Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ ³²ºÏ Åë½Å¼± º¹¿øÀ» °è±â·Î ÆòÈ ÇÁ·Î¼¼½º¸¦ Àç°¡µ¿ÇÏ·Á´Â ÀÇÁö¸¦ º¸ÀÌÁö¸¸, ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀº Àӱ⠸» ¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ³²ºÏ°ü°è °³¼± ½Ãµµ¿¡ Å« Àǹ̸¦ µÎÁö ¾Ê´Â ºÐÀ§±âÀÔ´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹ÀÌ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀ» ÃßÁøÇÑ´Ù¸é ºÏÇÑ¿¡ À̿븸 ´çÇÒ °ø»êÀÌ Å©°í ¹Ì-ºÏ ´ëÈÀÇ ¹°²¿¸¦ Æ®±â¿¡µµ ¿ªºÎÁ·À̶ó´Â ÁöÀûÀÌ ³ª¿É´Ï´Ù. ¹é¼º¿ø ±âÀÚ°¡ º¸µµÇÕ´Ï´Ù.
¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎ¿¡¼ ´ëºÏ Àü·« ¼ö¸³¿¡ °ü¿©ÇØ ¿Â ÀüÁ÷ °ü¸®µéÀº ¹Ì-ºÏ ´ëȸ¦ ÃËÁøÇϱâ À§ÇÑ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¿ªÇÒÀº ÀÌ¹Ì ÇÑ°è¿¡ ºÎµúÇû°í, ³²ºÏ Á¤»óÀÌ ¶Ç ÇÑ ¹ø ¸¶ÁÖ ¾É´Â´Ù°í Çصµ Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¾òÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ½ÇÀÍÀº ¾ø´Ù°í Áø´ÜÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
´ÜÀýµÆ´ø ³²ºÏ Åë½Å¼±ÀÌ 413ÀÏ ¸¸¿¡ º¹±¸µÇ°í Áö³ 4¿ùºÎÅÍ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óÀÌ ¿©·Á Â÷·Ê Ä£¼¸¦ ±³È¯ÇÑ »ç½ÇÀÌ ¾Ë·ÁÁö¸é¼ Çѱ¹¿¡¼´Â Á¤»óȸ´ã °³ÃÖ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±â´ë°¨±îÁö ³ª¿ÔÁö¸¸, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÀÌ·± ¿òÁ÷ÀÓÀº ¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎ¸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇØ ¾çº¸¸¦ ¾ò¾î³»°í ¹Ì-ÇÑ µ¿¸ÍÀÇ Æ´À» ¹ú¸®·Á´Â ÀüÇüÀûÀÎ ¼ö¹ýÀÏ »ÓÀ̶ó´Â ÁöÀûÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
ÀüÁ÷ °ü¸®µéÀº ƯÈ÷ Çѱ¹ Á¤Ä¡±Ç¿¡¼ Á¶½É½º·´°Ô ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ã °¡´É¼ºÀÌ Èê·¯³ª¿À´Âµ¥ ´ëÇØ, Ãß°¡ ȸ´ãÀÌ ¿·Áµµ ¹®ÀçÀÎ ´ëÅë·ÉÀ» ¾Õ¼¼¿ö ¹Ì±¹À» »ó´ëÇÏ·Á´Â ±èÁ¤Àº ºÏÇÑ ±¹¹«À§¿øÀåÀÇ Àü·«¿¡´Â º¯ÇÔÀÌ ¾ø°í, ´ëºÏ Á¤Ã¥¿¡ ÀÖ¾î ¹ÙÀ̵ç ÇàÁ¤ºÎ¿Í °áÀÌ ´Ù¸¥ Àӱ⠸» ¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎ ¿ª½Ã Á¦°øÇÒ ´ç±ÙÀÌ ¾ø´Ù°í Áø´ÜÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
±¹¹«ºÎ ºñÈ®»ê¡¤±ºÃà´ã´ç Ưº°º¸Á°üÀ» Áö³½ ·Î¹öÆ® ¾ÆÀÎÈ¥ ºê·çÅ·½º¿¬±¸¼Ò ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº VOA¿¡ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀÇ È¿¿ë¼ºÀº ¡°ºÏÇÑÀÌ Çѱ¹°úÀÇ Åë½Å¼±À» º¹¿øÇÏ°í ±è¿©Á¤À» ÅëÇØ ¹Ì-ÇÑ ¿¬ÇÕ±º»çÈÆ·ÃÀÌ ³²ºÏ°ü°è °³¼±À» °¡·Î¸·À» °ÍÀ̶ó°í °æ°íÇÑ µ¿±â°¡ ¹«¾ùÀÎÁö¿¡ ´Þ·ÁÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[·Î¹öÆ® ¾ÆÀÎÈ¥ ºê·çÅ·½º¿¬±¸¼Ò ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°The answers¡¦depend on North Korea¡¯s motivation for two recent actions: the restoration of key communications links with the South and Kim Yo-jong¡¯s warning that upcoming US-ROK joint military exercises could block improvement of inter-Korean relations. Do these actions mean that Pyongyang¡¯s desperate economic situation compels the North to seek assistance from Seoul and perhaps also engagement with the United States? Or are they part of a strategy designed to exploit Moon Jae-in¡¯s eagerness to improve North-South relations in order to get him to show greater independence from the United States, including by urging Washington not to conduct the military exercises or engage in other activities the North would consider threatening?¡±
¡°Àý¹ÚÇÑ °æÁ¦ »çÁ¤ ¶§¹®¿¡ Çѱ¹¿¡ µµ¿òÀ» ûÇÏ°í ¹Ì±¹°úÀÇ °ü¿©¸¦ ¸ð»öÇÒ ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø°Ô µÈ °ÍÀÎÁö, ¾Æ´Ï¸é ¿¬ÇÕÈÆ·Ã µî ºÏÇÑ¿¡ À§ÇùÀÌ µÉ ¸¸ÇÑ È°µ¿À» ÁßÁö½ÃÅ°±â À§ÇØ ³²ºÏ°ü°è °³¼±¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹®ÀçÀÎ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ °£ÀýÇÔÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ·Á´Â °ÍÀÎÁö µûÁ®ºÁ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù. ¾ÆÀÎÈ¥ ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°¸¸¾à ÈÄÀÚ¶ó¸é, ±èÁ¤ÀºÀº Ãß°¡ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀ» ¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀ» µ¶·ÁÇØ ¹Ì-ÇÑ °øÁ¶ÀÇ Æ´À» ¹ú¸®°í, ÇÙ ¹®Á¦¿¡ ÁøÀüÀÌ ¾ø´Âµ¥µµ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ÀÌ·Î¿î ³²ºÏ ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¸¦ µ¶ÀÚÀûÀ¸·Î ÃßÁøÇÏ°Ô ¸¸µå´Â ¼ö´ÜÀ¸·Î º¸´Â °Í¡±À̶ó°í Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[·Î¹öÆ® ¾ÆÀÎÈ¥ ºê·çÅ·½º¿¬±¸¼Ò ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°If the second explanation is correct, then Kim Jong Un may see another summit with President Moon as a way of encouraging him to distance the ROK from its US ally and to independently pursue inter-Korean projects advantageous to the North even in the absence of progress on the nuclear issue. If that is the case, and Kim Jong Un remains resistant to engagement with the US, President Moon¡¯s ability to bring the North to the negotiating table with the United States will be very limited.¡±
±×·¯¸é¼ ¡°±×·± »óȲÀ̶ó¸é ±èÁ¤ÀºÀº ¹Ì±¹°úÀÇ °ü¿©¸¦ °è¼Ó °ÅºÎÇÒ °ÍÀÌ°í, ºÏÇÑÀ» ¹Ì±¹°úÀÇ Çù»ó Å×À̺í·Î À¯µµÇÏ·Á´Â ¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ¿ª·® ¶ÇÇÑ »ó´çÈ÷ Á¦ÇÑµÉ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ³»´ÙºÃ½À´Ï´Ù.
¾Õ¼ ±è¿©Á¤ ºÏÇÑ ³ëµ¿´ç ºÎºÎÀåÀº Áö³ 1ÀÏ ³²ºÏ°ü°è Á¤»óȸ¦ ½ÃµµÇÏ´Â Çѱ¹ Ãø¿¡ ¡®¹ÌÇÑ¿¬ÇÕÈÆ·Ã Áß´Ü¡¯À» ¿ä±¸Çß½À´Ï´Ù. Çѱ¹¿¡¼ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀÌ ¿©·ÐÈÇÏ´Â µ¥ ´ëÇؼ± ¡°¼²ºÎ¸¥ ¾ïÃø°ú ±Ù°Å ¾ø´Â Çؼ®Àº µµ¸®¾î ½Ç¸Á¸¸À» °¡Á®¿Ã ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù¡±°í ¼±À» ±×¾ú½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯ÀÚ Çѱ¹ ¿©´çÀÎ ´õºÒ¾î¹ÎÁÖ´ç ³»ºÎ¿¡¼± 60¿© ¸íÀÇ ÀÇ¿øÀÌ ¿¬ÆÇÀåÀ» µ¹¸®¸ç ¿¬ÇÕÈÆ·Ã ¿¬±â¸¦ ¿ä±¸Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
Àü¹®°¡µéÀº Àӱ⠸» ³²ºÏ °ü°è °³¼±¿¡ ÁÖ·ÂÇÏ·Á´Â ¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎÀÇ Á¤Ã¥ ±âÁ¶¸¦ ¾àÇÑ °í¸®·Î º¸´Â ±èÁ¤Àº Á¤±ÇÀÌ ¾ÕÀ¸·Îµµ °è¼Ó ÀÌ ºÎºÐÀ» ÁýÁßÀûÀ¸·Î °ø·«ÇÒ °ÍÀ¸·Î Àü¸ÁÇß½À´Ï´Ù. Çö½ÃÁ¡¿¡¼ Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¡®ÁßÀçÀÚ¡¯ ¿ªÇÒ¿¡ °è¼Ó ¹Ì·ÃÀ» °®°í ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¿ä±¸¸¦ ¼ö¿ëÇÒ¼ö·Ï Çѱ¹ÀÇ ÀÔÁö¿Í Çù»ó·ÂÀº ¹°·Ð ³²ºÏ´ëÈÀÇ °¡Ä¡µµ ¶³¾îÁú ¼ö¹Û¿¡ ¾ø´Ù´Â ȸÀÇÀû ½Ã°¢ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
¿¡¹Ý½º ¸®ºñ¾î Àü ±¹¹«ºÎ ¼ö¼®ºÎÂ÷°üº¸´Â ¡°¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ÀӱⰡ ³¡³ª°¡¸é¼, ºÏÇÑÀº Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¾î¶² ´ë°¡¸¦ Ä¡¸£´õ¶óµµ ºÏÇÑ°úÀÇ °ü°è °³¼±À» °¥¸ÁÇÑ´Ù°í ¿©±â¸ç À̸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ·Á ÇÒ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ºÐ¼®Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[¿¡¹Ý½º ¸®ºñ¾î Àü ±¹¹«ºÎ µ¿¾ÆÅ ¼ö¼®ºÎÂ÷°üº¸]¡°Meanwhile, the term of the Moon administration is drawing to a close. This may convince Pyongyang that South Korea is not only eager, but desperate, to improve relations with the North at almost any price. Pyongyang will try to exploit this.¡±
ÀÌ¾î ¡°Ãß°¡ Á¤»óȸ´ã¿¡ ´ëÇÑ °ü½É°ú ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ ³²ºÏ°ü°è¿Í ÇÙ ¹®Á¦ ÁøÀüÀ¸·Î À̾îÁú °ÍÀ̶ó´Â ±â´ë¸¦ ÀÌÇØÇÑ´Ù¡±¸é¼µµ ¡°ºÏÇÑ Á¤±ÇÀÌ ³²ºÏ°ü°è °³¼±¿¡ °ü½ÉÀ» µÎ°Å³ª ±×·± ³ë·ÂÀ» ±â¿ïÀÏ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¹ÏÀ» ¸¸ÇÑ ÀÌÀ¯°¡ ¾ø´Ù¡±°í Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¡°¿ÀÈ÷·Á ºÏÇÑÀº »ç½Ç»óÀÇ ÇÙº¸À¯±¹À¸·Î ³²´Â µ¥ ÁÖ·ÂÇÏ°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ÀÌ·± »óȲÀº ÇÙ ¹®Á¦ ÁøÀü °¡´É¼ºÀ» °ÅÀÇ ºÒ°¡´ÉÇÏ°Ô ¸¸µé°í ÀÖ´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
[¿¡¹Ý½º ¸®ºñ¾î Àü ±¹¹«ºÎ µ¿¾ÆÅ ¼ö¼®ºÎÂ÷°üº¸]¡°I understand the interest in another summit and the possibility that it could lead to progress in South-North relations and the nuclear issue. However, there is nothing in North Korea's position that gives us reason to believe that Pyongyang has any interest in or commitment to improved progress in South-North ties. On the contrary, Pyongyang is clearly committed to remaining a de facto nuclear weapons state, which makes the prospect for progress on the nuclear issue almost impossible.¡±
¶ÇÇÑ ºñÇÙÈ Çù»ó ¹æÇâ°ú Á¦Àç ¼öÀ§ µî ¹ÙÀ̵ç ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ´ëºÏ Á¤Ã¥¿¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ³¢Ä¡±â ¾î·Á¿î ¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ÇÑ°èµµ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀÇ È¿¿ë¼ºÀ» ¶³¾î¶ß¸°´Ù´Â ÁöÀûÀÌ ³ª¿É´Ï´Ù.
¹é¾Ç°ü ±¹°¡¾Èº¸È¸ÀÇ ¾Æ½Ã¾Æ ¼±ÀÓº¸Á°üÀ» Áö³½ ¸¶ÀÌŬ ±×¸° Àü·«±¹Á¦¹®Á¦¿¬±¸¼Ò(CSIS) ¼±ÀӺμÒÀåÀº ¡°¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ¡®È»ó Á¤»óȸ´ã¡¯ ÃßÁøÀº ´õ ¸¹Àº Áö¿øÀ» ¾òÀ¸·Á´Â ºÏÇÑ Á¤±ÇÀÇ Àü¼úÀû º¯È¸¦ º¸¿©ÁÖÁö¸¸, Àü·«ÀûÀÌÁö´Â ¾Ê´Ù¡±°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[¸¶ÀÌŬ ±×¸° CSIS ¼±ÀӺμÒÀå]¡°I think President Moon¡¯s ¡°virtual summit¡± reflects a tactical shift by Pyongyang to acquire more aid, but I don¡¯t think it is strategic.¡±
±×¸° ¼±ÀӺμÒÀåÀº ¡°¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎ´Â ¹ÙÀ̵ç ÇàÁ¤ºÎ¿¡ ¼º ±è ±¹¹«ºÎ ´ëºÏƯº°´ëÇ¥ ÀÓ¸íÀ» ¼³µæÇßÁö¸¸, ºÏÇÑ°úÀÇ ´ëÈ¿¡ ½Ãµ¿À» °É±â À§ÇØ ¿¬ÇÕ±º»çÈÆ·ÃÀ» Áß´ÜÇϰųª ´ëºÏ Áö¿øÀ» Á¦°øÇÏ´Â °Í°ú °°Àº Áß´ëÇÑ Å¸ÇùÀ» Çϵµ·Ï ¹Ì±¹À» ¼³µæÇÏ´Â µ¥´Â ´õ Å« ¾î·Á¿òÀ» °ÞÀ» °Í¡±À̶ó°í ³»´ÙºÃ½À´Ï´Ù.
[¸¶ÀÌŬ ±×¸° CSIS ¼±ÀӺμÒÀå]¡°The Moon government convinced the Biden administration to appoint Sung Kim as our envoy, but I think Seoul will have a harder time convincing Washington to make major compromises (like ending military exercises or providing aid) to jumpstart talks.¡±
½ÇÁ¦·Î ¹Ì±¹ ±¹¹«ºÎ´Â ´ÜÈ£ÇÑ ´ëºÏÁ¦Àç ÀÌÇà ¿øÄ¢À» °í¼öÇÏ°í ÀÖ°í, ±¹¹æºÎ Á¸ Ä¿ºñ ´ëº¯Àεµ ¡°Çѱ¹À¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ÈÆ·Ã Áß´Ü ¿äûÀ» ¹ÞÀº ¹Ù ¾ø´Ù¡¯°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
¸®ºñ¾î Àü ¼ö¼®ºÎÂ÷°üº¸´Â ¡°¹Ì±¹Àº ºñÇÙÈ ÀÇÁö°¡ ¾ø´Â ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ¾çº¸¸¦ Á¦°øÇÒ »ý°¢ÀÌ ¾ø°í, ºÏÇѵµ Çѱ¹¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¾Èº¸ °ø¾àÀ» Æ÷±âÇÒ ¸® ¾ø´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ °ü½É»ç¿¡ È£ÀÀÇÒ ¸® ¾ø´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°ÀÌ·± ±³Âø »óÅ°¡ Á¶¸¸°£ ÇØ¼ÒµÉ °ÍÀ̶ó°í ¹ÏÀ» ÀÌÀ¯°¡ ¾ø´Ù¡±°í ¼³¸íÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é¼ ¡°ºÏÇÑ Á¤±Çµµ ÀÌ·± »ç½ÇÀ» Àß ¾Ë°í ÀÖ°í, ÀÌ·± »óȲÀ» ¹Ù²Ù±â À§ÇØ ¹®ÀçÀÎ ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÀÏÀº °ÅÀÇ ¾ø´Ù¡±°í ¸»Çß½À´Ï´Ù.
[¿¡¹Ý½º ¸®ºñ¾î Àü ±¹¹«ºÎ µ¿¾ÆÅ ¼ö¼®ºÎÂ÷°üº¸]¡°The U.S.-North Korea relationship is on a unique trajectory that is tangentially related to the North-South relationship. Washington has no interest in providing concessions in light of North Korea's lack of interest in denuclearization. At the same time, Pyongyang has no desire to accommodate Washington's concerns, since the United States will not abandon its commitment to South Korea. As a result, there is an impasse in U.S.-DPRK relations. There is little reason to believe that this impasse will be resolved soon. Pyongyang fully understands that. There is little that President Moon can do to change this dynamic.¡±
¹Ì ±¹¹«ºÎ¿Í ±¹°¡Á¤º¸±¹Àå½Ç ¼±ÀÓÀÚ¹®°üÀ» Áö³½ ·Î¹öÆ® ¸Å´× ¾ÖƲ·£Æ½Ä«¿î½½ ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿øÀº Àӱ⠸»±îÁö Çѹݵµ ÆòÈ ÇÁ·Î¼¼½º ÁøÀüÀ» À§ÇÑ ³²ºÏ ´ëÈ Çʿ伺À» °Á¶ÇÏ´Â ¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀ» ³¡¾øÀÌ ¹Ýº¹µÇ´Â Çö½Ç¿¡ °¤Èù ±×¸®½º ½ÅÈ ¼Ó Àι°¿¡ ºñÀ¯Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¹®ÀçÀÎ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ã ÃßÁøÀº ¡°½ÅµéÀ» ±â¸¸ÇÑ ÁË·Î ¹Ýº¹Çؼ ±¼·¯ ³»¸®´Â ¹ÙÀ§¸¦ ²÷ÀÓ¾øÀÌ »ê²À´ë±â·Î ¹Ð¾î ¿Ã·Á¾ß¸¸ ÇÏ´Â ¡®½ÃÁöÇÁ½º ½ÅÈ¡¯¸¦ ¿¬»óÄÉ ÇÑ´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
[·Î¹öÆ® ¸Å´× ¾ÖƲ·£Æ½Ä«¿î½½ ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø] ¡°It reminds me of the Myth of Sisyphus, the Greek myth of a man who defied the Gods, and was condemned for eternity to push a large rock up a hill, only to have it fall to the bottom each time he reaches the top.¡±
¸Å´× ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°±èÁ¤Àº°úÀÇ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀ» ¹®ÀçÀÎ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº ¼¼ ¹ø, Æ®·³ÇÁ ´ëÅë·ÉÀº µÎ ¹øÀ̳ª Çß´Ù¸é, Á¤»óȸ´ãÀº ºñ¿ëÀ» °ÅÀÇ µéÀÌÁö ¾Ê°í ¹«¾ùÀ» ¾ò¾î³¾ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö º¸·Á´Â ±èÁ¤ÀºÀÇ °ÔÀÓ¿¡ ºÒ°úÇÏ´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ ¸í¹éÇØÁ³¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù¡±°í ºñÆÇÇß½À´Ï´Ù. ±×·¯¸é¼ ¡°¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ Àӱ⠸¶Áö¸· ÇØ¿¡ ¶Ç ÇÑ ¹øÀÇ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀ» ÅëÇØ ³²ºÏ °£ ¾î·Á¿òÀ» º¯È½Ãų °ÍÀ̶ó´Â Áõ°Å°¡ ¾È º¸Àδ١±°í ÁöÀûÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[·Î¹öÆ® ¸Å´× ¾ÖƲ·£Æ½Ä«¿î½½ ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°After three Moon-Kim Summits and two Trump-Kim summits, it should be obvious that for Kim, it is mostly a game to see what he can get at little cost. I see no evidence that another Summit in his last year in office would substantially change the North-South predicament. If Kim moves in that direction, he might be setting the stage for a renewed cycle of diplomacy with Moon¡¯s successor.¡±
¶ÇÇÑ ¡°¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ Ã³À½ºÎÅÍ ³²ºÏ ÈÇØ¿Í Çù·ÂÀ» ´ëÅë·ÉÁ÷ÀÇ Á߽ɿ¡ µÐ °øÀº ÀÎÁ¤ÇÒ ¸¸ÇÏ°í Ãʱ⿡´Â Àü·Ê ¾ø´Â ÇÕÀÇ¿Í °æÁ¦ Çù·ÂÀ» ²ø¾î³»´Â ¼º°øÀ» °Åµ×Áö¸¸, Æ®·³ÇÁ ´ëÅë·É°ú ±èÁ¤ÀºÀÇ ÇϳëÀÌ Á¤»óȸ´ã ÀÌÈÄ¿¡´Â ÀÌ ¸ðµç °ÍµéÀÌ ÈåÆ®·¯Á³´Ù¡±°í Æò°¡Çß½À´Ï´Ù. ¡°Áö³ 18°³¿ù µ¿¾È ¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀº ÈÇØ¿Í °æÁ¦ Çù·ÂÀ» ÁõÁøÇϱâ À§ÇØ Á¦¾ÈµÈ ´Ù¾çÇÑ ´Ü°è¸¦ ÃßÁøÇßÁö¸¸, ±èÁ¤ÀºÀº ¹® ´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ¸éÀü¿¡¼ ¹®À» ¼¼°Ô ´Ý¾Æ¹ö·È´Ù¡±´Â ¼³¸íÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
[·Î¹öÆ® ¸Å´× ¾ÖƲ·£Æ½Ä«¿î½½ ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°To his credit, President Moon from the beginning made North-South reconciliation and cooperation a central theme of his Presidency. He achieved initial success, with a host of agreements and economic cooperation that was unprecedented, only to see it unravel after the failed Trump-Kim Summit in Hanoi. For the past 18 months, President Moon has put forward a rich stream of proposed steps for enhancing reconciliation and economic cooperation, only to have the door slammed in his face by Kim Jong Un.¡±
¸Å´× ¿¬±¸¿øÀº ¡°¼ÖÁ÷È÷, Áö³ 70³â µ¿¾È ´©ÀûµÈ ¹Ì-ºÏ °£ ±íÀº ºÒ½ÅÀ» ±Øº¹ÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ¾î¶² ÁöµµÀÚ¿¡°Ôµµ ¾î·Á¿î ÀÏ¡±À̶ó¸ç ¡°ÀÌ´Â ¿ÀÁ÷ ´Ü°èº°¡¤»ç¾Èº°·Î °¡´ÉÇÑ ÀÏÀÌÁö¸¸ ÇöÀç·Î¼´Â ±×·± °úÁ¤¿¡ Âø¼öÇÒ Á¤Ä¡Àû ÀÇÁö°¡ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ¾ø´Ù¡±°í Áø´ÜÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[·Î¹öÆ® ¸Å´× ¾ÖƲ·£Æ½Ä«¿î½½ ¼±ÀÓ¿¬±¸¿ø]¡°Frankly, I think overcoming the deep distrust between the US and North Korea, accumulated over 70 years, is something that it is difficult to see any leader accomplish. It can only occur step-by-step, issue-by-issue, but at the moment the political will in Pyongyang to embark on such a course is lacking.¡±
ÇÑÆí, ±¹¹«ºÎ ´ëº¯ÀÎ½Ç °ü°èÀÚ´Â Ãß°¡ ³²ºÏ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀ» ÁöÁöÇÏ´À³Ä´Â Áú¹®¿¡ ¡°¿ì¸®´Â ÇѹݵµÀÇ ¿ÏÀüÇÑ ºñÇÙÈ ¸ñÇ¥¸¦ À§ÇØ ºÏÇÑ°úÀÇ ¿Ü±³¿¡ °ü¿©ÇÒ Áغñ°¡ µÅ ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ºÐ¸íÈ÷ ÇØ¿Ô´Ù¡±¸ç ¡°ÀüÁ¦ Á¶°Ç ¾øÀÌ ¾ðÁ¦ ¾îµð¼µç ¸¸³ªÀÚ´Â ¿ì¸®ÀÇ Á¦¾ÈÀº ¿©ÀüÈ÷ À¯È¿Çϸç, ºÏÇÑÀÌ °á±¹ ¿ì¸®ÀÇ Á¦¾È¿¡ ¹ÝÀÀÀ» º¸À̱⠹ٶõ´Ù¡±°í ´äÇß½À´Ï´Ù.
[±¹¹«ºÎ °ü°èÀÚ]¡°We¡¯ve made clear, we remain prepared to engage in diplomacy with DPRK toward our objective of the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Our offer remains to meet anywhere, anytime without preconditions. Ultimately, we hope DPRK will respond positively to our outreach. In the meantime, in the absence of any type of engagements, United Nations sanctions on the DPRK remain in place and we will continue to enforce them along with the international community.¡±
ÀÌ °ü°èÀÚ´Â ¡°(ºÏÇÑ°úÀÇ) ¾î¶² Á¾·ùÀÇ °ü¿©µµ ¾ø´Â µ¿¾È À¯¿£ ´ëºÏÁ¦Àç´Â °è¼Ó À¯ÁöµÉ °ÍÀÌ°í ¿ì¸®´Â ±¹Á¦»çȸ¿Í ÇÔ²² Á¦À縦 °è¼Ó ÀÌÇàÇÒ °Í¡±À̶ó°í ¹àÇû½À´Ï´Ù.
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