소위 6·15 선언은 아래 다섯 가지 약속을 했으나 지켜진 것은 대한민국에는 불리하고 김정일에게는 유리한 것들뿐이다.

통일을 '우리민족끼리 힘을 합쳐서 자주적으로 해결한다'는 대목은 김대중, 노무현 좌파정권下 친북좌익세력에 의해서 선동구호로 채택되었고 집권당의 상당수 의원도 이에 호응하고 있다. '우리민족끼리'라는 거짓구호가 가짜 민족감정을 부추겨 反美-反韓 선동에 이용되고 있다.

소위 비전향장기수 문제는 북한측에 유리한 방향으로 해결되었다. 김대중 당시 대통령이 일본인 납치범 신광수까지 포함시켜 63명을 북송해주었기 때문이다. 국군포로와 납북자는 한 사람도 돌려 받지 않았다.

가장 위험한 조항인 2조의 통일방향 합의는 그 뒤 한국사회를 무장해제시키는 독소조항이 되었다. 김대중씨가 자신의 私的이고 親北的인 연합제안을 갖고 가서 對南적화 방안인 연방제와 짝짓기시키는 바람에 북한정권의 對南공작이 먹혀들 수 있는 환경이 조성되었다. '연합제+연방제'안은 산술적으로 '75%赤化방안'이다. 두 체제, 즉 汚物과 生水를 섞는 식의 통일을 하자는 것이다. 75%의 오물과 25%의 생수가 혼합되면 生水인가, 汚物인가?

이 틈을 타고 친북좌익 단체들은 赤化와 같은 뜻으로 '6·15 선언 실천'을 부르짖고, 연방제 실현을 촉구하고 있다. 과거에는 국가보안법에 의하여 처벌받았을 주장을 親北반역세력들이 공공연히 하고 다녀도 검찰이 손을 놓고 있다.

김정일의 서울 答訪 약속은 지켜지지 않았다. 약속을 어겨도 항의 한 번 한 적이 없는 김대중씨는 또 북한을 방문하겠다고 나섰다가 거절당하였다. 신하가 왕을 알현하러 가는 것도 아니고, 이런 굴욕이 있을 수 없다. 그만이 굴욕을 당하는 것이 아니다. 대한민국을 끌고 들어가서 김정일이 파놓은 함정에 빠뜨리고 민족반역자에게 굴종하도록 유혹한 것이다. 김대중씨로 해서 대한민국은 치욕을 당했다.

6·15 선언은 반역면허증이 되었다. 李明博 대통령은 6·15 선언 활동가를 수석에 내정함으로써 김대중이 발급한 반역면허증을 추인하려 한다.



남북 공동선언문 (全文)


조국의 평화적 통일을 염원하는 온 겨레의 숭고한 뜻에 따라 대한민국 김대중 대통령과 조선민주주의인민공화국 김정일 국방위원장은 2000년 6월 13일부터 6월 15일까지 평양에서 역사적인 상봉을 하였으며 정상회담을 가졌다.

남북 정상들은 분단 역사상 처음으로 열린 이번 상봉과 회담이 서로 이해를 증진시키고 남북관계를 발전시키며 평화통일을 실현하는 데 중대한 의의를 가진다고 평가하고 다음과 같이 선언한다.

1. 남과 북은 나라의 통일문제를 그 주인인 우리 민족끼리 서로 힘을 합쳐 자주적으로 해결해 나가기로 하였다.

2. 남과 북은 나라의 통일을 위한 남측의 연합제안과 북측의 낮은 단계의 연방제안이 서로 공통성이 있다고 인정하고 앞으로 이 방향에서 통일을 지향시켜 나가기로 하였다.

3. 남과 북은 올해 8·15에 즈음하여 흩어진 가족, 친척방문단을 교환하며 비전향장기수 문제를 해결하는 등 인도적 문제를 조속히 풀어 나가기로 하였다.

4. 남과 북은 경제협력을 통하여 민족경제를 균형적으로 발전시키고 사회·문화·체육·보건·환경 등 제반 분야의 협력과 교류를 활성화하여 서로의 신뢰를 다져 나가기로 하였다.

5. 남과 북은 이상과 같은 합의사항을 조속히 실천에 옮기기 위하여 이른 시일 안에 당국 사이의 대화를 개최하기로 하였다.

김대중 대통령은 김정일 국방위원장이 서울을 방문하도록 정중히 초청하였으며 김정일 국방위원장은 앞으로 적절한 시기에 서울을 방문하기로 하였다.

///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////


1
Beliefs About Delusions
Vaughan Bell, Peter Halligan and Hadyn Ellis.
Published in The Psychologist
Vol 16 No 8, pages 418-423.
August 2003
Reference as:
Bell, V., Halligan, P.W. & Ellis, H. (2003) Belief about delusions. The Psychologist, 16 (8), 418-
423.
Early in his third month of office, President Reagan was on his way to address a conference when
John Hinckley fired six gun shots at point blank range, wounding the president and three of his
entourage. In the controversial trial that followed, three defence psychiatrists successfully argued
that Hinckley was not guilty, on the grounds that he was suffering from the delusion that the
assassination would cause Jodie Foster, the actress from Taxi Driver (a film which Hinckley was
obsessed with), to fall in love with him. In the same year the award-winning author Philip K.
Dick, whose books have been turned into major Hollywood films, such as Blade Runner, Total
Recall and Minority Report, published one of his last books. The sprawling and eccentric VALIS
is a novel based on delusions resulting from his own psychotic breakdown, which he drew on for
much of his prolific career (see box 1).
From these and many other examples, it would appear that unusual or unlikely beliefs have
significant consequences and continue to captivate the interest of many of us. But to examine
such claims we need to know what is meant by a delusion. How do delusions differ from other
abnormal beliefs? Does the study of delusions provide a productive way of understanding
beliefs?
Box 1: Philip K. Dick
Many novels and short stories by Philip K. Dick contain elements from the
delusions he suffered regarding identity and the nature of reality. Dick described
many bizarre experiences and came to believe that human development was
controlled by an entity called VALIS (Vast Active Living Intelligence System) and
that his perception of Orange County, California was an illusion disguising the fact
that he was really living in firstcentury Rome.There were multiple reasons for
Dick’s bizarre beliefs, given his share of trauma, phobias and drug abuse, but it is
likely that many of the delusions he wrote about stemmed from psychotic episodes
he experienced as a sufferer and as an observer of others.This alone makes his
work of great psychological interest. However, Dick also seems to have some
knowledge of contemporary psychology himself, incorporating as he did the work
of Penfield,Vygotsky and Luria (among others) into his stories.
2
Defining issues
Delusions are one of the most important constructs used by psychiatrists to diagnose patients who
are considered to have lost touch with reality (Maher, 1988). For Jaspers (1963), one of the
founders of modern psychiatry, delusions constituted the ‘basic characteristic of madness’ despite
being ‘psychologically irreducible’.
More significantly, the detection of delusions has ‘enormous implications for diagnosis and
treatment, as well as complex notions concerning responsibility, prediction of behaviour, etc.’
(David, 1999). Yet, as pointed out by many commentators (see Jones, 1999), the clinical usage of
the term delusion and its distinction from other abnormal beliefs involve a host of semantic and
epistemological difficulties. Predominant amongst these is our belief that delusions are (to a large
extent) self evident that is, that they constitute a type of belief that (almost) everyone else would
recognise as pathological. This, however, is more apparent than real, and is not even reflected in
the many different opinions that surround the definition of the construct (Berrios, 1991 Garety &
Hemsley, 1994 Spitzer, 1990). Indeed, David (1999) has suggested ‘there is no acceptable
(rather than accepted) definition of a delusion’ (p.17).
For most of us, however, these thorny issues of definition can be sidestepped by choosing to
adopt the descriptive and widespread characterisation offered by the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). This
established psychiatric nosology text considers a delusion to be, first and foremost, a form of
belief: a belief whose acceptance and subsequent behaviour can constitute the grounds for
insanity. But no justification is offered and the statement itself amounts to a belief in delusions.
More explicitly, the standard definition characterises delusions as false, based on an incorrect
inference about external reality and different from what almost everyone else believes (APA,
1994). Other features such as degree of conviction and imperviousness to persuasion do not set
delusions apart from other beliefs (Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
Delusions – An abnormal belief by any other name
Despite differences in emphasis, most definitions consider two criteria to be significant when
establishing a delusion: falsifiability and bizarreness. Simply described, ‘bizarre delusions are
generally impossible, whereas non-bizarre delusions are generally improbable’ (Sedler, 1995,
p.256). The DSM-IV distinguishes these as follows: a non-bizarre delusion may involve
situations that in principle could occur in real life but are thought (by the psychiatrist) to be
highly improbable and therefore potentially falsifiable a bizarre or fantastic belief, however, is
considered impossible and therefore assumed to be one not normally held by others in the culture
or society.
The problem with each of these definitions lies not with the differential distinction, but with the
absence of agreed operational definitions as to how these criteria are arrived at clinically. The
DSM definition does not specify how one might set about establishing the falseness or
bizarreness of the belief nor how one could know whether the belief was the product of an
impaired inference, such as occurs in paranoid patients, who show a tendency to jump to
conclusions in situations requiring probabalistic reasoning (Bentall, 1994). Here we turn to some
specific problems.
3
Falsifiability Non-bizarre delusions involve situations and events that could occur in real life,
such as believing that one is being followed, infected, poisoned or deceived by another. Therefore
the ‘falsifiability’ criterion can mean that psychiatrists are often required to make judgements on
claims of marital infidelity, persecution or conspiracy in the workplace (Jones, 1999), where the
available relevant evidence is either limited, cannot be ascertained within the confines of the
consulting room, or lies beyond the forensic capabilities of the clinician. As pointed out by
Young (2000), ‘many of the beliefs considered to be delusions do not meet these criteria (or are
not tested against them) in practice’ (p.47). This can have some curious consequences (see ‘The
Martha Mitchell Effect, box 2).
Accordingly, this falsity criterion has been rightly questioned (Spitzer, 1990). Moreover, it is
unclear what level of evidence would be required to consider a belief ‘incontrovertibly false’ and
whether judgements should be based on the ‘balance of probabilities’ or the more stringent test of
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. ‘Delusional’ beliefs, consequently, may not be false (Heise, 1988) or
even firmly sustained (Myin-Germeys et al., 2001).
Bizarre beliefs The attribution that a delusion is bizarre is typically defined in terms of beliefs
considered not normally held by other members of a person’s culture or society. This, however,
often first involves the psychiatrist’s own evaluation as regards the plausibility of the belief after
which the psychiatrist considers whether it is one typically sustained by the others in the person’s
culture. Although both evaluations may be related, they need not be. If, based on his or her own
beliefs and experience, the psychiatrist considers the belief sufficiently bizarre, then presumably
a diagnosis of delusion can be made independent of ascertaining the actual prevalence of the
belief in the patient’s culture.
The DSM definition, however, clearly assumes that the criterion of abnormality or bizarreness
should be obvious, given that the belief is one not ordinarily accepted by other members of a
Box 2: The Martha Mitchell Effect
Sometimes improbable patient reports are erroneously assumed to be symptoms of
mental illness (Maher, 1988).The ‘Martha Mitchell effect’ referred to the tendency
of mental health practitioners not to believe the experience of the wife of the
American attorney general, whose persistent reports of corruption in the Nixon
White House were initially dismissed as evidence of delusional thinking, until later
proved correct by the Watergate investigation. Such examples demonstrate that
delusional pathology can often lie in the failure or inability to verify whether the
events have actually taken place, no matter how improbable intuitively they might
appear to the busy clinician. Clearly, there are instances ‘where people are pursued
by the Mafia’ or are ‘kept under surveillance by the police’, and where they rightly
suspect ‘that their spouse is unfaithful’ (Sedler, 1995).As Joseph H. Berke (1998)
wrote, even paranoids have enemies! For understandable and obvious reasons,
however, little effort is invested by clinicians into checking the validity of claims of
persecution or harassment, and without such evidence the patient could be labelled
delusional.
4
person’s culture or subculture. This is not necessarily a reliable strategy: many studies of
psychiatrists show poor interrater reliability for ratings of bizarre beliefs (Flaum et al., 1991
Junginger et al., 1992). Moreover, most clinicians are not in a position to know or find out
whether such beliefs comprise those normally accepted, except by direct comparison with those
of his or her own peer group.
One method of comparison is the use of large-scale surveys, but most clinical judgements on the
prevalence of beliefs in society are not typically informed by empirical evidence. In fact, beliefs
in unscientific or parapsychological phenomena are not statistically uncommon (see Della Salla,
1999), and were this criterion alone employed as a sufficient condition, then many of us at times
might be classified as delusional (Moor & Tucker, 1979). Large-scale marketing research polls
carried out in the UK and North America consistently reveal that significant numbers of people
within society hold strong beliefs about the paranormal. For example, a 1998 UK survey found
that 41 per cent of respondents believed in communication with the dead, and 49 per cent
believed in heaven – but only 28 per cent in hell (‘Survey of paranormal beliefs’, 1998).
Such surveys also reveal important cultural differences in held beliefs. In many Western
countries opinion polls confirm that large numbers believe in god(s) and hold other paranormal
beliefs (Taylor, 2003). Consequently, religious beliefs, including praying to a deity, are not
typically considered delusional, while believing and claiming that one is a deity (see ‘The Three
Christs of Ypsilanti’, box 3) or that one’s spouse has been replaced (see ‘Capgras delusion’, box
4) typically are.
The existence of high levels of conviction in what might be considered abnormal, unscientific or
paranormal beliefs raises important questions for mental health workers when justifying the
notion of bizarre beliefs on purely conceptual or statistical grounds. As pointed out by French
(1992), most beliefs are based upon ‘personal experiences perhaps supported by reports of trusted
others, and the general cultural acceptance that such phenomena are indeed genuine’.
Although clinically important, the conceptual basis for the criteria of falsification or impossibility
clearly breaks down under scrutiny. It is also problematic because psychotic symptoms such as
delusions and hallucinations are not inevitably associated with the presence of a psychiatric
disorder (Johns & van Os, 2001). Consequently, patients with DSM-IV-type delusions do not
constitute a homogeneous group.
Box 3: The Three Christs Of Ypsilanti
In 1959 social psychologist Milton Rokeach brought together three schizophrenic
patients in the same psychiatric ward in Ypsilanti, Michigan, all of whom suffered
from the Messiah complex – each believed he was Jesus Christ. Rokeach was
interested in seeing whether these mutually exclusive delusions would interact and
affect the extent of conviction and content of each patient’s delusional beliefs. In his
book Rokeach (1964/1981) records how each patient dealt with this conflict, one by
avoidance, one by relinquishing his delusion and the other by attributing the identity
claims of his compatriots to mental illness.Whilst this study would be considered
ethically dubious today, it was one of the most original forays into the study of
psychopathology where the explicit aim was to inform normal belief processes.
5
More often than not the decision about whether or not a belief is delusional is made on pragmatic
grounds – namely, the evidential consequences of the beliefs including the extent of personal
distress, potential or actual injury or social danger generated by the belief. Sometimes the
decision may be simple – Cotard’s delusion, a person’s belief that they are dead, may be assessed
differently from a delusion of grandeur such as believing that you are dating a famous TV star.
Can delusions tell us about ‘normal’ beliefs?
Notwithstanding difficulties with the standard psychiatric definitions, most people accept that
normal beliefs perform an essential and fundamental process in establishing mental reference
points from which to help explain and interact with the world. It is impossible to understand
racism, prejudice, and political and religious conflict without considering discrepancy in
fundamental belief systems. Fodor (1983) indicated that beliefs comprise a ‘central’ cognitive
process and should be regarded as qualitatively different from the modular processes that have
been well exploited by cognitive neuropsychologists (Coltheart, 1999). The proposition,
however, is not matched by any clear consensus in neuropsychological accounts of what
constitutes the cognitive or neural mechanisms involved, the evolutionary functions, or how such
beliefs can be changed and maintained.
Jones (1999) describes beliefs as mental forms that incorporate the capacity to influence
behaviour and cognition and govern the way people think and what they do. But the debate as to
what defines a belief or belief state rumbles on, and some researchers have instead opted to
examine the ways in which damage or change to known cognitive processes can affect belief
formation, as communicated or acted upon by patients diagnosed as suffering from delusions.
Bryant (1997) observed that over the past 20 years a variety of cognitive models of belief
formation have drawn ‘empirical support from evidence that delusions can be elicited in normal
individuals undergoing anomalous experiences (Zimbardo et al., 1981), the prevalence of
delusions in neuropathological disturbances of sensory experience (Ellis & Young, 1990),
reasoning deficits in deluded patients (Garety et al., 1991) and the tendency for deluded patients
to make external attributions following negative life events (Kaney & Bentall, 1989)’ (p.44).
Recent developments from cognitive neuropsychiatry have shown how detailed investigations of
monodelusional conditions (e.g. Capgras) can help to generate testable theories of delusion, face
Box 4: Capgras Delusion
Following a car crash in September 1995 Alan Davies became convinced that his
wife of 31 years died in the accident and had been replaced by someone with whom
he did not want to share his life. Diagnosed as suffering from Capgras syndrome, Mr
Davies was awarded £130,000 damages after it was claimed that his rare psychiatric
syndrome was caused by the crash that he and his wife, Christine, had survived.
Despite suffering only minor physical injury he came to regard his wife, whom he
now called Christine II, as an imposter and became stressed by any show of affection
(de Bruxelles, 1999).
6
recognition and normal belief formation (Ellis & Lewis, 2001). But this potentially rich vein of
research for cognitive neuropsychiatry (see Coltheart and Davis, 2000 Halligan & David, 2001)
does not necessarily imply that delusions are the primary source of psychopathology in patients
diagnosed as psychotic. Since most patients requiring psychiatric help have fully formed
delusions by the time they are clinically diagnosed, establishing the causal factors responsible for
the delusion is difficult. The neuropsychological or neurophysiological abnormalities observed
could just as easily be interpreted as the product rather than the cause of these mental disorders.
However, if the formation of delusions as abnormal beliefs is the product of selective but as yet
unspecified cognitive disturbance (e.g. in reasoning, thinking, attribution) then studying delusions
may inform our understanding of how this psychopathology impacts on normal belief systems.
Either way, they provide a platform for elucidating the cognitive architecture of belief formation
itself.
Future directions from a useful past
Despite the concept of delusion being common parlance in psychiatry and society, it is only in
the last 20 years that serious attempts have been made to define and understand the construct in
formal cognitive terms (Bentall et al., 2001 Coltheart & Davis, 2000 Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
One area that has been either ignored or relegated to a mysterious box in belief formation
diagrams is the influence of our current ‘web of beliefs’ on the adoption or rejection of new
beliefs. Stone and Young (1997) strongly argued that belief formation may involve weighing up
explanations that are observationally adequate versus those that fit within a person’s current
belief set. However, a plausible process by which beliefs may be integrated into such a belief set,
or by which such a pre-existing set may influence how we generate beliefs about our perceptual
world, has not been widely adopted.
Philosophers and social psychologists have attempted to piece together some of this network –
and with some success. Quine and Ullian (1978) set out some philosophical principles by which a
web of belief should operate. Of particular interest is their principle that beliefs are more easily
shed, adopted or altered when the resulting network disruption is minimal, and that beliefs are
validated by their relationships with existing beliefs. Moreover, they claim that any belief ‘can be
held unrefuted no matter what, by making enough adjustments in other beliefs’ (p.79) – though
sometimes this results in madness. Based on the idea that not all beliefs (or links) are created
equal empirical work has shown that particular beliefs can be differentiated by the amount and
strength of other beliefs, which are relied on for justification (Maio, 2002).
One theoretical framework that we are exploring in Cardiff is that provided by coherence theory
(Thagard, 2000) when considering dynamic models of belief processes in action. Our working
model describes how active beliefs can be evaluated for their acceptability by how well they
cohere into existing belief sets. Beliefs and the constraints between them (for example, believing
that Elvis is alive would constrain you to reject the belief that he is buried at Graceland) can be
given values or weights. These allow an overall measure of coherence to be calculated and also
permit a quantitative measure of disruption when beliefs are added, discarded or revised.
Sensory input may be a constraint in itself with the threshold for believing things obtained from
your own senses (‘I believe it was raining this morning’) considered higher than those taken on
authority alone (‘I believe it was raining during the Battle of Waterloo’). This hierarchy may
partly explain why in some cases delusional beliefs can be adopted over very short periods and
with such conviction, and involve the sufferer dramatically revising other beliefs to cohere with
7
their new-found preoccupation. Unusual experiences, which may accompany brain injury or
mental illness, may also give direct perceptual experience for unlikely or bizarre beliefs that
cause a radical reorganisation of a previously conservative belief network.
However, there must be more to pathological beliefs than simply reacting to unusual experiences,
otherwise our belief systems would be in a constant state of flux. Influences on the ways in which
individuals establish links between beliefs and their subsequent relevance for the individual also
need to be taken into account when trying to explain why delusions are often considered bizarre.
A coherence theory account can address some of these problems by allowing reasoning biases to
be modelled via damage to the constraints between beliefs. Of particular advantage to this
approach is that coherence models can be implemented as artificial neural networks.
This means the model can address predictions from neuropsychiatry. For example, Spitzer (1995)
has argued for the the role of dopamine modulation in perceiving significance. He likens the role
of dopamine to a perceptual ‘signal to noise ratio’ contrast control, where too little modulation
could mean we make no useful distinction between meaningful and nonmeaningful information.
Too much, however, could lead us to see significance and meaning in perceptual information that
we might otherwise ignore, causing, according to Spitzer, a range of unusual and unlikely beliefs.
Given the heterogeneity and complexity of the factors involved, not least of agreeing a common
language to describe and access the construct of abnormal beliefs in question, it would seem
sensible to adopt an eclectic approach to delusions – one that links understanding from
neuroscience, cognitive and social psychology. This would allow ‘abnormal’ and delusional
beliefs to be understood as arising not simply from damaged biological mechanisms or
information processing modules, but from cognitive beings firmly situated within their social
milieu. Such an approach might also better allow us to treat patients with distressing beliefs, as
well as provide a clearer insight into how each of us comes to hold our own beliefs, be they
viewed by others as mundane, profound or peculiar.
8
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