¹Ì±¹ ±¹¹«ºÎ°¡ ºÏÇÑÀÌ ³²Ä§ ´É·ÂÀÌ ¾ø´Ù´Â Çѱ¹ ¿©´ç ´ëÇ¥ÀÇ ¹ß¾ð¿¡ ´ëÇØ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â´Â Àü ¼¼°è¸¦ À§ÇùÇÑ´Ù°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ºÏÇÑÀÇ Àü·Â°ú ¹Ì-ÇÑ Àü½ÃÀÛÀüÅëÁ¦±Ç Àüȯ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Çѱ¹ Á¤Ä¡ÀÎÀÇ ¹ß¾ð¿¡ ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÇ ±º»ç Àü¹®°¡µéµµ ¹®Á¦¸¦ Á¦±âÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ¹é¼º¿ø ±âÀÚ°¡ º¸µµÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
±¹¹«ºÎ°¡ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ±º»ç·ÂÀ» ¹«½ÃÇؼ´Â ¾È µÈ´Ù´Â ÀÔÀåÀ» ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù. ±¹¹«ºÎ ´ëº¯ÀÎ½Ç °ü°èÀÚ´Â VOA¿¡ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¿¾ÇÇÑ ¹«±â ½ÇŸ¦ µé¸ç ³²Ä§ °¡´É¼ºÀ» ÀÏÃàÇÑ Çѱ¹ ´õºÒ¾î¹ÎÁÖ´ç ¼Û¿µ±æ ´ëÇ¥ÀÇ ÃÖ±Ù ¹ß¾ð°ú °ü·ÃÇØ ¡°º¹¼öÀÇ À¯¿£ ¾Èº¸¸® °áÀÇ¿¡ ¹Ý¿µµÈ °Íó·³, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â ÇÁ·Î±×·¥Àº ºÒ¹ýÀûÀÌ¸ç ±¹Á¦ ÆòÈ¿Í ¾Èº¸¸¦ À§ÇùÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
[±¹¹«ºÎ °ü°èÀÚ]¡°North Korea's WMD programs, as reflected in multiple UN Security Council resolutions, are unlawful and constitute a threat to international peace and security.¡±
¹Ì±º ö¼ö·Î È¥¶õ¿¡ ºüÁø ¾ÆÇÁ°¡´Ï½ºÅº°ú Çѹݵµ »óȲÀº ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ´Ù¸£´Ù°í °Á¶ÇØ ¿Â ±¹¹«ºÎ°¡ ºÏÇÑ ±º»ç·Â¿¡ À־ ÀÌ·ÊÀûÀ¸·Î Çѱ¹ ¿©´ç Á¤Ä¡ÀÎÀÇ Æò°¡¿Í È®¿¬ÇÑ ¿ÂµµÂ÷¸¦ µå·¯³Â½À´Ï´Ù.
¼Û¿µ±æ ´ëÇ¥´Â Áö³ 18ÀÏ ÆäÀ̽ººÏ¿¡ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¡°³²Ä§ÇÒ ´É·ÂÀºÄ¿³ç ÀڽŵéÀÇ »ýÁ¸°ú üÁ¦ À¯Áö°¡ ´õ Àý¹ÚÇÑ ½ÇÁ¤¡±À̶ó°í Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¾Õ¼ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÑ Ä®·³´Ï½ºÆ®°¡ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Áö¿øÀÌ ¾øÀ¸¸é Çѱ¹µµ ¾ÆÇÁ°¡´Ï½ºÅº°ú ºñ½ÁÇÑ Ã³Áö°¡ µÉ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ÁÖÀåÇÏÀÚ ¡°ºÏÀº ¸ðµç ¹«±âü°è°¡ ³°¾Ò°í, À¯¿£°ú ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ °æÁ¦Á¦Àç·Î ÀüÂ÷¿Í ÀüÅõ±â¸¦ ¿î¿ëÇÒ ¿¬·áÁ¶Â÷ Á¦´ë·Î º¸±ÞµÇÁö ¸øÇÏ´Â »óȲ"À̶ó¸ç ÀÌ°°ÀÌ ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÇ Çѹݵµ Àü¹®°¡µéµµ ¼Û ´ëÇ¥ÀÇ ºÏÇÑ Àü·Â Æò°¡¿¡ µ¿ÀÇÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù´Â ¹ÝÀÀÀ» º¸¿´½À´Ï´Ù. ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¹«±âü°è°¡ ³°¾Ò´Ù´Â ¼Û ÀÇ¿øÀÇ ÁÖÀå°ú ¹Ý´ë·Î ºÏÇÑ Á¤±ÇÀº ÇÙ°ú ¹Ì»çÀÏ ´É·ÂÀ» °è¼Ó Áõ°ÇÏ°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, Áö³ µÎ Â÷·ÊÀÇ ¿º´½Ä¿¡¼µµ ÅÊÅ©¿Í ÈÆ÷, ¹æ°ø ½Ã½ºÅÛ µî ¸¹Àº »õ ¹«±âµéÀ» °ø°³Çß´Ù¡±°í ¹Ý¹ÚÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°Contrary to Rep. Song¡¯s assertion that Pyongyang has outdated weapons systems, the regime continues to augment its nuclear and missile capabilities. During its last two military parades, it revealed numerous new weapons, including conventional systems of tanks, artillery, air defense, etc.¡±
½ÇÁ¦·Î Çѱ¹ ±¹¹æºÎ°¡ Áö³ 2¿ù ¹ß°£ÇÑ ¡®2020 ±¹¹æ¹é¼¡¯´Â ±º»ç·Â¿¡ ÀÖ¾î¼ Çѱ¹Àº ¾çÀûÀ¸·Î, ºÏÇÑÀº ÁúÀûÀ¸·Î ¿ìÀ§¸¦ Á¡ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù¸ç ºÏÇÑÀº ÀÌ °°Àº ¾çÀû ¿¼¼¸¦ ±Øº¹Çϱâ À§ÇØ Àç·¡½Ä ¹«±â ¼º´É °³·®°ú ÇÔ²² ÇÙ°ú WMD, ¹Ì»çÀÏ, Àå»çÁ¤Æ÷, Àá¼öÇÔ, Ư¼öÀüºÎ´ë µî ºñ´ëĪ Àü·Â Áõ°¿¡ ¸ôµÎÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù°í Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
¹Ì ±º»ç Àü¹®°¡µéÀº ƯÈ÷ ¼Û ´ëÇ¥°¡ ¡°Çѹ̵¿¸ÍÀÇ Á߿伺 ¸øÁö¾Ê°Ô ¿ì¸®³ª¶ó´Â ¿ì¸® ½º½º·Î ÁöŲ´Ù´Â ÀÚÁÖ±¹¹æÀÇ ÀÚ¼¼°¡ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù. ±×·¡¼ ÀüÀÛ±Ç È¸¼ö°¡ ÇϷ绡¸® ÀÌ·ïÁ®¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í °Á¶ÇÑ µ¥ ´ëÇؼµµ ÀÌÀǸ¦ Á¦±âÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
¸¶ÀÌŬ ¿ÀÇÚ·Ð ºê·çÅ·½º¿¬±¸¼Ò ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°ÀÌ¹Ì °·ÂÇÑ ±º»ç·ÂÀ» °è¼ÓÇؼ °³¼±ÇÏ·Á´Â Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¾î¶² ³ë·Â¿¡µµ Âù»ç¸¦ º¸³½´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°ÇÏÁö¸¸ ÁöÈÖü°è, ±×¸®°í ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÇÙ ¾ïÁö·Â°úÀÇ ¿¬°è¸¦ È¥¶õ½º·´°í º¹ÀâÇÏ°Ô ¸¸µé Àü½ÃÀÛÀü±Ç Àüȯ¿¡ °·ÂÈ÷ ¹Ý´ëÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
[¸¶ÀÌŬ ¿ÀÇÚ·Ð ºê·çÅ·½º¿¬±¸¼Ò ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°I applaud any ROK effort to continue to improve its already-strong military. However, I strongly oppose OPCON transfer. To me, it confuses and complicates the chain of command, and the link among other things to the American nuclear deterrent.¡±
Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¼Û ´ëÇ¥ÀÇ ÀüÀÛ±Ç °ü·Ã ¹ß¾ð¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¡°¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹Àº ½ÃÇÑÀ» ±âÁØÀ¸·Î ÇÑ ÀýÂ÷¸¦ ¹ö¸®°í Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀ» äÅÃÇÑ ¸¸Å, ÀüÀÛ±Ç È¸¼ö¿¡ ¼Óµµ¸¦ ³»°Ú´Ù´Â °ÍÀº À߸øµÈ Ç¥ÇöÀÌ¸ç ¾ç±¹ÀÌ ÇÕÀÇÇÑ ¿ä°Ç¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌÇØ ºÎÁ·À» ¹Ý¿µÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°Speeding up OPCON is a misnomer and reflects a lack of understanding upon the bilateral agreed upon requirements. Several years ago, the US and South Korea abandoned a timeline-based process and adopted a conditions-based transition.¡±
ƯÈ÷ ¡°ÃÖ±Ù ¸î ³â µ¿¾È ÀÌ·ïÁø °ý¸ñÇÒ ¸¸ÇÑ ÁøÀü¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í, Çѱ¹Àº ¾ÆÁ÷ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ Á¶°ÇÀ» ÃæÁ·ÇÏÁö ¸øÇß´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°Çѱ¹ÀÌ °ø¼ö ´É·Â Çâ»ó ¿ä°ÇÀ» ³Ñ¾î ¿¬ÇÕÀÛÀü ÁÖµµ ´É·ÂÀ» °³¼±ÇØ¾ß ÇÏ°í, ºÏÇÑ ÇÙ¹«±â °¨¼Ò³ª Æ÷±â¸¦ ÀǹÌÇÏ´Â Çѹݵµ ¾Èº¸ »óȲÀÇ °³¼± ¶ÇÇÑ ÀÌ·ïÁ®¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°Despite admirable progress in recent years in improving its military capabilities, South Korea has not yet achieved the necessary conditions. Beyond the requirements for Seoul to improve its offensive and defensive capabilities, it must also improve its ability to lead combined operations. Another condition was that the peninsular security situation [improve], which meant the decrease or abandonment of North Korea¡¯s nuclear weapons, which also has not been achieved.¡±
Ŭ¸µ³Ê ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°¼Û ÀÇ¿øÀÇ ÀüÀÛ±Ç Á¶±â À̾ç ÃßÁøÀº ±º»çÀû ¿äÀÎÀ̳ª ÇÑ¹Ì ¾ç±¹ÀÇ ÀÌÀü ÇÕÀÇ¿Í ÀÏÄ¡Çϱ⺸´Ù´Â Á¤Ä¡Àû, À̳äÀû ¿äÀο¡ À̲ø¸° °Í¡±À̶ó°í ºñÆÇÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[ºê·ç½º Ŭ¸µ³Ê Ç츮ƼÁöÀç´Ü ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°Rep. Song¡¯s push for premature OPCON transition is driven by political and ideological factors rather than military ones or what is consistent with what Seoul and Washington previously agreed to.¡±
¾Õ¼ Á¸ Ä¿ºñ ¹Ì ±¹¹æºÎ ´ëº¯ÀÎÀº Áö³ 9ÀÏ ÀüÀÛ±Ç Àüȯ°ú °ü·ÃÇØ ¡°Æ¯Á¤ÇÑ ½Ã°£Ç¥¸¦ °ø¾àÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ¿ì¸® ±º°ú ±¹¹ÎµéÀ» À§Çè¿¡ ºü¶ß¸± ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù"°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¹Ì±¹ ±¹¹æºÎ´Â ¹ÙÀ̵ç ÇàÁ¤ºÎ Ãâ¹ü ÀÌÈÄ¿¡µµ ¡°Á¶°Ç¿¡ ±âÃÊÇÑ ÀüÀÛ±Ç ÀüȯÀº ¹Ì±¹°ú Çѱ¹ÀÌ »óÈ£ µ¿ÀÇÇÑ °ÍÀÏ »Ó ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ¿ì¸®ÀÇ º´·Â°ú ÀηÂ, ±×¸®°í ±× Áö¿ªÀÇ ¾Èº¸¸¦ º¸ÀåÇÏ´Â µ¥µµ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù¡±´Â ÀÔÀåÀ» À¯ÁöÇØ¿Ô½À´Ï´Ù.
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