¿µ±¹ÀÇ ºÐÀﱺºñ¿¬±¸¼Ò ÇöÀå Á¶»ç´ÜÀÌ ¿ÃÇØ 1¿ù 2ÀÏ Çϸ£Å°¿ì¿¡¼ ¼ö°ÅÇÑ ºÏÇÑ Åºµµ¹Ì»çÀÏÀÇ ÀÜÇظ¦ 1¿ù 27ÀÏ°ú 2¿ù 1ÀÏ Á¶»çÇÏ°í ±â·ÏÇß´Ù. ºÐÀﱺºñ¿¬±¸¼Ò À¥»ç¿¡Æ®¿¡ °ø°³µÈ ÀÜÇØ »çÁø.
¿µ±¹ÀÇ ºÐÀﱺºñ¿¬±¸¼Ò(CAR)´Â 20ÀÏ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª Çϸ£Å°¿ì¿¡¼ ȸ¼öÇÑ ºÏÇÑ»ê ¹Ì»çÀÏ ÀÜÇØÀÇ 290°³ ºÎÇ°À» Á÷Á¢ Á¶»çÇÑ °á°ú, ºÎÇ°ÀÇ 75%°¡ ¹Ì±¹ ȸ»ç°¡ ¼³°è, ÆǸÅÇÑ °ÍÀ¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³µ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ ´Üü´Â À̳¯ ¹ßÇ¥ÇÑ ¡®ºÏÇÑ ¹Ì»çÀÏ, ÃֽŠÀüÀÚ ºÎÇ° »ç¿ë¡¯À̶ó´Â Á¦¸ñÀÇ º¸°í¼¿¡¼ ÀÌ°°ÀÌ ¹àÈ÷°í, ³ª¸ÓÁö 16%´Â À¯·´ ȸ»ç, 9%´Â ¾Æ½Ã¾Æ ȸ»ç¿Í ¿¬°èµÅ ÀÖ´Ù°í µ¡ºÙ¿´½À´Ï´Ù.
[º¸°í¼]¡°From marks observed on these components, CAR identified 26 companies, headquartered in eight jurisdictions (China, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States), that are linked to the production of these components. Seventy-five percent of the components documented are linked to companies incorporated in the United States. Sixteen percent of documented components are linked to companies incorporated in Europe. Nine percent of documented components are linked to companies incorporated in Asia.¡±
ÀÌ ´Üü´Â ¶Ç ºÎÇ°µéÀÌ Áß±¹, µ¶ÀÏ, ÀϺ», ³×´ú¶õµå, ½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£, ½ºÀ§½º, ŸÀÌ¿Ï, ¹Ì±¹¿¡ º»»ç¸¦ µÐ 26°³ ȸ»çÀÇ Á¦Ç°ÀÎ °ÍÀ¸·Î ÆľǵÆÀ¸¸ç, ÁÖ·Î ¹Ì»çÀÏÀÇ Ç×¹ý ½Ã½ºÅÛÀ» ±¸¼ºÇÏ´Â °ÍµéÀ̶ó°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
ºÐÀﱺºñ¿¬±¸¼Ò´Â À¯ÀÔ °æ·Î¸¦ Á¶»çÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù¸ç ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ ¾÷ü À̸§Àº °ø°³ÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Ò½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ ´Üü´Â ºÎÇ°ÀÇ Àý¹Ý¿¡ ³¯Â¥°¡ ÀûÇô ÀÖ¾úÀ¸¸ç, ±× Áß 75% ÀÌ»óÀÌ 2021³â¿¡¼ 2023³â »çÀÌ »ý»êµÈ °ÍÀ¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³µ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
ºÐÀﱺºñ¿¬±¸¼ÒÀÇ ÇöÀå Á¶»ç´ÜÀº ¿ÃÇØ 1¿ù 2ÀÏ Çϸ£Å°¿ì¿¡¼ ¼ö°ÅÇÑ ºÏÇÑ Åºµµ¹Ì»çÀÏÀÇ ÀÜÇظ¦ 1¿ù 27ÀÏ°ú 2¿ù 1ÀÏ Á÷Á¢ Á¶»çÇÏ°í ±â·ÏÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ÀÌ ´Üü´Â ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª¿¡¼ ¹ß°ßµÈ ºÏÇÑÁ¦ ¹Ì»çÀÏ¿¡¼ ÃֽŠ¿Ü±¹ ºÎÇ°ÀÌ ¹ß°ßµÈ °ÍÀº Àü ¼¼°è ºñÈ®»ê üÁ¦°¡ Áß´ëÇÑ µµÀüÀ» Á÷¸éÇÏ°í ÀÖÀ½À» º¸¿© Áشٰí Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[º¸°í¼] ¡°It shows that North Korea has been able to produce advanced weapons, integrating components produced as recently as 2023, in spite of United Nations Security Council sanctions in place since 2006 that prohibit the production of ballistic missiles by North Korea. It shows that, despite long-standing international sanctions on such activities, North Korea could have transferred the weapon to the Russian Federation after the start of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The presence of a large proportion of recently produced non-domestic electronic components in a North Korean ballistic missile strongly suggests that the country has developed a robust acquisition network capable of circumventing, without detection, sanction regimes that have been in place for nearly two decades.¡±
º¸°í¼´Â À̹ø ¹ß°ßÀº À¯¿£ ¾Èº¸¸® ´ëºÏ Á¦Àç°¡ 2006³âºÎÅÍ ½ÃÇàµÇ°í ÀÖÀ½¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í ºÏÇÑÀÌ ÀÛ³â±îÁöµµ ÇØ¿Ü ºÎÇ°À» Á¶¸³ÇØ Ã·´Ü ¹«±â¸¦ »ý»êÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾úÀ½À» º¸¿©Áشٰí Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¶Ç ¿À·£ ±¹Á¦ Á¦Àç¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í ºÏÇÑÀÌ 2022³â ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª Àü¸é ħ°øÀÌ ½ÃÀÛµÈ ÀÌÈÄ ·¯½Ã¾Æ¿¡ ÀÌ ¹«±â¸¦ ÀÌÀüÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾úÀ½À» º¸¿©ÁØ´Ù°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
¾Æ¿ï·¯ ºÏÇÑ»ê źµµ¹Ì»çÀÏ¿¡ ÃֽŠÇØ¿Ü ÀüÀÚ ºÎÇ°ÀÌ »ó´ç¼ö žÀçµÈ °ÍÀº ºÏÇÑÀÌ °ÅÀÇ 20³â µ¿¾È ½ÃÇàµÈ Á¦Àç üÁ¦¸¦ ¿ìȸÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °ß°íÇÑ Á¶´Þ ³×Æ®¿öÅ©¸¦ °³¹ßÇßÀ½À» º¸¿©Áشٰí ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ºÐÀﱺºñ¿¬±¸¼ÒÀÇ ¿ìÅ©¶óÀ̳ª °ü·Ã ºÐ¼® Ã¥ÀÓÀÚÀÎ µ¥À̹̾𠽺Çø®Åͽº ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº 20ÀÏ VOA¿Í ÀüÈÅëÈ¿¡¼ ¾ÕÀ¸·Î À¯ÀÔ °æ·Î¸¦ Á¶»çÇØ °ü·Ã ´ç±¹¿¡ ¾Ë¸± °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
[½ºÇø®Åͽº ºÎ±¹Àå]¡°So when we identify the parties responsible for the for the diversion of those components, we will alert the proper authorities and we work directly with, you know, authorities responsible for the control of those components. And I'm not sure we will, you know, make those findings public, but we will certainly alert the proper authorities.¡±
½ºÇø®Åͽº ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº ¡°ºÎÇ° Àü¿ë¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ã¥ÀÓÀÌ ÀÖ´Â ´ç»çÀÚ¸¦ ½Äº°Çϸé ÇØ´ç ºÎÇ°ÀÇ ÅëÁ¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ã¥ÀÓÀÌ ÀÖ´Â ´ç±¹°ú Á÷Á¢ Çù·ÂÇÒ °Í¡±À̶ó¸ç ¡°ÀϹݿ¡ Á¶»ç °á°ú¸¦ °ø°³ÇÒÁö´Â ¸ð¸£°ÚÁö¸¸ °ü°è ´ç±¹¿¡´Â È®½ÇÈ÷ ¾Ë¸± °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
Á¦Ç°À» Á¦Á¶ÇÑ ¾÷ü¿¡ ÃßÀû ¿äûÀ» ÇÑ µÚ ±×µé°ú Çù·ÂÇØ ¹®Á¦°¡ ÀÖ´Â À¯Åë °æ·Î¸¦ ´Ù°¢ÀûÀ¸·Î Á¶»çÇØ ÆľÇÇÒ °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ¶Ç ¡°Áö±Ý±îÁö ·¯½Ã¾Æ¿Í À̶õÀÇ ¹«±â¿¡¼ ¹ß°ßµÈ ºÎÇ°µéµµ ¼º°øÀûÀ¸·Î ÃßÀûÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°ºÏÇÑ ¹Ì»çÀÏ¿¡¼ ¹ß°ßµÈ ºÎÇ°¿¡ ´ëÇؼµµ ±×·¸°Ô ÇÒ °èȹ¡±À̶ó°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
½ºÇø®Åͽº ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº ¼öÃâÅëÁ¦¿Í Á¦Àç´Â °·ÂÇÑ °¨½Ã üÁ¦°¡ ÀÖÀ» ¶§¸¸ È¿°úÀûÀ̶ó°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é¼ ÀڽŵéÀÌ »ê¾÷°è¿Í Çù·ÂÇØ ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¹Ì»çÀÏ¿¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ ºÎÇ°À» ¾î¶»°Ô Á¶´ÞÇß´ÂÁö¸¦ ¹àÈ÷°í ³ª¸é ´ç±¹ÀÌ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[½ºÇø®Åͽº ºÎ±¹Àå]¡°Then you know, comes the role of authorities. Like the Treasury, OFAC to take the appropriate measures to try to preempt future diversion or to list or sanction if appropriate the entities that have been identified as responsible for the diversion of such components.¡±
½ºÇø®Åͽº ºÎ±¹ÀåÀº ¡°¹Ì À繫ºÎ ÇØ¿ÜÀÚ»êÅëÁ¦½Ç(OFAC)ÀÌ ÇâÈÄ Àü¿ëÀ» ¹æÁöÇϱâ À§ÇØ ÀûÀýÇÑ Á¶Ä¡¸¦ ÃëÇϰųª ºÎÇ°ÀÇ Àü¿ë¿¡ Ã¥ÀÓÀÌ ÀÖ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î È®ÀÎµÈ ±â°üÀ» Á¦Àç ¸ñ·Ï¿¡ ¿Ã¸± ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
¹é¾Ç°ü ±¹°¡¾Èº¸È¸ÀÇ ºÏÇÑ´ã´ç ±¹ÀåÀ» Áö³½ ¾Ø¼´Ï ·çÁö¿¡·Î ¹ÎÁÖÁÖÀǼöÈ£Àç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ±¹ÀåÀº 20ÀÏ VOA¿Í ÀüÈÅëÈ¿¡¼ ¡°¼ÖÁ÷È÷ Áö³ ¸î ³â µ¿¾È ´ëºÏ Á¦Àç°¡ Á¦´ë·Î ÀÌÇàµÇÁö ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù¡±¸ç À̹ø Á¶»ç °á°ú°¡ ¡°³î¶øÁö ¾Ê´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é¼ ¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ ºÏÇÑÀΰú ºÏÇÑ ±â¾÷¸¸ Á¦ÀçÇÏÁö ¸»°í Áß±¹°ú ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ Á¶·ÂÀÚµéÀ» Á¦ÀçÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[³ìÃë: ·çÁö¿¡·Î ¼±ÀÓ±¹Àå] ¡°when you have really minimal sanctions, when the sanctions primary focus on North Koreans, North Korean companies, North Korean individuals and others, when it and when it doesn't focus on the banks and the companies and the individuals primarily in China and Russia that are aiding North Korea, sanctions evasion, then you get these kind of, you know, loopholes that North Korea could continue to exploit.¡±
·çÁö¿¡·Î ±¹ÀåÀº ¡°ºÏÇÑ °³Àΰú ºÏÇÑ ±â¾÷¸¸ °Ü³ÉÇÏ´Â ÃÖ¼ÒÇÑÀÇ Á¦À縸 °¡ÇÏ°í ºÏÇÑÀ» µ½´Â Áß±¹°ú ·¯½Ã¾ÆÀÇ ÀºÇà°ú ±â¾÷, °³ÀÎ, Á¦Àç ȸÇÇ¿¡ ÃÊÁ¡À» ¸ÂÃßÁö ¾ÊÀ¸¸é ºÏÇÑÀÌ °è¼Ó ÀÌ¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÇãÁ¡ÀÌ »ý±â°Ô µÈ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.