the Viet Minh forces fighting French colonial rule. Giap orchestrated the defeat of the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1953 and remained minister of defense of the newly independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He was the chief North Vietnamese military leader in the subsequent war against U.S. forces. This interview, which was conducted in May 1996, has been translated from Vietnamese.

On the battle of Dien Bien Phu:

The Dien Bien Phu campaign is a great and first victory of a feudal colonial nation, whose agricultural economy is backward, against the great imperialist capitalist which has a modern industry and a great army. Thus, it means a lot to us, to people all over the world, and to other countries. This is also how Ho Chi Minh saw it.

We see the Dien Bien Phu victory as the victory [over] the French army and [over] the intervention of the Americans --because in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, 80 percent of the war expenditures were spent by the Americans. The Americans had their hands in it. So the Dien Bien Phu defeat was a defeat for both the French and the Americans. But whether the Americans had drawn the lessons from that, I don't think so. That's why the Americans continued in South Vietnam. ...

When we received news of the Dien Bien Phu victory, everyone practically jumped up in the air, they were so happy about it. But Ho Chi Minh said that this is only victory of the first step: we have yet to fight the Americans. It was very clear then.

On the United States' involvement in Vietnam:

In 1945, some Americans parachuted into our war zone [for a] meeting [with] our late President Ho Chi Minh. ... Back then, President Roosevelt's attitude was that the U.S. did not want to see events like the war with France coming back to Indochina, but later this attitude was changed. After the August Revolution in 1945, the relationship between Vietnam and the U.S. could have been good, and we wished that it had been good.

Then only the intelligent people or those with vision and wisdom, such as Eisenhower, ... saw the impracticality of the [domino] theory. And any mistakes were due to following the domino theory. They thought that if the theory was put into practice here, it would become the pivotal location for [preventing] the spread of communism to the whole Southeast Asia. So Vietnam was made the central location to check the expansion of communism, and this was what President Kennedy believed, and it was mistake. ...

The Americans sent advisers to each and every division in the South Vietnamese [army] before 1965. In 1965, they started to commit big forces. We discussed among ourselves in the Politburo whether at that point it was ... a limited war. We decided that it was already a limited war. We discussed it in the Politburo that with America bringing in gigantic forces was to carry out a new campaign, with the American forces committed, it was not good for America but it would be very hard for us to fight. The struggle would be very fierce but we already concluded that we would win the war. ...

On fighting technologically superior U.S. forces:

When American combat forces were committed, it was a myth that we could not fight and win because they were so powerful. ... [We survived] because of our courage and determination, together with wisdom, tactics and intelligence. During the attacks of B-52s, we shot down a few B-52s and captured documents. One of them was a order by the [U.S.] air command about the targets to be bombed in and around Hanoi and the positions of [our] forces. Some [of the figures] were correct, [but] some were wrong because of our deception [measures]. And our conclusion was that with such anti-air-power measures, the B-52 is not an effective way to fight. ...

We had to resort to different measures, some of which are quite simple, like hiding in man-holes and evacuating to the countryside. And we fought back with all our forces and with every kind of weapon. We fought with anti-aircraft artilleries and with small guns, even though [it was] sometimes solely with the strength of our local force. An 18-year-old girl once said that she followed routes every day and studied the patterns of American flights and when they would attack. I told her that she is a philosopher to understand that, because only philosophers talk about principles. Later she used small gun to shoot down an aircraft from a mountainside. That is an example of the military force of the common people. ... We had ingenuity and the determination to fight to the end.

I appreciated the fact that they had sophisticated weapon systems but I must say that it was the people who made the difference, not the weapons. There was also a human factor involved. [As to] whether they were tempted to use nuclear weapons during the war: there was a time during the Dien Bien Phu campaign in which the Americans were going to use nuclear weapons, and this is back in 1954 during the Eisenhower era. We were also aware of possible use of nuclear weapons and we were prepared for it. But whether the Americans could really use nuclear weapons was a question of international politics, and it also depended on the American allies. But looking at the intertwined forces, as the situation was, the result [of a nuclear blast] would not be good, and the Americans had to think hard. If nuclear weapons were used on locations where the Vietnamese troops were concentrated, it [would] also [affect] American troops.

On the Ho Chi Minh Trail:

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a very extensive system; it started with a trail but later became a road. Many roads, actually: the Western road system and the Eastern road systems, criss-crossing here and there. And also there were the extensive systems of gas pipelines and communications lines, and routes on rivers and across the sea. We did everything possible to keep the whole system going. I visited many important points which were subjected to many B-52 bombings 23 out of 24 hours a day; we had many teams working toward maintaining the operation, including a team made up of women who had to use iron rings to defuse the [unexploded] bombs. ...

We made big sacrifices. I visited a dozen girls who maintained the route in Dong Lap of Nghe An Province; they showed me how they invented camouflage to cover the lamps so that those in vehicles can see, but the planes could not see. They urged us to move fast; and they all died during the bombing. There was danger of the trail being cut off, but it never really was cut off. With a long procession of vehicles, and with the bombing from the B-52s, it was very difficult, but we had to use both courage and wisdom. There are some routes that the Americans did not know about, but if they had used a telescope they would have seen the routes quite clearly. But we did not use those routes. We used some secret smaller trails as a detour and we went during the day.

On the Tet Offensive:

The Tet Offensive is a long story. ... It was our policy, drawn up by Ho Chi Minh, to make the Americans quit. Not to exterminate all Americans in Vietnam, [but] to defeat them.

It could be said [Tet] was a surprise attack which brought us a big victory. For a big battle we always figured out the objectives, the targets, so it was the main objective to destroy the forces and to obstruct the Americans from making war. But what was more important was to de-escalate the war -- because at that time the American were escalating the war -- and to start negotiations. So that was the key goal of that campaign. But of course, if we had gained more than that it would be better.

And [after Tet] the Americans had to back down and come to the negotiating table, because the war was not only moving into the cities, to dozens of cities and towns in South Vietnam, but also to the living rooms of Americans back home for some time. And that's why we could claim the achievement of the objective.

On the U.S. leadership during the war:

In general, I must say they were the most intelligent people, with certain talents such as military, political and diplomacy skills. They were intelligent people. That was the first point that I want to say. The second point I want to say is that they knew little about Vietnam and her people. They didn't understand our will to maintain independence and equality between nations even though these are stated in President Jefferson's manifestation. And so they made mistakes. They did not know the limits of power. ... No matter how powerful you are there are certain limits, and they did not understand it well. ...

The people in the White House believed that Americans would definitely win and there is not chance of defeat. There is a saying which goes, 'If you know the enemy and you know yourself, you would win every single battle.' However, the Americans fought the Vietnamese, but they did not know much about Vietnam or anything at all about the Vietnamese people. Vietnam is an old nation founded in a long history before the birth of Christ. ... The Americans knew nothing about our nation and her people. American generals knew little about our war theories, tactics and patterns of operation. ...

During the war everyone in the country would fight and they [would] do so following the Vietnamese war theory. We have a theory that is different from that of the Russians and that of the Americans. The Americans did not understand that. They did not know or understand our nation; they did not know our war strategies. They could not win. How could they win? As our president said, there was nothing more precious than independence and freedom. We had the spirit that we would govern our own nation; we would rather sacrifice than be slaves.

Now that the normalization between our two countries have been established, we hope for better relations, but it should be based on equality. Otherwise, if America is at advantage simply because she is richer, it will be unacceptable for us. Now we hope that American leaders can understand Vietnam and her people better.