가장 큰 오해: "미국이 分斷에 책임 있다"

한반도 전체의 赤化를 막은 것은 미국과 李承晩이었다. 38선을 긋지 않았다면 소련군은 부산까지 점령했을 것이다.

가장 큰 오해-미국의 分斷 책임론

미국이 38도선을 긋지 않았다면 한반도 전체가 소련군 진주지역이 되어 대한민국은 탄생하지도 못했을 것이다.
조화유(월간조선. 워싱턴)

한국 근/현대사에 대하여 우리나라 사람들이 가지고 있는 큰 오해가 하나 있다. 그것은 “미국 때문에 한반도가 38도선을 경계로 분단되었으며, 이 때문에 한국전쟁의 비극도 발생하였고 아직까지 우리민족이 통일이 되지 못하고 있다. 그러므로 미국은 우리 민족의 불행의 씨앗'이라고 생각하는 것이다. 이것은 정말 오해다. 오해도 이만저만한 오해가 아니다. 만일 이것이 오해라면 진실은 무엇인가?

진실은 이와 정반대다. 만일 미국이 38도선을 그어 소련군의 한반도 전체 점령을 막지 않았더라면 오늘날 한반도에는 대한민국은 없고 조선민주주의인민공화국 밖에 없었을 것이다“이다. 이러한 오해와 진실을 속시원하게 설명해준 어떤 한국 책도, 어떤 한국 교과서도 필자는 아직 보지 못했다. 그러면 진실은 무엇인가?

우선, 1945년 한반도에 38선이 그어지게 된 경위를 당사자들의 증언을 통해 알아보자. 38선이 그어질 당시의 미국 대통령 해리 트루먼이 1955년 출판한 회고록 'Memoirs by Harry S. Truman' (트루먼 회고록)의 444∼5 페이지에 이렇게 적혀있다.

'내가 듣기로는 번즈 국무장관이 현실적으로 가능한 한 멀리 한반도의 북쪽에서 일본군의 항복을 받도록 선을 그라고 국방부 작전국 정책과에 건의한 것으로 알고 있다. 그러나 육군은 한반도로부터의 먼 거리와 병력 부족이라는 극복하기 어려운 장애물에 직면하고 있었다.

따라서 (먼저 한반도에 진입하는 쪽에서 한반도의 일본군 항복을 받아야 하지 않겠느냐고) 소련이 이의를 제기할 경우, 우리가 실제로 병력을 파견하기에는 38도선도 사실은 너무 멀리 잡은 것이었다. 소련이 이의를 제기해서 우리가 실제로 병력을 제때에 보낼 수 있는 거리에다 선을 그어야 했다면, 그 선은 38도선보다도 훨씬 남쪽에 그어졌을 것이다. 북위 38도선을 따라 군부가 선을 그었기 때문에 우리는 조선의 옛 수도 서울에서 일본의 항복을 받을수 있는 기회를 가지게 된 것이다. 물론 (38선을 그을) 당시에는 일본의 항복을 받는 일을 兩國이 분담한다는 편의성 이외의 다른 생각은 없었다.'

트루먼 대통령의 말을 보충 설명하자면 이렇게 된다. 미국은 일본이 항복하자마자 즉시 일본 본토는 물론, 한반도 내의 일본군으로부터도 항복을 받아야 했는데, 미군은 그때 한반도에서 1천km 남쪽 멀리 오키나와에 있었고, 또 미군은 주로 일본 본토에 들어가 일본의 항복을 받아내는 데만 정신을 쏟고 있었기 때문에 한반도에까지 군대를 신속히 보낼 여유가 없었다.

한편 한반도와 국경을 맞대고 있는 소련은 신속히 군대를 진입시킬 수 있었기 때문에 일본에 선전포고를 한 바로 다음날(8월9일)에는 벌써 함경북도로 들어오기 시작했고 8월12일에는 청진, 나진, 웅기, 경흥 등을 점령해버렸다. 이런 속도라면 불과 2, 3주 사이에 소련군은 한반도 전체를 다 점령할 염려가 있었기 때문에, 일본이 항복을 선언한 8월14일(워싱턴 시각) 밤늦게 서둘러 38선을 그어 거기까지만 소련군이 내려오도록 결정하여 소련측에 통고했고, 소련이 이를 받아들였던 것이다.

왜 하필 38선인가에 대해서는 38선을 그은 당사자인 당시 미국 국방부 작전국 정책과 소속 딘 러스크(Dean Rusk) 육군중령 (후에 케네디, 존슨 대통령 밑에서 국무장관 역임)의 말을 들어보자. 1990년에 출판한 그의 회고록 'As I Saw It' (내가 본대로) 124 페이지에 이렇게 적혀있다.

'넓은 지역에 흩어져있는 일본군으로부터 언제 어디서 항복을 받느냐 하는 문제에 대해서 국무부와 국방부는 의견이 달랐다. 국무부는 중국 본토의 가능한 한 북쪽에서 일본군의 항복을 받아 만주의 주요 지점들이 우리 점령지역에 들어가도록 하기를 바랐다. 그러나 육군은 장래를 염려하여 우리 군대가 아주 조금 있거나 거의 없는 지역들은 아예 책임지지 않으려고 했다. 사실은 아시아 대륙에 들어가는 것 자체를 육군은 원하지 않았다. 그러나 우리는 아시아 대륙에 상징적으로 군대를 좀 유지한다는 차원에서 한반도에 발판 같은 걸 하나 마련해 두기로 합의했다.

일본이 항복한 바로 그 날인 (미국 동부시각) 8월14일 늦은 밤 (국방부 작전국 정책과장) 찰스 본스틸 대령과 나는 (국무부, 국방부, 해군이 합동회의를 하고 있던 회의실) 옆방으로 자리를 옮겨 한반도 지도를 자세히 보았다. 급박한 상황에서 우리는 미국이 점령할 지역을 선택해야 하는 막중한 임무를 맡고 있었다....National Geographic 잡지가 만든 지도 한 장을 놓고 우리는 서울 바로 북쪽에서 한 편리한 경계선을 찾았으나 지리적으로 자연적인 선을 찾을 수가 없었다. 그래서 우리는 북위 38도선을 건의하기로 결정했다. 스윙크(국무부, 국방부, 해군 협의회)는 우리 건의를 별다른 이의 없이 받아들였고, 놀랍게도 소련 역시 이의 없이 동의했다. 당시 미/소 양국 군대가 위치한 지점을 고려한다면 소련이 38도선보다 훨씬 더 남쪽의 선을 요구할지도 모른다고 나는 생각했었다.'

러스크의 이 증언을 보면, 일본과의 4년간 전쟁에 지친 미국 군부는 아시아 대륙에 들어가는 것 자체를 싫어했으나 국무부가 우겨서 한반도에 들어가기로 했다는 것을 알수 있다. 그리고 가능한 한 한반도 북쪽에 선을 그어 소련의 한반도 전체 점령을 막으려 했다는 것도 알수 있다. 만일 군부의 고집대로 미군이 한반도 진출을 아예 포기했다면 한반도 분단은 없었겠지만, 지금 우리는 김정일 독재 밑에서 살고 있을 것이다.

그러면 국무부는 왜 미군의 한반도 진주를 원했는가?
이유가 있었다. 1945년 봄에 나치 독일과 파시스트 이탈리아가 연합국(미국. 영국, 소련 등)에 항복한 뒤, 소련은 對獨(대독)전쟁 중 점령한 동부독일을 비롯하여 체코슬로바키아, 폴랜드, 불가리아, 루마니아 등 동 유럽 나라들을 전부 공산주의 국가로 만들어가고 있었다. 이 점을 잘 알고 있었던 미국 국무부는 소련이 일단 점령한 나라는 반드시 赤化시킨다는 확신을 가지고 있었던 것 같다. 그래서 소련군이 한반도 전체를 다 점령하는 것을 막기 위해 미국 육군의 반대에도 불구하고 38선에서 소련군의 남하를 저지시켰던 것이다.

만일 그때 미국이 38선을 긋지 않았다면 소련군이 한반도 전체를 다 점령했을 것이 뻔하고, 그 결과 대한민국은 아예 탄생하지도 못하고, 조선인민공화국만이 만들어져 지금 우리는 김정일 治下에서 살고 있을 것이다. 2차세계대전후 미군이 점령한 서부독일과 일본은 미국식 민주주의와 시장경제 채택하여 오늘날 경제대국들이 되었고 역시 미군이 점령했던 남한은 오늘날 세계 12위의 경제강국이 되지 않았는가!

앞으로 쓰는 초중고 역사 교과서에는 반드시 이 점을 분명하게 알려야 미국에 대한 불필요한 적대감을 없앨수 있을 것이다. ‘월간중앙’ 2007년 7월호는 서울 시내 7개 초등학교 3~6학년 학생 3,660명을 대상으로 실시한 한 개탄스러운 조사 결과를 보도했다. 이 보도에 의하면, 조사 대상 학생의 38%가 6·25는 조선시대 전쟁으로 알고 있다고 한다. 초등학생 상당수는 6.25전쟁을 일본이 한국을 침공한 것으로 알거나 조선시대 임진왜란과 혼동하고 있다는 것이다.

또한 학교에서 6.25전쟁에 관해 배운 적이 없다고 대답한 학생이 33.5%, 학교 선생님으로부터 들어서 6.25전쟁을 처음 알게 되었다는 학생은 15.5%에 불과했다고 하니 우리나라가 근/현대사 교육에 얼마나 소흘한가를 알 수 있다.

워싱턴에서
조 화 유

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建國 과정에 대한 10문10답

대한민국은 李承晩이 좌익 및 미국과 싸워서 세운 나라. 단독정부수립이 없었다면 공산화되었을 것.

소련군은 북한지역을 점령하자마자 38線을 경계로 하여 남한지역과의 교통·통신을 단절하여 南北 주민들 간의 자유로운 통신·통행을 금지했다. 소련군은 이어 金日成을 앞세워 북한지역에서 토지개혁, 산업 국유화, 교육개혁, 주민 사상 개조운동 등을 실시하여 북한 주민의 생활방식을 남한 주민의 생활방식과 완전히 다르게 변질시켰다.

梁東安

[月刊朝鮮 청년강좌 ①] 대한민국 建國 과정에 대한 오해와 이해 - 10問 10答

대한민국 建國 과정에 대한 오해와 이해

1 建準과 人共은 少數左翼분자들의 조직
2 군사분계선에 불과한 38線을 통치분계선으로 만든 소련이 분단의 元兇
3 신탁통치 받아들였으면 全한반도가 공산화됐을 것
4 李承晩은 미국과 싸우면서 대한민국 建國
5 左右合作은 呂運亨·金奎植이 아니라 美軍政의 작품
6 美蘇共委 결렬은 右翼 배제를 주장한 소련 책임
7 金九·金奎植의 南北협상은 성과 全無
8 선거인의 95.5%가 참여한 5·10 총선은 건국 바라는 民意의 表出
9 대한민국 건국 과정에서 親日派 배제 노력
10 북한이 먼저 단독정권 수립

梁東安 한국정신문화연구원 교수

1945년 전남 순천 출생. 서울大 정치학과 졸업. 중앙大 정치외교학 석사. 합동통신 기자. 경향신문 논설위원(비상임). 경기大 조교수 역임. 著書·논문 「대한민국건국사」, 「남로당의 조직과 활동에 대한 연구」, 「칼 마르크스의 諸이론에 대한 분석」 등.

[편집자 注] 月刊朝鮮은 이번 호부터 「月刊朝鮮 청년강좌」를 연재한다. 정치·경제·사회·문화 등 각 분야 권위자들의 글로 꾸며지는 「月刊朝鮮 청년강좌」는 젊은 세대들에게 대한민국의 正體性과 자유민주주의, 시장경제에 대한 올바른 인식을 심어 주는 자리가 될 것이다. 이번 호에는 梁東安 한국정신문화연구원 교수의 「10問10答-대한민국 建國 과정에 대한 오해와 이해」을 싣는다. 이 글은 梁교수의 허락을 받아 「대한민국건국사」(현음사刊, 2001년)에서 발췌한 것이다.

1. 조선건국준비위원회와 인민공화국은 민중의 뜻에 따라 左右의 모든 정치세력이 참여한 민족통일전선이었다?

建準과 人共은 少數左翼분자들의 조직

解放 다음날인 1945년 8월16일에 구성이 발표된 「조선건국준비위원회(建準)」는 당시 서울에서 활동 중이던 少數의 左翼분자들이 만든 조직이다.

日帝의 조선총독부는 일본의 항복이 임박하자 일본의 항복 후 초래될 한반도에서의 혼란상태와, 그로 인한 한반도 거주 일본인들의 피해를 방지하기 위한 대책으로 조선인 정치 지도자에게 治安權(치안권)을 이양할 것을 계획했다. 조선총독부는 呂運亨(여운형)에게 치안권을 이양하기로 했고, 당시 서울에서 활동 중이던 공산주의자들인 정백·이강국·최용달·홍증식 등은 呂運亨과 접촉했다. 그들은 일본인들로부터 呂運亨이 치안권을 인수한 것을 근거로 우리 민족의 독립국가 건국을 준비하는 조선건국준비위원회를 조직하기로 합의했다.

출범 당시의 建準 중앙조직은 左翼세력과 安在鴻(안재홍)이 이끄는 中道派의 일부만이 참여한 左翼과 중도파의 연합체에 불과했다. 그나마도 建準 출범 15일 후인 8월31일의 建準 간부진 개편 후에는 安在鴻이 이끄는 중도파마저 탈퇴, 建準은 左翼진영만의 조직체로 축소됐다.

建準이 출범 6일 만인 8월22일에 발표한 建準 간부 34명의 명단에 右翼진영 인사인 金俊淵(김준연)과 咸尙勳(함상훈)이 포함된 것도 사실이다. 그러나 간부 명단에 두 사람의 이름이 포함된 것은 右翼진영과의 합의는 물론이고 당사자들의 동의도 없이 建準 측에서 일방적으로 도용한 것에 불과하다.

「인민공화국(人共)」은 조선공산당이 꾸미고 연출한 정치적 연극에 불과했다. 人共의 선포는 철저히 조선공산당 지도자인 朴憲永(박헌영)에 의해 계획되고 공산당內朴憲永派에 의해 실천됐다. 朴憲永은 人共의 형식적 母胎(모태)기관으로 建準을 내세우면서도 建準에서 人共 문제를 협의하도록 제안한 바도 없었다. 그는 建準의 위원장이며 人共의 중앙인민위원장으로 내정된 呂運亨과도 사전 협의하지 않은 채 人共 선포를 추진했다. 朴憲永은 人共을 선포하기 이틀 전인 9월4일에야 呂運亨에게 人共 추진을 통고했고, 人共을 선포하는 회의도 밤중에 左翼系 치안단의 본부가 있는 옛 경기女高 강당에서 개최했다.

우선 국내외 각계각층을 대표하는 사람들이라면 국내외 각계각층에서 공식적으로든 非공식적으로든 회의에 파견할 대표를 인선하는 작업이 있었어야 할 것인데, 그런 일이 전혀 없었다. 뿐만 아니라 당시 중국 重慶에 있던 대한민국 임시정부를 대표한 인사나 延安의 독립동맹을 대표한 인사, 미국의 독립운동 세력을 대표하는 인사는 물론이고 국내에 있던 右翼진영 및 중도파를 대표한 인사들이 그 회의에 전혀 참석하지 않았고 초청받은 일도 없다. 그날 밤 회의에 참석한 會衆은 조선공산당의 朴憲永派와 그들 휘하에 있는 京仁지역 노동자들이었다. 이 사실에 비추어 볼 때, 人共이 민중의 뜻에 따라 선포된 기구가 아니라는 것은 말할 나위 없이 분명하다.

일부 연구자들은 9월5일 밤에 발표된 人共의 중앙위원 명단이나 9월17일에 발표된 人共의 부서 책임자(각료에 해당) 명단에 右翼진영 인사들의 이름이 포함된 것을 근거로 人共에 左右를 망라한 모든 정치세력이 참여한 것처럼 주장하고 있다. 人共의 간부 명단에 李承晩·金九를 비롯한 右翼진영 인사들의 이름이 포함된 것은 사실이나, 그것은 당사자들과의 아무런 사전 협의 없이 이뤄진 것이다. 다시 말해 建準과 人共은 민족통일전선기구와는 거리가 먼 左翼 통일전선기구에 불과했다.

2. 미국은 한반도 분단의 元兇?

군사분계선에 불과한 38線을 통치분계선으로 만든 것은 소련

미국이 한반도에서 美軍과 소련군 간의 군사분계선으로 38線을 획정한 것은 이론의 여지없는 사실이다. 그러나 미국이 38線을 획정한 사실이 곧 한반도 분단에 대한 미국의 책임으로 연결되는 것은 결코 아니다.

우선 38線 획정만 하더라도 미국의 일방적 선언에 의해서가 아니라 미국과 소련이 합의해서 이뤄진 것이다. 따라서 만일 38線의 획정이 한반도 분단의 원인이라 하더라도 그것은 미국의 책임이 아니라 美蘇의 공동책임이 되는 것이다.

여러 나라의 例를 볼 때 군사분계선이 곧 국토분단선이 되는 것은 결코 아니다. 군사분계선이 어떤 나라의 국토에서 활동하는 외국 군대들 간의 군사활동 분계선으로만 멈추고 거주민들의 생활이나 정치활동의 분리선으로 변질되지 않을 경우에는 그것이 국토 분단을 초래하지 않는다.

제2차 세계대전 종전 직후 西獨지역의 美·英·佛 군대 간의 군사분계선이나 오스트리아에서 美·蘇·英·佛 군대 간의 군사분계선은 그 지역의 국토 분단을 유발하지 않았다. 1990년대 유엔 평화유지군이 파견된 여러 나라들에서 유엔군으로 참여한 각국 군대 간의 군사분계선도 마찬가지다.

군사분계선이 국토 분단을 초래하는 것은 외국 군대가 군사분계선을 기준으로 자기들의 관할下에 있는 지역과 여타 지역 간의 교통·통신망을 단절시키고 그 지역 주민의 생활방식을 여타 지역 주민의 생활방식과 상이하게 만들 경우에 한정된다. 광복 직후 남한지역을 점령한 미국은 38線을 순수한 군사분계선으로 유지하려 했던 데 반해 북한지역을 점령한 소련은 38線을 통치분계선으로 변질시켰다.

소련군은 북한지역을 점령하자마자 38線을 경계로 하여 남한지역과의 교통·통신을 단절하여 南北 주민들 간의 자유로운 통신·통행을 금지했다. 소련군은 이어 金日成을 앞세워 북한지역에서 토지개혁, 산업 국유화, 교육개혁, 주민 사상 개조운동 등을 실시하여 북한 주민의 생활방식을 남한 주민의 생활방식과 완전히 다르게 변질시켰다.

남한을 점령한 美軍은 美蘇공동위원회를 비롯하여 몇 차례에 걸쳐 38線을 경계로 단절된 南北韓 간의 교통·통신을 회복하고, 南北韓 주민 간의 자유 왕래와 자유로운 상거래 등을 회복할 것을 소련군에게 제의했으나 소련군은 일절 응하지 않았다.

이 사실을 기준으로 할 때, 한반도 분단을 초래한 책임은 38線이란 군사분계선을 제안한 미국에 있는 것이 아니라 군사분계선으로 설정된 38線을 통치분계선으로 변질시킨 소련에 있다는 것이 분명해진다.

1945~1948년 사이 미국의 한반도 정책 및 남한에 대한 정책을 분석해 보면 어느 구석에도 남한을 식민지化·군사기지化하려고 노력한 흔적이 없다. 미국은 처음부터 남한지역의 전략적 가치를 낮게 평가했다. 미국은 남한이 美軍을 주둔시켜야 할 전략적 가치가 없는 지역이며, 극동에서 전쟁이 발생할 경우 남한 주둔 美軍은 군사적 부담이 될 것으로 평가하고 있었다. 미국은 처음엔 소련군이 한반도 全域(전역)을 점령하는 것을 저지하려 했고, 그것이 저지된 다음에는 한반도 전체가 소련의 위성국이 되는 것을 방지하려고만 했다. 미국은 분명하지는 않지만 한반도에 左右연립 통일정부가 수립되고 나면 남한지역에서 조속히 군대를 철수하려는 의도를 가지고 있었다.

미국은 한반도 통일정부 구성이 불가능해지자 더 이상 헛돈을 쓰지 않기 위해 서둘러 남한에 정부를 수립해 놓고 남한 주둔 美軍을 조속히 철수하고자 했다. 이 사실은 1948년 8월 대한민국이 건국된 후 대한민국 정부와 국회가 駐韓美軍의 주둔 지속을 간곡히 요청했음에도 불구하고 미국이 서둘러 美軍을 철수한 사실에서 잘 확인된다.

3. 우리 민족을 위해 信託統治를 받아들여야 했다?

오스트리아에서는 左翼이 對蘇自主노선 견지

미국과 소련이 1945년 12월 모스크바 협정에서 합의한 한반도에 대한 신탁통치 실시를 우리 민족이 수용했어야 한다고 주장하는 사람들은, 우리 민족이 신탁통치를 수용했더라면 南北으로 분단되지 않고 통일된 정부下에서 민주적으로 발전했을 것이라고 주장한다.

이들은 대부분 오스트리아가 제2차 세계대전 終戰後 신탁통치를 받아들여 민족의 분단을 방지하고 민주적 번영을 이룩했다는 점을 지적한다. 이들이 우선 범하고 있는 오류는 한반도와 오스트리아의 상황이 판이했다는 점을 간과했다는 것이다.

첫째, 오스트리아에 대해선 강대국들이 신탁통치를 실시한 바가 없다. 유럽에서 제2차 세계대전이 종료된 1945년 5월 오스트리아를 분할 점령한 美·蘇·英·佛 군대는 오스트리아를 신탁통치하는 협정을 체결한 것이 아니라 점령 통제에 관한 협정을 체결했다. 그에 반해 한반도에선 미국과 소련이 신탁통치를 실시하려 했다.

둘째, 외국 군대가 오스트리아를 점령한 직후부터 오스트리아의 정치세력들은 통일된 임시정부를 구성했으며, 한 번도 4개 외국 군대 점령지역별로 별개의 독립된 정치·행정기관이 구성된 일이 없었다. 그에 반해 한반도에서는 美蘇 양국 군대의 점령 지역 진입과 동시에 南北韓에 별도의 통치기구가 설립되어 각 지역을 상이한 내용으로 통치했다.

셋째, 오스트리아에서는 각국 군대의 분할·점령지역 간에 교통·통신·商거래의 단절이 이뤄지지 않았다. 각국 군대 간에 군사분계선이 존재했지만 그 분계선은 군사 활동에 관한 경계선에 그치고 통치분계선으로 변질되지 않았다. 그에 반해 한반도에서는 소련군이 북한을 점령하자마자 교통·통신을 차단하여 북한지역을 남한으로부터 분리함으로써 美蘇兩國 군대 간의 군사분계선이 통치분계선으로 변질되었다.

넷째, 오스트리아의 左翼세력이 소련에 대해 자주적 자세를 취하고 左右연합에 의한 통일정부 유지에 적극적인 자세를 취했다.

당시 오스트리아에는 右翼진영에 인민당(舊기독교사회당), 左翼진영에 사회당(舊사회민주당)과 공산당이 존재했다.

온건 左翼노선의 사회당은 공산당보다 압도적으로 우월한 黨勢(당세)를 유지하고 있어 左翼진영內의 주도권을 장악하고 있었다. 사회당은 사회주의 노선을 취하면서도 오스트리아가 소련의 위성국이 되는 것은 절대 피하려는 입장이었으며, 오스트리아를 점령한 美·蘇·英·佛 4개 외국 군대에 대응함에 있어 右翼정당인 인민당과 확고한 공동보조를 취했다.

그에 반해 한반도에서는 左翼진영의 주도권을 소련에 맹종하는 극좌노선의 공산당이 장악하고 있었으며, 공산당은 右翼진영과의 협력을 외면하고 소련의 한반도 정책 실천에 협력하려고만 했다.

託治 수용은 全한반도 공산화 의미

어떤 민족에 대해 신탁통치를 실시하는 것이 정당성을 인정받으려면, 그 민족 구성원들이 民度가 낮아 자치 역량을 갖추지 못하거나 독립을 희망하지 않아야 한다.

그러나 한국인은 당장 독립이 되더라도 독립국가를 유지·운영할 수 있는 民度와 자치 역량을 갖추고 있었다. 한국 민족은 일본에 강제 병합되기 전부터 장기간 독립적으로 국가를 유지·운영해 왔고, 일제의 식민지 통치를 받던 기간 중에도 독립운동을 지속적으로 전개해 왔다.

1945~1948년 당시 한국인의 民度와 自治역량은 그 시기에 신탁통치를 거치지 않고 독립한 인도·파키스탄·버마·인도네시아 등 국민의 民度와 비교할 때 결코 떨어지지 않는 수준이었다. 실제로 美軍政의 정치고문으로 일했던 사람도 私席에서는 한국인의 자치 능력을 인정했다.

당시 한반도의 정치세력들에 대한 대중의 지지도, 소련과 미국의 한반도 정책, 중국의 공산화 등을 고려할 때, 5년 동안의 신탁통치를 거쳐 독립이 됐을 경우 한반도는 전체가 공산화되지 않았으면 두 개의 국가로 분단되었을 것이다.

당시 한반도의 정치세력들에 대한 대중의 지지도를 보면, 공산당을 비롯한 左翼세력이 가장 많은 지지를 받았을 것으로 추정된다. 우선, 북한에서는 1946년 전반기의 토지개혁 실시 이후 공산당이 압도적 지지를 받게 됐다고 봐야 한다.

남한에서는 신탁통치 반대 운동으로 인해 右翼세력이 左翼세력에 대한 초기의 열세를 크게 만회하기는 했지만 전체적으로 左右 진영에 대한 대중의 지지도가 거의 비슷했을 것으로 보는 것이 타당하다.

李承晩과 金九는 지도자로서 대중의 존경을 받았지만 左翼정당들의 토지개혁 공약 등에 대한 대중적 지지도가 높아서 李承晩과 金九에 대한 존경이 右翼진영에 대한 지지로 바로 연결되진 못했을 것이다.

이상과 같은 정치세력들의 대중 지지도를 고려할 때, 통일 임시정부가 구성되고 그 임시정부에 의해 선거가 실시됐다면 한반도 전체에서 左翼진영이 과반수에는 미달하지만 최다 득표를 획득했을 것이다. 右翼진영은 左翼보다 약간 적은 득표를 했을 것이다. 중도파는 미미하지만 일정한 득표는 했을 것이다.

그런 상황에서 左翼과 중도파 및 右翼의 金九-臨政系가 참여하는 연합세력이 집권연합을 구성하게 되고, 李承晩과 한국민주당은 野黨이 되었을 것이다. 「左翼+중도파+臨政系」의 집권연합은 신탁통치가 종료된 후에도 계속됐을 것이고, 그 집권연합은 북한에서 1946년에 실시된 것과 동일한 토지개혁과 산업국유화를 남한지역까지 확대 실시했을 것이다. 따라서 다른 요인들을 고려하지 않더라도 한반도 전체가 공산화의 길로 접어들었을 것이다.

4. 李承晩은 미국의 앞잡이며 민족 분단을 추구했다?

美軍政, 李承晩을 家宅軟禁하기도

李承晩을 미국의 앞잡이라고 주장하는 사람들은 李承晩이 (1)미국에서 독립운동을 할 때나 고국이 해방된 후 귀국할 때 미국 정부의 지원을 받았으며 (2)귀국 후 남한지역에 親美반공정권을 수립하려는 미국의 지시에 따라 남한지역에 민족을 분단하는 단독정부를 수립했다고 말한다.

李承晩은 미국에서 독립운동을 전개하면서 미국 정부의 지원을 특별히 받은 것도 없지만 미국 정부와 관계가 나쁘지도 않았다. 그러나 제2차 세계대전 終戰까지의 수년간 미국 정부, 특히 미국의 한반도 정책 주관부처인 국무성은 李承晩의 활동을 지원하기보다는 방해했다.

李承晩과 美 국무성 간의 관계가 「불만족스러웠던」 원인은 美 국무성內의 左翼관리들의 李承晩에 대한 혐오 때문이다. 훗날 밝혀진 바에 따르면, 히스 특별정치국장, 빈센트 극동국장 등과 같은 親蘇·親中共 인사 내지 공산주의자들이 제2차 세계대전 말기 美 국무성에 침투해 있었고, 중국과 極東문제를 담당하는 관리들 가운데 그런 사람들이 다수 포함되어 있었다. 이들이 민족 자주의식이 강하고 확고한 反共·反蘇 입장을 취한 李承晩에게 非우호적인 태도를 취했을 것은 설명이 필요 없다.

李承晩이 1946년 6월부터 전개한 남한지역 자율정부 수립 운동도 미국의 한반도 정책과는 관계가 없는 것이었다. 적어도 그 시점에서의 미국의 한반도 정책과는 배치되는 것이었다. 대한민국 정부 수립문제와 관련해서도 李承晩과 미국은 대립했다. 미국은 모스크바 협정에 입각, 소련과 합의해서 한반도 통일임시정부를 구성하려는 입장을 견지했다.

그에 반해 李承晩은 소련이 북한에서 일방적으로 단독 공산정권을 구성하고 토지개혁 등 사회주의로 가기 위한 조치들을 단행하고 있으며, 공산당이 헤게모니를 장악할 수 있는 통일임시정부가 아니면 통일임시정부 구성 자체를 불가능하게 만들려는 술책을 취하고 있는 상황에서 미국의 정책은 실현 불가능하다고 판단했다.

李承晩과 미국 정부의 이러한 입장 차이로 인해 대한민국 정부의 수립이 확정되는 단계에 이를 때까지 李承晩과 미국 정부(駐韓美軍政)는 크게 갈등·대립했다. 李承晩이 1945년 6월 「井邑발언」을 통해 남한에 독자적으로 정부를 수립할 것을 천명하자 美軍政은 李承晩을 강력 비난했다. 美軍政은 미국의 한반도 정책에 순종적인 金奎植(김규식)을 중심으로 한 중도파 세력을 美軍政의 협조자로 삼고 남한에 자율정부를 수립하려는 李承晩과 金九를 적대시하면서 두 사람을 한국 政界에서 退出시키려 노력했다.

심지어 남한 政界의 지도자들로 위촉하는 남조선과도입법의원의 官選의원에 당시 남한의 가장 영향력 있는 정치 지도자인 李承晩과 金九를 배제했다. 美軍政은 李承晩이 남한지역 정부 수립에 대한 미국內의 지지여론을 조성하기 위한 訪美 외교활동을 떠날 때는 그의 出國을 방해했고, 그가 귀국했을 때는 정부 수립 활동을 저지하기 위해 한때 李承晩을 가택연금했다.

5. 左右합작은 金奎植이나 呂運亨이 주도했다?

左右합작 운동은 美軍政 작품

左右합작 운동을 높이 평가하는 사람들은 左右합작 운동이 金奎植 혹은 呂運亨이 민족주의적 동기에서 발의한 것이며, 그것이 성공했으면 南北통일이 되었을 텐데 李承晩과 韓民黨의 방해로 실패하고 말았다고 주장한다.

1946년 5월부터 시작된 남한에서의 左右합작 운동은 金奎植이나 呂運亨이 민족주의적 동기에서 발의한 것이 결코 아니다. 그것은 미국 정부가 自國의 한반도 정책을 원활히 집행하기 위해 남한 정계에서 李承晩과 金九를 무력화하고 새로운 협조세력을 확보하려는 계획에 따라 시작한 것이다. 그에 관한 각본을 마련하고 배후 조종한 것은 美軍政 당국이었다.

金奎植이나 呂運亨이 左右합작의 필요성을 주장한 일이 없는 것은 아니나, 1946년 5월부터 전개된 左右합작 사업은 그들이 계획하고 발의한 것이 아니었다. 이런 사실은 세 차례에 걸친 左右합작 예비회합을 美軍政의 정치고문인 버치의 집에서 가졌다는 사실 하나만으로도 충분히 입증된다.

金·呂兩人의 左右합작 참여 동기도 꼭 민족주의적인 것만은 아니었다. 특히 呂運亨의 경우, 左右합작과 관련된 그의 행동은 민족주의적 동기만으로 설명하기 어려운 점들이 많다. 呂運亨은 左翼진영에서 朴憲永의 주도권 강화로 자신의 입지가 약해지면 左右합작에 적극적인 태도를 보이다가 입지가 회복될 가능성이 보이면 소극적인 태도를 보였다. 그는 또 金日成에게 左右합작을 발전시켜 美軍政의 영향력을 감소시킨다는 내용의 密書(밀서)를 보낸 바 있으며, 남한지역에서 左右합작을 하고 나서 그 토대 위에 다시 南北韓이 합작한다는 노선을 취하고 있었다.

李承晩과 한민당이 左右합작을 방해했다는 주장도 타당하지 않다. 李承晩의 경우는 金奎植으로 하여금 左右합작에 나서도록 종용했으며, 左右합작의 정신을 지지했다. 한민당도 左右합작을 반대하지 않았다.

左右합작이 실패하게 된 주된 원인은 남한의 左右 정치세력의 입장이 정면 대립하여 절충이 불가능했던 데 있다. 左右 진영의 입장이 크게 대립했기 때문에 左右합작委가 1946년 10월 초 左右 양측 입장을 적당히 절충한 「左右합작 7원칙」을 발표했을 때 左右 진영의 핵심부에 위치한 공산당과 한민당이 다 같이 그것을 거부했고, 그에 따라 左右합작이 실패했던 것이다.

남한에서 左右합작이 성공하고 그를 토대로 南北합작 통일정부가 수립되면, 통일정부에서는 左翼이 헤게모니를 장악할 것이 분명했다.

단순한 산술적 계산을 해 보면, 1946년 2월 이후 북한에는 左翼정권이 수립되어 있었기 때문에 남한의 左右합작 체제와 북한의 左翼정권이 합작하면 그 南北통일 정권에서 左翼은 75%의 지배력을 장악하게 될 것이다. 이러한 산술적 계산에 더하여 남한의 공산당은 북한 공산당에 완전히 지배되어 있었고, 呂運亨은 金日成과 긴밀한 내통관계에 있었다. 左右합작 성공으로 金九系와 金奎植系가 통합, 李承晩-한민당系와 갈등할 것이며, 토지개혁으로 한민당의 경제적 지지 기반이 약화될 것이라는 당시의 정치적 상황을 고려한다면 남한의 左右합작을 토대로 한 南北합작의 통일정부에서는 左翼의 헤게모니가 확고하게 보장될 것임이 분명하다.

左翼이 압도적 다수를 차지하고 확고한 헤게모니를 장악한 정부가 통치하는 한반도는 필연적으로 사회주의화되었을 것이다. 左右합작이 성공하여 통일이 이뤄졌어야 하는데 그렇게 되지 못한 것이 아쉽다고 말하는 것은 한반도가 공산화 통일이 됐어야 하는데 그렇게 되지 못해 아쉽다고 말하는 것과 같은 의미다.

6. 美蘇공동위원회 결렬의 책임은 미국에 있으며, UN의 남한 총선 실시 결의는 잘못된 것이다?

美蘇共委 결렬은 右翼 배제 주장한 소련 때문

두 차례에 걸쳐 진행된 「美蘇공동위원회(美蘇共委)」를 결렬로 이끈 핵심적 쟁점은 신탁통치 반대 운동에 참가한 정당과 사회단체 및 개인을 한반도 통일임시정부 구성문제와 관련하여 美蘇공동위원회의 협의대상에 포함시킬 것인지 여부였다.

소련은 그런 정당·단체·개인을 협의대상에서 배제해야 한다고 주장했고, 미국은 포함시켜야 한다고 주장했다. 美蘇共委의 결렬이 미국 때문이라는 주장은 한반도 통일임시정부 수립과 관련한 美蘇共委의 협의대상에서 反託운동 참가 세력, 즉 남한의 右翼진영 전체와 일부 중도파를 배제해야 한다는 주장과 동일하다.

美蘇共委의 협의대상에서 반탁운동 참가 세력을 배제한다는 것은, 南北韓 정치세력 전체의 절반을 협의대상에서 배제한다는 의미다. 그것은 또 통일임시정부 구성에 관한 협의를 美蘇共委와 南北韓의 左翼진영 세력 간에만 전개해야 한다는 의미다.

그런 협의 결과 구성될 한반도 통일임시정부는 누가 생각해 봐도 左翼지배 정부일 것이 분명하다. 이렇게 볼 때 美蘇共委의 결렬 책임이 미국에 있다는 주장은 곧 左翼지배의 통일임시정부가 구성되었어야 한다고 주장하는 것과 동일하다.

한국 문제를 UN총회에 상정한 미국의 조치가 잘못된 것이라고 주장하는 것은, 한국문제를 美蘇共委에서 계속 다루도록 했어야 한다고 주장하는 것과 같다. 이 주장의 타당성은 美蘇共委에서 한국 문제를 계속 협의했을 경우 합리적인 결론에 도달할 수 있었을 것이라는 전제下에서만 인정될 수 있다. 그런데 미국과 소련의 입장은 너무도 거리가 먼 것이어서 절충이 불가능했다.

UN총회가 남한 총선 실시를 결의한 1948년 2월 현재 북한지역에서는 북조선인민위원회라는 「프롤레타리아 독재정권」이 조직되어 강력한 통치를 실시하고 있었고, 공산주의 사상으로 무장된 간부들이 지휘하는 공산당에 충성하는 대규모 병력의 강력한 군대가 존재하고 있었다.

그에 반해 남한에서는 한국인 스스로 조직한 정부기관이 존재하지 않은 채 美軍政이 극히 非효율적인 통치를 하고 있어 정치·사회적 혼란이 가중되고 있었다. 남한의 군대는 규모가 작고 장비도 빈약한데다 공산주의자들이 대거 침투해 있어 右翼정당에 대한 충성심도 약했다.

이처럼 극도로 불균형한 南北韓의 상황 속에서 남한 주둔 美軍과 북한 주둔 소련군을 철수해 놓고 한반도의 운명을 南北韓 정치세력들 간의 협상에 맡길 경우 어떤 결과가 나왔을까?

남한 右翼진영의 입장과 南北韓左翼진영의 입장 차이가 너무 커서 협상은 곧 결렬되고 말 것이며, 그 후엔 內亂상태에서 각 정치세력의 동원 가능한 군사력과 군중 동원 역량이 한반도의 운명을 결정했을 것이다. 그렇게 되면 한반도 전역은 틀림없이 공산화되고 말았을 것이다.

7. 金九·金奎植의 南北협상은 올바른 것이다?

金九·金奎植의 南北협상은 성과 全無

金九와 金奎植의 南北협상을 긍정적으로 평가하는 사람들은 두 가지 근거를 제시한다. 하나는 1948년 4월 평양에서 전개된 南北협상이 실제로 성과를 거뒀다는 견해다.

그러나 南北要人회담의 합의 내용을 담은 공동성명서를 면밀히 검토해 보면 南北협상의 성과라 할 내용이 아무것도 들어 있지 않다.

南北要人회담 공동성명서는 ① 美蘇 군대의 즉시 철수, ② 美蘇 군대의 철수 후 내란·무질서 발생 부정, ③ 美蘇 군대 철수 후 全조선정치회의를 통한 통일임시정부 수립과 임시정부의 주관에 의한 南北韓 총선 실시, ④ 남한 단독선거와 그에 입각한 남한 단독정부 不인정 등 4개의 합의사항을 내포하고 있다.

南北협상을 긍정 평가하는 사람들은 그 중 ②항과 ③항의 합의를 높이 평가한다. 그러나 내란이나 무질서의 발생은 본질적으로 口頭약속이나 문서로 저지할 수 없는 것이기 때문에 ②항의 합의는 무의미한 것이다. 그것은 美·蘇軍이 철수하고 나면 내란이 일어날 것이라는 남한 민중들의 우려를 불식하기 위한 선전에 불과하다.

③항은 全조선 정치회의에 참여하게 될 南北韓의 정당과 사회단체들의 성격 때문에 결정적으로 잘못된 것이다. ③항은 全조선 정치회의에 참가할 南北韓의 정당과 사회단체 56개의 명단을 제시했는데 그 명단에는 평양의 연석회의에 참석했던 정당과 단체들만 기재되어 있고, 남한 右翼진영에 속하는 정당과 사회단체는 단 하나도 포함되지 않았다. 남한 右翼진영의 정당과 사회단체들을 전면 배제한 全조선 정치회의를 구성하자는 합의를 南北협상의 성과로 본다는 것은 한반도의 공산화 통일을 위한 중간단계의 조치를 지지하는 것과 동일하다.

金九와 金奎植의 南北협상 노력을 긍정 평가하는 사람들이 내세우는 또 하나의 근거는 南北협상을 추진한 金九와 金奎植의 민족주의적 의지다.

아무리 고상한 뜻에서 비롯된 행동이라 할지라도 그 행동이 他人이나 공동체에게 큰 피해를 줄 경우에는 긍정 평가해선 안 된다. 북한 공산세력은 공고한 단독정권을 수립해 놓고 북한지역을 사회주의화하기 위한 노력을 확고하게 전개하면서 군사력을 강화하여 그 군사력을 동원해서라도 남한까지 공산화하려는 태세를 취하고 있었다.

1948년 봄은, 남한만이라도 공산화를 방지하려면 남한 민중의 의사에 근거한 민족정부를 수립하여 남한의 혼란을 방지하고 북한 공산세력의 공산화 기도에 대응해야 했던 시점이다.

金九와 金奎植이 추구한 南北협상은 비록 민족분단을 막아야 한다는 고상한 뜻에서 비롯된 것이라 할지라도 남한지역의 공산화 방지 노력에 막대한 부정적 영향을 미친 어리석은 행동이었음이 분명하다.

金九와 金奎植의 南北협상 노력을 당시 남한 중도파의 핵심적 지도자의 한 사람인 安在鴻의 입장과 비교해 보면 兩金의 南北협상 노력이 어리석은 것이었음이 분명하게 드러난다. 安在鴻은 金九·金奎植과 동일하게 민족분단에 반대하고 남한의 단독선거에 비판적이었다. 하지만 그는 북한에 이미 단독정권이 수립되어 사회주의화를 실천하고 있으며 공산군의 강화가 진행되고 있는 상황에서는 남한에 정부를 수립하여 그에 대처하는 것이 불가피하다고 생각했다. 그는 5·10 선거에 불참했으나 南北협상에도 참여하지 않았다. 安在鴻은 또한 대한민국 정부가 수립된 후에는 그 정당성을 인정했다.

8. 5·10 선거는 民意에 반대되는 것이었다?

선거인의 95.5%가 5·10 총선 참여

대한민국의 건국을 비판하고 南北협상을 찬양하는 사람들은 대한민국의 기반이 되는 1948년 5월10일의 선거가 남한 민중의 뜻에 반대되는 것이었고 공명한 분위기 속에 진행되지 않았다고 주장한다.

남로당은 선전선행대, 백골대, 유격대 등 무장투쟁 조직을 결성하여 경찰관서 습격, 선거사무소 습격, 선거시설·관공서·右翼인사 가옥 등에 대한 습격과 방화, 통신·운송기관 등 공공시설과 생산시설의 파괴, 경찰관·右翼인사·선거위원·통반장 등에 대한 살상 등 각종 형태의 무장공격을 감행하여 선거를 저지·파탄시키려 했다. 이런 左翼세력의 투쟁으로 인해 제주도에서는 선거가 실시되지 못했다. 경찰과 右翼단체들은 左翼세력의 이러한 선거파탄 투쟁으로부터 선거를 보호하기 위해 활동했던 것이다.

5·10 선거가 民意에 반하는 것이 아니었다는 사실은 무엇보다 높은 선거인 등록률과 투표율이 잘 말해 주고 있다. 선거인 등록 마감일인 4월9일까지 선거인으로 등록한 유권자는 전체 법정 유권자의 91.7%에 달했다. 5월10일의 투표에 참가한 인원은 등록 선거인의 95.5%에 달했다.

이처럼 높은 선거인 등록률과 투표율은 선거가 공명한 분위기 속에 이뤄지는지 여부를 감시하기 위해 파견된 UN 조선위원단과 西方 주요 국가의 신문기자들이 감시하는 가운데 산출된 것이기 때문에 크게 부풀려진 것이라 볼 수 없다.

유엔 조선감시단에 참여한 중립국 인도의 대표 싱은 『유권자들이 엄숙한 중에서도 자기 나라를 세운다는 긴장 속에 새벽 일찍부터 투표장에 모여든 것에서 애국애족의 열성을 볼 수 있었다. 개표도 질서정연하게 진행되는 것을 볼 때 세계 어느 나라의 선거에도 떨어지지 않았다. 우리는 자유 분위기가 완전히 보장된 것을 확인하는 바이다』고 논평했다.

9. 대한민국은 미국의 앞잡이와 親日派들에 의해 建國됐다?

親日派들의 선거권·被선거권 박탈

대한민국이 미국의 앞잡이와 親日派(친일파)들에 의해 건국되었다고 주장하는 사람들은 그 주장의 근거로 대한민국 建國운동의 핵심 지도자인 李承晩이 미국의 앞잡이며, 李承晩과 더불어 대한민국 건국을 위해 활동한 한민당이 親日派들의 집단이라는 점을 제시한다.

李承晩이 미국의 앞잡이는커녕 미국 정부에 맞서 싸우면서 대한민국의 건국을 추진한 것은 앞에 서술했다.

한민당에 親日활동을 했던 사람들이 상당수 참여했던 것은 부인할 수 없는 사실이다. 그러나 그런 親日활동 경력자들을 모두 「親日派」로 규정할 수는 없다. 광복 직후 親日派 숙청을 강하게 주장했던 左翼진영의 통일전선기구인 「민주주의민족전선(民戰)」은 親日派를 「일본 제국주의에 의식적으로 협력한 자들」이라 정의했다.

民戰의 親日派 정의를 기준으로 할 때 한민당에 참여한 親日활동 경력자들의 대부분은 친일파로 규정하기 어려운 사람들이다. 그들 대부분은 「親日을 해야겠다」는 의식을 가지고 親日활동을 전개한 것이 아니라 日帝의 강요 때문이거나, 日帝 말기 사회단체나 기관의 책임자였기 때문에 마지못해 日帝가 조직한 단체의 임원 명단에 포함되거나 親日的인 연설을 하고 글을 썼던 인사들이다.

左翼의 呂運亨이 日帝 말기 상당한 親日활동을 했음에도 불구하고 그를 親日派로 규정하지 않는 것과 마찬가지로 한민당에 참여한 親日 경력자의 대부분도 親日派로 규정할 수 없는 사람들이다. 게다가 한민당 간부진 중 親日 경력자의 비율은 日帝 치하에서 민족운동을 전개했던 인사의 비율보다 훨씬 적다. 즉, 한민당은 親日派들의 정당이 아니라 극소수의 親日派를 내포한 온건한 민족지사들의 정당으로 규정하는 것이 타당하다.

대한민국의 建國과정에서는 親日派를 배제하려는 의식적인 노력이 전개됐다. 대한민국 건국세력은 선거법을 제정할 때 親日附逆者(부역자)들의 被선거권은 물론 선거권까지 박탈하는 조항을 포함시켰다. 또한 李承晩은 대한민국의 첫 번째 내각을 구성하면서 親日 경력자를 철저히 배제했다.

10. 대한민국 建國으로 인해 南北이 분단되고 6·25 전쟁이 발발했다?

먼저 單政 수립하고 분단으로 간 것은 북한

8·15 광복 이후 南北韓에서 전개된 정치변화를 면밀히 비교해 본 사람이라면, 남한에서 단독정권인 대한민국 정부가 먼저 수립되고 그에 따라 북한에서 조선민주주의인민공화국 정부가 수립됐다는 주장을 누구도 할 수 없을 것이다.

단독정부가 먼저 수립된 것은 북한이다. 1946년 2월에 수립된 북조선임시인민위원회는 토지개혁, 산업 國有化, 주민 사상개조 운동, 경제계획 수립 등 정부만이 할 수 있는 사업들을 수행한 분명한 정부이다.

金日成은 1946년 2월20일 북조선임시인민위원회 제1차 회의에서 행한 연설에서 『지난 2월8일 북조선임시인민위원회가 수립됨으로써 우리 인민은 우리나라 역사상 처음으로 진정한 중앙정권기관을 가지게 되었습니다』라고 말했다. 북한의 역사학자 김한길은 북조선임시인민위원회를 「인민민주주의 독재정권」이라 기술했다.

북한은 1946년 11월에 道·市·郡 인민위원회 선거를 실시하고 1947년 2월과 3월에 里(洞)·面 인민위원회 선거를 실시했다. 이를 기초로 1947년 2월 국회에 해당하는 북조선인민회의를 구성했으며, 그 북조선인민회의가 행정부인 북조선인민위원회를 구성했다.

요컨대 북한에서는 남한에서 단독선거인 5·10 선거가 실시되기 1년 수개월 前에 단독선거를 실시해 단독국회를 구성하고 단독정부를 수립한 것이다.

따라서 대한민국 정부가 수립됨으로써 민족이 분단된 것이 아니라, 북한의 단독 공산정권 수립으로 이미 민족이 분단된 상황에서 대한민국 정부가 수립된 것이라고 말하는 것이 타당하다.

이 사실을 알면서도 대한민국 정부 수립 때문에 민족이 분단됐다고 주장한다면, 이것은 우리 민족이 공산주의로 통일될 수 있었는데 대한민국 정부 수립으로 이뤄지지 않았다는 점을 아쉬워하는 것으로 해석돼야 할 것이다.

대한민국 건국으로 인해 南北韓에 대립적인 정권이 수립되고 6·25 전쟁이 일어났다는 주장은, 독일에서 東西獨의 대립적 정권이 수립됐음에도 불구하고 전쟁이 일어나지 않았다는 사실에 비춰 볼 때 분명히 잘못된 주장이다. 상대방을 무력 침공하여 굴복시키려는 노력이 전개되지 않으면 전쟁은 일어나지 않는 것이다.

실제로 북한 공산정권은 1946년부터 인민군을 급속하게 강화해 왔으며, 남한의 左翼세력은 남한군대에 左翼분자들을 대대적으로 침투시켜 놓았다. 1948년 3월에는 중국 공산당 정권과 비밀 군사협정을 체결했다. 非군사적 방법으로 남한을 공산화할 수 없을 경우 군사적 방법을 동원하기 위해서였던 것이다.

이같이 볼 때, 6·25 전쟁은 대한민국 정부 수립 때문이 아니라 남한을 공산화하려는 북한의 의지 때문에 발발한 것임이 분명하다. 누군가 이런 사실을 알고도 대한민국 건국 때문에 6·25 전쟁이 일어났다고 주장한다면 남한의 공산화를 바라는 마음에서 비롯된 것으로 해석돼야 할 것이다.●

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'이승만은 복잡한 세계정세를 정확하게 이해한 인물'

무초 미국 대사의 인물評
趙甲濟

존 J. 무초 초대 한국주재 미국대사는 6.25 때 미국의 지원을 이끌어내는 데 중요한 역할을 했다. 트루먼, 맥아더와 함께 우리 민족이 두고 두고 고마워해야 할 恩人이다. 그는 미국에서 은퇴생활을 하던 1971년 2월10일 역사자료로 남기기 위한 인터뷰를 했는데 6.25 전후 상황이 자세히 소개되어 있다. 아래에 원문을 소개한다. 이 증언에서 그는 李承晩 대통령에 대해서 이런 평을 하고 있다.

'李 대통령은 아주 머리 좋은 사람이었습니다. 그는 45년간 한국의 독립이란 한 목표를 위해 달려온 사람이었습니다. 그는 모든 한국인에게 잘 알려진 인물이었고 이것이 그의 정치적 강점이 되었습니다. 그는 의지의 인간이었습니다. 그는 독립투사로 단련된 성격을 국가원수가 되고나서도 바꿀 수 없었습니다. 그는 이성적일 때는 훌륭한 역사적 이해력을 보여주었습니다. 그는 아주 고차원의 시각에서 복잡한 세계 정세를 정확하게 이해했습니다. 감정적으로 되면 그는 독립투사 시절의 본능으로 돌아갔습니다. 그는 한국인의 생존과 자신의 생존에 집착했습니다. 그는 의심이 많았습니다. 그는 매우 복잡한 인물이었으나 그는 생각과 일을 잘하고 특히 위기 때 일처리를 잘 했으며 자신의 뜻을 고급 영어로 잘 표현했습니다. 그의 영어는 글과 말 무엇이든지 유창했습니다. 그는 제퍼슨식 민주주의자임을 자랑했습니다. 이 분야에 대한 그의 레토릭은 미국인들을 사로잡았습니다. 많은 사람들은 외국인 부인(注: 프란체스카 여사)이 그에게 큰 영향력이 있다고 생각했지만 사실은 그렇지 않았습니다.'

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Oral History Interview with
John J. Muccio
Special Representative of the President to Korea, 1948-49; Ambassador to Korea, 1949-52;
Envoy Extraordinary to Iceland, 1954.
Washington, D. C.
February 10, 1971
by Jerry N. Hess

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Muccio Oral History Transcripts | List of Subjects Discussed]

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NOTICE
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

As an electronic publication of the Truman Library, users should note that features of the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview, such as pagination and indexing, could not be replicated for the online version of the Muccio transcript.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened January, 1972
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Muccio Oral History Transcripts | List of Subjects Discussed | Top of the Page]

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HESS: All right, Ambassador, to get under way, would you give me a little of your personal background; where were you born and raised, where were you educated and what are a few of the many, many positions and posts that you have held?

MUCCIO: I was born in Italy, 1900, March 1900, and brought to the United States when I was five months old. My father was already here. And I went to one grade school, one high school, one college, and had one job for forty-two years of my life, and that was in the Foreign Service as a Consular Assistant, this was in the Consular Service before the Consular and Diplomatic Services were joined under the Rogers Act of 1924. It wasn't until '35 that I had experience in the diplomatic side of the Service and that was in La Paz, Bolivia. I spent most of my time in the Service between the Far East and Latin America. Finally retired in 1962.

Do you think that is enough?

HESS: That's fine. Now moving into the Truman administration, you were a member of the American Mission to Germany from May of '45 until 1947, correct?

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: Would you outline a few of the duties that you had while a member of that mission, some of the problems that may have arisen, some of the methods that you may have used in solving those problems?

MUCCIO: Before getting into that I'd like to mention that the first time I saw President Truman face to face was at Potsdam in July 1945. He had been President of the United States for a few weeks only. He was playing international poker with two outstanding experts, 'Uncle Joe' [Joseph] Stalin and [Winston S.] Churchill. Potsdam at that time was hot, soggy, stenchy, full of mosquitoes and flies. And Truman very clearly was ill at ease, having only been President a short time and having so many crucial issues thrown at him, and having to rely on James Byrnes, who was Secretary of State, as his principal adviser.

The next time I saw the President face to face was in July 1948, just prior to taking off for Korea as Ambassador. Truman had just come back from Florida. He had a wonderful tan, was very exuberant, brightly dressed, he looked like a completely different person from the one I had seen at Potsdam. And mind you, that was before he was elected on his own, which came up . . .

HESS: The following November.

Do you recall if when you saw him in July of '48 if this was before or after the convention, the Democratic convention in Philadelphia of that year?

MUCCIO: I'd have to--I don't recall exactly. But after he was elected on his own, the man . . .

HESS: One question about James Byrnes who was the Secretary of State at the time of the Potsdam Conference. There are those that say that Mr. Truman appointed Mr. Byrnes as a consolation prize because Mr. Byrnes had also been in the running for the vice-presidential nomination in 1944 for Mr. Roosevelt's fourth term, and since he did not get it and Mr. Truman did, that upon the death of Mr. Roosevelt Mr. Truman appointed Byrnes to the highest spot in the Cabinet as more or less a consolation prize because he was not the top man. Have you ever heard anything on that?

MUCCIO: Well, I've read accounts of that in several places, but there are much better authorities on that than I.

HESS: How effective was James Byrnes as Secretary of State?

MUCCIO: I'd prefer to let that sort of thing go by because I was never in Washington at that particular time. I was in the field most of the time. And my opinion of the man at that particular time is not too pertinent.

HESS: Okay. All right, moving back to your duties as a member of the American Mission to Germany?

MUCCIO: I was on Bob Murphy's staff during my two year stay in Germany, May of '45 until April of '47.

HESS: Do you recall any particular problems that came up, your duties there at that time?

MUCCIO: Well, can we later talk about--I mean there were many issues, like denazification, so damn complex and controversial. You had the U.S. Control Commission, which was part of the Allied Control Council bogged down from the outset. I think if we get into a lot of these things it will be an interminable interview. Could we try to focus on . . .

HESS: All right. All right, would you like to focus on the matters on Korea?

MUCCIO: Why, I think we'd better . . .

HESS: All right.

MUCCIO: . . . move up.

HESS: All right, moving into matters pertaining to Korea, you were appointed, I believe, as Special Representative of the President to Korea in August of '48, is that correct?

MUCCIO: Correct.

HESS: Do you have an observation on why you were selected for this particular position?

MUCCIO: Well, I'd been with the Service a good long time. I was still a bachelor and in rugged good health. Undoubtedly the experiences that I had had in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, Germany and Panama, was a key factor. All involved active international situations with a heavy United States military presence. My long association with the U.S. military had an influence in my selection.

HESS: What were the first problems that you were presented with when you arrived at your new post in Korea?

MUCCIO: Well, the Government of Korea was inaugurated August 15, 1948. U.S. military government and all of its ramifications still intact. My immediate concern was the transfer of all the functions of military government to the new government set up by the Koreans, under the direction of President [Syngman] Rhee. We transferred the police force, the whole police establishment, on the llth of September of 1948. And between that and December 12th, when we finally transferred the bank account to the new authorities, there was a constant transfer of responsibility from U.S. Military Government authorities to their new Korean counterparts. It was very intricate.

One interesting and complicating factor that plagued me during this period was the struggle between the Koreans that had come to the fore under U.S. Military Government and these appointed by the new government. The former came forward from 1945 to 1948, and later as the United States authorities set up what was called the interim government, when Koreans were placed in authority with Americans as advisers. These Koreans who first worked with the Americans were sneeringly referred to by other Koreans as the 'interpreter government.' We must admit that their ability to understand and know some English had had a great deal to do with their selection.

Rhee did a thorough job of ignoring practically to a man those that had come to the fore during military government days. He set up his own hierarchy. And there's no love lost between the first group who considered themselves indispensable and the Koreans who were about to take over. That was the basic problem we faced at that particular time.

HESS: And you were appointed as the first United States Ambassador to Korea the following year in 1949.

MUCCIO: Yes, right.

HESS: During this period of time, the number of U.S. troops in Korea was being reduced, is that correct?

MUCCIO: Well, that raises the intriguing problem of the evolution of the U.S. position in Korea. The early days 1945 to 1947 are known better to other individuals. From '48 on, it might be of interest to recall, the U.S. military, principally General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, and General Douglas MacArthur, CINCFE [Commander in Chief, Far East) were first to raise the question as to the validity of our position in Korea, and that militarily, it was better to get out of Korea. And, in the summer of 1947, it was one of the very first U.S. international problems handled under the new mechanism of the National Security Council. And the Korean position was elaborated and set forth in the National Security Council and issued by President Truman, I forget the exact date, but it was in August, July or August 1947. We threw the problem, after one last try with dealing directly with the Russians, into the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations meeting in the fall of 1947. Our resolution was passed-by the United Nations, and since that time there has been a United Nations presence in Korea, since the end of that General Assembly in 1947. There still is a UN presence there.

HESS: At this particular time in history which of the officials of the State Department did you work with the closest? Was Dean Rusk Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time?

MUCCIO: Walt [W. Walton] Butterworth was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. He was appointed Ambassador to Sweden, and Dean Rusk was placed in charge of the Far Eastern...

HESS: Did those men give you the necessary assistance and aid that an Ambassador would need; the man on the spot in Korea?

MUCCIO: They gave me excellent direction and support. I was told when I left Washington after numerous conferences at State and with the defense establishment and intelligence agencies, that this was the first time that the transfer of military government functions to a civilian agency had taken place after World War II. I would undoubtedly face problems they didn't have ready answers to, but for me to use my judgment and they'd back me up to the hilt. And I must say that they gave me superb backing.

HESS: As an official of the State Department, did you have any particular problems with some of the United States military commanders, officials of the Defense Department who may not have seen eye-to-eye on some of the things that you thought should take place in the switch over of the powers?

MUCCIO: Well, there were a few. A good example was the visit in late '48 of the Secretary of the Army, accompanied by General [Albert C.] Wedemeyer. I escorted the two to President Rhee and they presented to President Rhee U.S. thinking about the Korean situation with stress on Korean needs in defense matters.

When they reported in Washington, they proceeded on the assumption that Rhee had agreed to this U.S. proposal. My report was to the effect that Rhee had said, 'Yes, yes, yes,' to all of the things that we offered Rhee for his military needs, but that he had never said, 'Yes,' and he never said, 'No,' to the suggestion that the time had come for the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces.

HESS: Was Kenneth Royall Secretary of the Army at that time?

MUCCIO: Royall was Secretary of the Army. And the Secretary, General Wedemeyer, and I went and spent a long time with Rhee on this one problem. I was summoned back to Washington, over night, to discuss compatibility of my reports with what the Secretary of the Army and General Wedemeyer had reported.

HESS: How was the problem of your reports solved? Did you get together with General Wedemeyer and...

MUCCIO: It was decided during my visit to Washington to defer a bit proceeding with the general plan, and nothing was to be said about it until after I had had a chance to work over some of the issues with President Rhee. Under the elongated schedule the final U.S. armed military unit left Korea on June 29, 1949, at which time we set up and left behind, a 500 man unit, KMAG, Korean Military Advisory Group, to help organize and train the Koreans.

HESS: Did you have any particular difficulty of presenting the United States' view to President Rhee at this time, of removing the troops?

MUCCIO: Well, President Rhee, at that particular time, was devoting most of his considerable talents towards forcing us to keep U.S. military presence in Korea and very little time to establishing his own governmental apparatus, and thinking of leadership and progress for his own people. He was more interested in keeping the United States tied up there.

HESS: And yet we removed our troops at that time, correct?

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: Did you have any particular difficulty explaining why we were removing our troops to him, or what did he say to you?

MUCCIO: The Wedemeyer plan was for our military to be out of Korea by the 31st of March, 1949. I urged Washington not to say anything about this until I had a chance to work on Rhee. When I got back to Korea the first thing I did was start pointing out to Rhee the wonderful progress (and they were making good progress), the new Korean constabulary was making.

HESS: Developing their own forces.

MUCCIO: Developing their own forces. Soon Rhee got up several times and publicly said that his boys were doing mighty well and could take care of the situation. Once he publicly committed himself that way, then I started working on him on, 'Well, it's about time we get our forces out of the way.' He didn't like that a damn bit but could not back out.

HESS: He began to backtrack a little bit.

MUCCIO: Well, backtrack, and he sparked demonstrations all over Korea, which were similar to what is going on in Vietnam today. Both misused U.S. presence to their full ability, but when time came for us to get out of the way--you are capable of running your own show--then they look at it with an entirely different light.

HESS: Before we move on, since we have mentioned President Rhee, just what kind of a man was President Rhee?

MUCCIO: Rhee was very intelligent person, who for forty-five years worked on one specific objective, and that was the Korean independence. He became the symbol of the struggle against Japan and the struggle for independence, as such. He was known to all Koreans. That was his political strength.

Rhee was a very determined willful person. He had fought in what really amounted to a guerrilla operation so long that when he finally ended up as the duly elected President of Korea, he was so old by that time that he could not change from his guerrilla, revolutionary instincts to being a duly recognized head of state.

When he was in his logical frame of mind, he had an excellent historical prospective. He understood the very complex world setup to a very high degree. But when he got emotional, then he reverted to his longstanding instincts of self survival of himself as an individual, as a leader of this independence move, and the survival of his people. But self-survival came first always. And with the experience he had had he was very distrustful, inordinately so. He didn't trust anyone. I doubt whether he trusted himself. He was a very complex personality, but a man who thought well and worked well under stress and he expressed himself in English, orally and in writing, beautifully. He prided himself in being a Jeffersonian Democrat. His rhetoric in this respect spellbound most American visitors. I think he should have changed that over to a Rhee Autocrat. He is not...

HESS: Was he an Autocrat?

MUCCIO: Oh, absolutely! Willful, very obstinate. A lot of people thought that his wife had tremendous influence on him. I don't think she had directly. He had gotten to the stage where he couldn't read very much and didn't handle the paper work, and she also, before the fight broke out, had control of what non-Koreans got in to see him.

HESS: Even yourself?

MUCCIO: Well, I never had much trouble in that regard.

HESS: Her control started somewhat lower than the Ambassadorial level, is that right?

MUCCIO: Well, she had very little control on what Koreans got in to see him, but as far as non-Korean she had a great deal to say. Besides, she handled the paper work and his office staff.

HESS: And the appointments schedule.

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: All right, now there had been a decision made to exclude Korea from the sphere of American strategic concern.

MUCCIO: Right.

HESS: And I believe that that was initiated by the Army Chief of Staff in 1947?

MUCCIO: '47.

HESS: That was before your association with Korea started.

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: Correct.

MUCCIO: Yes. I was out in the Far East at that time as an inspector in the Foreign Service.

HESS: What was your personal opinion about that decision, do you believe that Korea should have been excluded from our sphere of concern, our sphere of strategic concern, as this was called?

MUCCIO: I think Acheson's speech of January 1950 . . .

HESS: January the 12th of 1950.

MUCCIO: . . . was not correctly presented to the American people. This was not a new position on the part of the United States. It was a position taken . . .

HESS: Three years before.

MUCCIO: . . . three years prior to that. The 1950 congressional campaign the whole impact was that what Acheson said was new. And if you read the pertinent paragraph in that speech you will note that what he had--what he presented was that the United States unilaterally would have to fight any aggression committed against the periphery of Asia. And then he goes on to bring out that in case of aggression beyond that it was a problem for the United Nations, not for the United States unilaterally. And that's exactly what happened in Korea. It certainly was not any new policy.

HESS: All right. Moving on just a bit, when did you first suspect that there might be an invasion from North Korea into South Korea, when did it look likely to you?

MUCCIO: Well . . .

HESS: Was this a longstanding thing?

MUCCIO: When I arrived in Korea in August 19th, 19 . . .

HESS: '48.

MUCCIO: . . . '48, we still had a U.S. military liaison group at Pyongyang, the Russians had a liaison group in Seoul. There was a weekly train run from Seoul to Pyongyang with mail and the 38th parallel was open. There was a great deal of traffic in persons and goods across that 38th parallel. By the end of '48, after the South Korean Government was set up, a veritable stone wall was erected at the 38th parallel.

Now we removed our forces, the U.S. forces, and the whole front area was taken over by the new Korean constabulary. Naturally there were constant incidents between the South Koreans and the North Koreans. And the U.S. forces were very seldom involved except they were in the background. But there were constant skirmishes.

As an illustration when ECA [Economic Cooperation Administration] took over from the military, Eric Biddle and his group out of Washington were there setting up the ECA representation in Korea and the takeover from the military. And just prior to the departure of this group President and Mrs. Rhee had a tea for them. And while we were in the Blue House, the presidential residence, Lee Bum Suk, who at that time was Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and head of the National Youth Corps, came in joyfully exhaulting that his boys had just taken over Haeju, which is just beyond the 38th parallel opposite Kaesong. That was his news that his boys had entered Haeju, he didn't go on to say that practically every one of them were killed on the spot. But that's the sort of thing that was going on from both sides, it wasn't exclusively from the North south, there was a certain amount of it . . .

HESS: From the South north also.

MUCCIO: That's why it was so difficult to determine what was going on on the 38th parallel between 1948 and 1950. Neither side was coming clean.

HESS: All right, moving a little closer to the latter part of June, just what do you recall about events say in May and the early part of June 1950? What were conditions like in Korea at that time?

MUCCIO: Well, we . . .

HESS: I believe there was a diplomatic mission that came out from the United States for one?

MUCCIO: Well, in the spring of 1950 our intelligence reported the arrival of certain military hardware, Yaks, and a few Ilyushins, a few tanks. Also the return of two elements of North Koreans that had been with the Chinese Communists, returned as units. That part of our intelligence was good. Now there had been constant posturing, bluffing, of one kind or other.

HESS: Saber rattling.

MUCCIO: Particularly from the north, during this whole period from the end of '47 until the spring of 1950. We knew of the military material build-up in the north, but it was hard to determine whether this was additional posturing or whether they actually had some action in mind, and if so just whet. That's where the uncertainty was. The South Koreans were pressing us for additional material, additional backing. The U.S. was interested in not having a vacuum develop in South Korea so the Communists could just walk in, but at the same time we were in the dilemma of how much we could back South Korea without having them, especially when they were in the hands of men like Rhee and Lee Bum Suk, of building up their potentials so that they would in turn move north.

Fortunately, when the clash came it was very clear-cut that the south was not in a position to move north and that it was definitely overt Communist aggression. That was the interpretation of what had been accepted by the Free World from the discussions in the General Assembly of the United Nations. And that's what makes the Korean case so distinct from the Vietnam case where the question as to the basic issues involved has been confused.

HESS: One brief question about the intelligence reports that you mentioned. Where were you getting your intelligence information; were these South Korean spies that were in the north at the time?

MUCCIO: Oh, mainly from the numerous U.S. agencies involved.

As far as happenings along the border, we had better intelligence than old man Rhee had, because we had advisory personnel with each Korean military unit along the front. And they had their own radio communication with KMAG headquarters and that's why when the blow came I could keep Rhee informed. He was getting so much diverse, confused intelligence in the first few days, he didn't know--his picture of what was going on was not at all clear.

HESS: Can you tell me about . . .

MUCCIO: Pardon me, would you like a cup of coffee?

HESS: Yes.

While we're at this point Mr. Ambassador, let me ask you about the success or failure of the ECA in Korea at this time. Now this had been set up after Mr. Truman's point 4 message and just tell me a little bit about the workings of ECA and perhaps your part in developing that function.

MUCCIO: It's very difficult to cover briefly what went on in Korea from the time of our arrival in September of '45 up to 1950. But when we first arrived there, the Korean attitude was that American 'overlords' had merely replaced Japanese overlords. There was practically no cooperation, no response from the Koreans. They figured that we were there, we had to feed them, we had to take care of them. And that's what made General [John R.] Hodge's job so frustrating.

There were very few Americans available that understood Korean, or understood the Koreans themselves. And Rhee appeared on the scene and he held himself forth to General Hodge as the leader of the Korean people. And Hodge felt that the Korean people should have a chance to select the person that they really wanted to lead them. And the strain between General Hodge and Dr. Rhee led to acute antipathy. Rhee thought he had enough influence in Washington to have General Hodge removed, and came to Washington for that purpose in 1947. And the irony of it was that Rhee came to the fore through quite an open, fair election. But he was never able to get Hodge out of his skin until I arrived and took over as the senior U.S. representative.

And my first aim was to make clear to President Rhee and his whole hierarchy that they were responsible for what was being done in Korea, and it was no longer the United States running the show. And the Koreans were very slow in really seriously taking on the task of developing a defense force, a defense capability.

The whole aim, until the final unit of American armed forces left in June 29, 1949, was to keep us there militarily. But once that final unit left the Koreans did more for themselves in the one year from June 1949 until 1950, than they had done for themselves in all the four previous years. And I include both military preparation for defense, and political and economic development in that statement. In 1949 they had such a good rice crop for instance that they were able to sell to Japan, who were always fond of Korean rice and were prepared to pay a premium for it. They had gotten to know how good the Korean rice was from the period that Japan ran Korea.

HESS: From the time they were over there taking it away from them?

MUCCIO: And in the winter of '49-'50 Korea actually sold Japan a hundred thousand tons of rice.

HESS: Was this the first year that they had exported rice?

MUCCIO: Well, since before the war, yes. Prior to the war, of course, the Japanese took a lot of the rice and sent millet and other cheap grains as substitutes.

HESS: After the ECA was established did Mr. Paul Hoffman visit Korea to get things moving, to get things underway?

MUCCIO: He came initially for a few days in November 1948. I don't recall Paul Hoffman coming back here in person thereafter.

HESS: And Mr. Biddle was the man who was in charge of ECA was he?

MUCCIO: He was sent out from Washington to help organize and take over from the military.

HESS: Did he have a difficult task to perform?

MUCCIO: Washington sent a team of experts out representing the Bureau of the Budget, Defense, ECA, USIS, and State. The latter Glenn Wolfe from State, was in overall charge of setting up the American Mission in Korea.

We took over from the military everything from beauty parlors, shoe repair shops, undertaking facilities, the whole gamut of military life. As time went on we eliminated as many of those functions as possible.

HESS: Do you think that ECA was a success in Korea, at least until the time of the invasion?

MUCCIO: Outstandingly successful. As an example: You may recall that a good deal of the power for South Korea came from the north. In the spring of 1948 the U.N. was denied permission to go into the north. The United Nations decided to go ahead and have the elections in that part of Korea available. When the meeting of the 'four Kims' failed to find a compromise, the north pulled the switch cutting off all power to the south. This was calamitous. However, the ECA turned to--I don't recall the exact name--the U.S. power association. A group of electric power experts were sent out there and by repairing standby plants, bringing in a couple of power barges, and by improving the grid system of South Korea, they managed to stumble along as they repaired other facilities. The ECA did an outstanding job.

HESS: You mentioned the four Kims, who are they?

MUCCIO: That happened before I arrived. In April or May of 1948 two Kims from the South got together with two Kims from the north and that's always referred to as the 'four Kims' meeting.

HESS: Was there someone who was in charge of the ECA mission in Korea, was there an individual appointed to that position?

MUCCIO: Arthur Bunce, B-u-n-c-e, was head of it, Al Loren and Owen Jones were the two deputies. They did an outstanding job and they were particularly helpful in making their experience and background available to the U.S. military when the military came back into Korea in the summer of 1950.

HESS: Were there times when Mr. Bunce and his associates called on you for assistance? Did you have a smooth working relationship in other words?

MUCCIO: We had--and it was the first time--a unified American mission was tried anywhere, AMIK (American Mission in Korea), included KMAG, USIA, ECA as well as the normal Embassy unit with one JAS (Joint Administrative Service).

HESS: Now were all these . . .

MUCCIO: And I was definitely responsible for U.S. operations in Korea at the time.

HESS: As senior man you were the top man there.

MUCCIO: In fact, when they were setting up the mission the question came up as to whether or not I should have the cap of being the director of ECA as well as Ambassador, but I didn't feel that that was essential as it was clear-cut in the whole setup of the mission that I was responsible for all U.S. official activities in Korea at the time.

Of course, once the military came back as a fighting situation then the question of the exact position of the U.S. Ambassador vis-a-vis the commanding officer responsible for U.S. military operation is a very subtle and very indefinite subdivision. Delimitation, is a better word, of responsibilities.

HESS: Were there times that that subtle differences cause you difficulty?

MUCCIO: No, no material difficulties, no. I mean now and then members of my staff would come back and say, 'Well, the Eighth Army says so and so.'

And I would ask, 'Who did you talk to at the Eighth Army?' And ask them, the member of my staff if so and so really had a definite decision on the part of the military or whether that was his interpretation of what position was. That sort of thing was going on all the time, but nothing material.

HESS: Did you feel that if you had been called on to be head of ECA at this time that that would have been one too many irons in the fire, one too many demands on your time? Did you need someone to head ECA at that time?

MUCCIO: Well, we did have.

HESS: Yes, that's what I mean, but then when they were discussing . . .

MUCCIO: I was consulted--I was asked by Paul Hoffman which one of four names mentioned I'd prefer as head of ECA before this man was appointed.

HESS: Who were the others under consideration, do you recall at this time?

MUCCIO: Oh, certainly I recall. Three of them are still alive. The only one that's not alive is the man that got the job.

HESS: All right, okay.

All right, in moving back from matters of ECA to the military situation and to the situation in Korea, we were discussing the general atmosphere, the general conditions in Korea in the spring, in May and June of 1950 before the invasion, what else do you recall about those perilous and interesting times? I believe Mr. John Foster Dulles came over on a mission, is that correct?

MUCCIO: Well, in November-December of 1949, in a few weeks five congressional groups came out to take a look at what was going on in Korea. About the same time Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup, accompanied by his lovely wife and secretary, Miss Vernice Anderson, spent some five days in Korea. And in June of 1950, just a week before the fight broke out, John Foster Dulles, at that time in charge of negotiations with the Japanese on the administrative agreement, spent four days in Korea.

HESS: Was his main job at that time working out the ins and outs on the Japanese peace treaty?

MUCCIO: Not treaty--I was trying to think of the exact term, it was--well, anyway, it was what resulted in our next step in relation to the Japanese at that time.

HESS: And you have a picture on your wall of Mr. Dulles during that trip.

MUCCIO: During the Dulles visit there were two interesting things. One was his visit to the 38th parallel where pictures were taken, just looking over the certain military installations there...

HESS: Looking over a cannon in that photograph.

MUCCIO: …which later were used by the Communists at the upcoming meeting of the General Assembly that fall as confirming that the south had gotten the okay from the United States to attack the north.

HESS: After he had been over there to check the armament.

MUCCIO: And the other interesting thing of the Dulles visit was his talk to the National Assembly, to the effect that you go ahead and make up your own mind as to what you want to do, but if you do do the right thing, the United States will take a much better position than if you don't. That was the gist of his talks to the National Assembly. I never saw the text of his talk prior to the delivery.

HESS: All right, moving into the day of the invasion, where were you when you first received information that something was seriously amiss? This was the latter part of June of 1950.

MUCCIO: The morning of the 25th of June, I got a call from my deputy, [Everett Francis] Drumright, just about 8 o'clock, telling me that in the past hour KMAG headquarters had been receiving reports from the several units along the front of an onslaught across the 38th parallel. He said he had held up calling me until he could get a better indication of what was really going on. (We had had so many reports of that kind in the two years prior, that it was hard to determine if these were just forays across the 38th parallel or whether it was something beyond that.) And I said, 'Well, I'll meet you at the office right away.'

I walked over, it was about a five minute walk from the residence to the chancery, which at that time was in the Bando Building. On the way over about 8:30, I ran into Bill James of the UP. He apparently had had a restless night and was heading toward his office. And he said, 'What are you doing stirring at this time of the morning?' It was Sunday morning.

And I said, 'Oh, we've had some disturbing reports from activities on the 38th parallel, you might want to look into them.'

And went up and Drum and I drafted a telegraphic report to Washington, which was very carefully worded because we were not too--it was not too clear yet just what was going on. But that was the first flash to Washington, which left the Embassy there just after 9:00 on the morning of the 25th (Korean time). Of course that whole day, Sunday, was filled with all kinds of rumors.

In reflection, I've been unable--not been able-to understand why the Communists didn't get into Seoul that same night, because they had such preponderance of armor and mobility, and they had control in the air, and the south had no defense against air of any kind. And it's hard to understand why it took the Communists over three days to do, three and a half days, to do what they should have done really in that many hours.

I think there's a combination of factors there. One was unexpected firmness of the South Koreans, not a single unit gave up. The second was that there was a torrential rain that morning which impeded their air and also the movement of their tanks. I think that what the Communists had in mind was to rush into Seoul, capture the government, and then they'd be able to present to the world that Rhee and his government had no support from the people of Korea, and the whole issue would be settled right then and there before the UN or the Free World could do anything. And that, I think, is why when the Communists finally came into Seoul on Wednesday morning it took them another six or seven days before they crossed the Han River, and even longer than that getting organized to start their trek down the spine of the peninsula. Of course, that's my personal reflection at this time, and there are many, many, many interpretations of why they didn't make a go of it at the time.

HESS: Soon after the invasion, President Rhee moved his government to Taegu.

MUCCIO: Well, that's jumping a bit there. During the first day I went up to see Rhee repeatedly to make available to him the intelligence that I had been receiving, mainly from these KKAG units who were working with the Korean military units along the whole front and down the east coast. And AMIK also had ECA and USIA people who had had contacts with a lot of the Koreans and a mass of material coming in. The intelligence or military developments were mainly from KMAG sources. And I imagine Rhee had probably a hundred times more channels of intelligence flowing in to him to such an extent that it was probably too confusing to enable him to appraise and analyze. What we received at the Embassy was a lot clearer than what President Rhee was getting. This very first day I spent quite a bit of time going up to see him on developments.

That evening, well, it was about 9 o'clock, Shin Sung Mo, who was acting Prime Minister and Minister of Defense came by and said the President would like to see me.

And when I arrived at the Blue Mansion, President Rhee, in the presence of Shin Sung Mo, said the Cabinet had just had a meeting and decided that it would be disastrous for the Korean cause to have him fall into the hands of the Communists and that their defense capabilities were such they had better move on out of Seoul.

I was jarred to hear this. I very carefully reminded Rhee what I had been pointing to him in the course of the day, that his military was doing a superb job in facing up to this onslaught; no single unit had given in. Some of them had been overwhelmed it was true, and scattered. I agreed with him that the last thing in the world I wanted to do was to fall into the hands of the Communists. We faced a delicate question of timing--of staying on as long as we could to bolster up the forces, the South Korean forces, and at the same time not be caught by the enemy.

HESS: What did he say when you presented that view?

MUCCIO: Well, we talked for over an hour and he was so insistent that it was not good for Korea if he be taken by the Communists, and I kept countering that I didn't feel that we had yet gotten to that desperate point and that the moment his forces heard that he had left and that his government had left Seoul, there wouldn't be any government and there wouldn't be any forces, organized forces, left.

After an hour or so I finally got up and I said, 'Mr. President, you make up your own mind, but I'm staying here.' I put it that bluntly.

The next morning the first thing I did was go up and see him again and I kept seeing him all that day posting him on developments--that was Monday. Rhee had two trains set up Monday night. These pulled out about 4 o'clock, between 3:00 and 4:00 in the morning, and I didn't know until after they had left that they had actually gone.

HESS: They didn't inform you?

MUCCIO: No. Between the two of us--I think maybe this should not be made public.

HESS: We can close it.

MUCCIO: His failure to do so was one thing that I had over Rhee that stood me in good stead the next few months, that he had left Seoul before I did.

HESS: Back to the day of invasion . . .

MUCCIO: While we're on that, let me recall that during the next few months, if not for the next year, the collaboration, both Rhee and particularly Mrs. Rhee, gave me was very, very spontaneous and very wholehearted, i.e. during the period when they were still worried about their future.

Mrs. Rhee and I developed, more or less unconsciously, a little procedural understanding. She would get on the phone and call (and she didn't have to say anything on the phone), the call itself was just a tip-off to me that he was about to do something that she thought was not advisable. I would then find some excuse for dropping in on the old man. And if I sat there long enough he he'd come out with what he had in mind. She did this repeatedly during those very crucial days.

As I mentioned earlier, even though the President was already pretty well along in years he had a phenomenal stamina for a man that age, but he had his better spells and less stalwart spells, and she was very sensitive to that. That's the sort of thing that I don't know how far it is advisable for us to get into.

HESS: As far as you would like, and we can close it if you think that it is something of a extra sensitive nature. Because this is what oral history is; the gaining something that we will not gain in any other manner. It's quite good.

One question back on the day of the invasion. How soon was it after the information that was provided you showed that it was definitely a full-fledged invasion, that you or someone in the Embassy got in touch with General MacArthur? Did you do this or was this done through the Army?

MUCCIO: All the messages sent by me into Washington were repeated to CINCFE.

HESS: That's the Supreme Commander in the Far East.

MUCCIO: Commander in Chief.

HESS: Commander in Chief, Far East.

MUCCIO: On that particular point, when we left Seoul, the first few messages I sent in were in under what we call one-time pads, and at the tail end of each one of these messages, because it could only be deciphered in Washington in the State Department, I had 'Repeat CINCFE.' I understand that when the first few messages passed through Tokyo enroute to Washington [General Charles A.] Willoughby tried to break them down and held them up while he was trying to do that.

HESS: So they went through Tokyo?

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: And he delayed them?

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: And they could not be deciphered in Tokyo?

MUCCIO: No.

HESS: He knew this?

MUCCIO: I don't know whether you know the principles of 'one-time' or not. I could tell you, but perhaps I had better not.

HESS: All right, were there representatives of General MacArthur in Seoul at that time?

MUCCIO: Well KMAG.

HESS: Who was in charge of that?

MUCCIO: Well, unfortunately Lynn Roberts, Brigadier General Lynn Roberts, was on his way home, he was to be replaced. [Colonel] Sterling Wright, KMAG Chief of Staff, went over to Japan for the weekend to get his family on transport there. So, Sterling Wright returned immediately by special plane to Seoul, and got back there Sunday night.

HESS: All right, Mr. Ambassador, how long after the invasion was it that you left Seoul and what were some of the problems you encountered in moving the Embassy?

MUCCIO: Fortunately we had a plan of evacuation that had been worked up and coordinated with CINCFE.

Sunday was a very confused day and we were mainly spent in trying to find out what was really going on at the front. But by nightfall Sunday it had become evident that it was just a question of time.

HESS: By that time you could see it was a full-scale invasion.

MUCCIO: Oh yes. Well, that became very evident because as we got word Sunday morning that they had not only attacked along the whole 38th parallel, but they made two landings on the east coast and that certainly couldn't be dismissed.

But my first thought was the women and children. About midnight Sunday night we sent word for them to be ready to move. In the meantime we were checking on vessels that might be available in Pusan or Inchon. Well, whether to take them down to Pusan by bus and car or by train, or what to do with them. And fortunately about half way to Inchon, on the spur of the road that goes to Inchon and cuts out through Suwon and Taejon and Taegu to Pusan, we had a military depot called Ascom City, where certain remnants of military government days and some KMAG facilities were still in existence. So we decided to gather all the women and children the first thing in the morning and get them down to Ascom so that we could move them to Inchon--or to Pusan--once we determined the best route.

Well, Monday night about 7 o'clock I got word that all 385 or 387, I forget the exact number, women and children were already on board the vessel in the harbor at Inchon, and on the way to Japan. I never felt so relieved at any time as when I got that word.

Early that evening, we decided--CINCFE of course had been alerted under the evacuation program, to ask for enough planes the next morning to take all the gals on the staff of the American Mission (that included KMAG, ECA, USIA as well as the chancery, any of the United Nations females). By midnight the situation had deteriorated so fast that we decided to call for additional planes to take care of all male members of the staff of the several entities, including the Diplomatic Corp s (five countries were represented there), and the United Nations Commission. It was decided that I would stay on with four, and Drumright would stay on with four other members of the Embassy staff, and we would move south as the Korean Government did and not be in Seoul when the Communists came in.

The last bus left the Bando Building with the personnel being evacuated at about 11:00 in the morning. I had not been back at the residence since Sunday morning when I left following Drumright's message. I went by the residence, opened up the food and liquor lockers, and told the servants to help themselves and not to be found there at the residence. And I took my personal car with Sam Berry, Don MacDonald and Major Holland from KMAG, who had handled the evacuation. I told my chauffeur, Chung, to take the official limousine and put his family in it and whatever supplies he needed and drive south.

I went into the residence and I picked up my cigars and I told Sergeant Edwards, who was my right-hand man, to get a case of Scotch and I packed a bag with some clean socks, and underwear, a hat and a few shirts, and started down to KMAG headquarters, got there about noon.

KMAG headquarters was attached to the Korean army headquarters. There I caught up with the Minister of Defense, Shin Sung Mo, and the chief of staff of the Korean forces, 'Fat' Chai, and the whole senior hierarchy, military hierarchy, and the KMAG officers who had not yet left and were awaiting transportation to come back from the airport for them.

And at these headquarters was that beloved Bishop Patrick J. Byrne the Apostolic Delegate to Seoul. By the way, I forgot to mention that early that morning I personally went to see the Delegate, the Chinese, the French, British Ambassador and the UN Commission and told them what I had decided to do, and why I had decided. And the British, Holt, Vivyan Holt, and Peruche the French charge', both decided that they were going to stay there, that they had no instructions. And I pointed out that I had no instructions but I just didn't see anything to be gained by remaining as a guest' of the Communists, that I wasn't going to leave the country, I was just going to move down through the countryside.

The Apostolic Delegate, Bishop Byrne, also decided to stay with his American assistant Booth. Bishop Byrne, of course, died a few weeks later on the trek when the Communists decided to take all these political figures north.

There had been several passes by Yaks, and spraying of certain areas of Seoul by the Communists' air force including Korean army headquarters just on the outskirts of the city of Seoul while we were there. Twice we took refuge under desks. Since there was also a lot of talk going on about blowing up the bridges across the Han, Colonel Wright and I decided we had better get across the Han as soon as possible.

I left Korean military headquarters with the four that were going with me about 4 o'clock, and had an understanding with General Wright that we would meet at a certain schoolhouse, a school compound just beyond the bridge across the Han, and that if anything came up that made it inadvisable for us to wait for them there we would meet at Suwon.

Well, the bridge was already jammed with refugees streaming across the Han heading south. And when we got across the Han road repairs caused a serious jam-up. Here a Yak came along pursued by two F-80s. Major Holland suggested that we hug the embankment of the river. Just then a volley of machinegun fire from an F-80 went right over our heads. I turned to Major Holland and asked, 'What do we do now?'

'Oh, that was friendly fire,' he assured me.

And I said, 'Well, I'm not going to give a damn whether it is friendly or not, let's get out of here.'

HESS: He didn't think the friendly fire counted?

MUCCIO: So, we went straight on to Suwon, and finally got to Suwon about 6:00. And here was some thirty-five, forty KMAG officers and men still on the edge of the strip waiting for planes to come in from Tokyo to evacuate them. Now from the final plane off came Major General John Church. He had started out from Tokyo as head of a survey group, with seven or eight officers, and while he was still in the air his instructions were changed. He became ADCOM, Advanced Commander. He turned to me and wanted to know where General Wright was, wanted to get in touch with him. And I told him I had just left him about an hour and a half earlier in Seoul and we had an understanding to meet in the schoolhouse or down at Suwon. And I said, 'He should be here any minute.'

And as time went on he wanted to know what was I going to do that night, I had already sent Don MacDonald, my second secretary, out to find a place to bunk down for the night, and suggested that he check in at the agricultural school where we had some ECA agricultural experts and I knew had left that morning.

By the time we got up to the agricultural school the skies opened up raining 'cats and dogs.' And we had no sooner gotten out of our car and looking these bungalows over as to how we were going to take care of all of the Americans who had gathered there, and the chauffeur of Ben Lim, who was the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs, came up and said that General MacArthur was on the phone and that he wanted to talk to me. And if it had been anyone else I would have considered him a phony of some kind, because I didn't know of any possible telephone connection from Suwon to Tokyo. I turned to General Church and I said, 'If it is General MacArthur he'll probably want to talk to you. How about going along?

So, the two of us drove up to the Post Office in the center of Suwon. The power was off and the only lights in there were a couple of candles. It was a very eerie feeling to go there and see an old French style telephone and as I picked up the receiver a female voice said, 'Mr. Ambassador?'

And I said, 'Yes, yes, but,' I said, 'who and where are you?'

And she said, 'Goddamn it, they all left and I'm still here at the switchboard.' This was the international switch. And this was a Korean woman who was brought up in the Hawaiian Islands who because of her command of Korean and English had been become the senior telephone operator of this when the services were installed.

HESS: In Seoul.

MUCCIO: As background: That morning Maria Park Lee had telephoned me and said, 'You know I'm not an American citizen, but my daughter is.'

I replied, 'You come down here with what you and your young daughter can carry and report to Major Holland.' I explained to him that she was to be included in the evacuation. Naturally I was terribly surprised when I picked up that receiver and found that she was still at the switchboard.

And she said, 'Just a minute, the General is on.'

And it wasn't General MacArthur, it was General [Edward M.] Almond, the Chief of Staff, MacArthur had already left the headquarters. And that's when I heard that General MacArthur wanted to come over in person and 'get a feel of the situation,' on Thursday and he wanted suggestions as to where to come to.

HESS: What was your suggestion?

MUCCIO: Well we were there at Suwon where there was a plausible airstrip. But Rhee and his Cabinet were already down at Taejon. And I flew down to Taejon the next afternoon, Wednesday afternoon, and came back to Suwon, Rhee in one L-5 and I in another L-5, early Thursday morning where we met MacArthur. That was on the 29th of June.

HESS: What do you recall about that meeting? What was it decided should be done and could be done at that time?

MUCCIO: General MacArthur spent the day talking in succession with President Rhee, myself, the American and Korean military and going up for a fleeting view of the Han River. Before leaving he told me he had decided to report to Washington that what was needed were some regular U.S. armed units to firm up the Koreans--'Say, some two divisions.' He actually sent his report and request for two divisions while in flight back to Tokyo from Suwon. The Air Force had already been committed originally to furnish an umbrella for the evacuation. (By the way, during the evacuation one of these F-80s came over Seoul. I didn't know what their instructions were at the time, but a couple of Yaks appeared on the scene and the F-80 just pulled away. Well, he had no business coming up to Seoul I found out later and he had been a little beyond his instructions and that's why he got out of the way and I just was baffled as to why an American F-80 would pull away from Yaks.)

HESS: How far down the peninsula by this time had our forces been pushed, the few forces that we had in Korea?

MUCCIO: We had no armed forces in Korea at the time except KMAG--five hundred officers and men, training and helping organize the Korean forces. U.S. armed forces didn't come in until that initial battalion arrived--I think it was the 5th of July. They came up the (I'm forgetting my military terms), main line from Pusan, stopped in Taegu, where General Dean was, and went right on. They got up as far as Osan where they were deployed to meet the Communist forces coming down.

That was just about ten days from the time the Communists had smashed across the 38th parallel before there was any direct confrontation between Americans and North Koreans.

HESS: Where did you stay during that time?

MUCCIO: Well, the first night I bunked in Suwon, the next night I was in Taejon, came back with President Rhee for the day with General MacArthur, and flew back--no we didn't, we went back by car. General MacArthur turned around to me and said, 'How did you get up here?'

And I said, 'We came up in two L-5s.' He turned around to Colonel [Anthony] Story, his air pilot, and said, 'Is the Beechcraft still here? Why don't you send them down in the Beechcraft?'

And President Rhee and I got into the Beechcraft that had just landed, stopped momentarily, motors on, just long enough for us to get in and we hadn't even got our seat belts on when it took off. Halfway, down the runway it jerked into a quick turn around. The crew came back opened the door and shouted, 'Jump for it, take cover.' A Yak had come down at us. And after the Yaks left, the pilot turned around to Rhee and myself and said, 'You better stay here,'--we were stretched out in a rice paddy by then--'until I see what condition the plane's in.'

He came back after a spell saying he could not say how long it would take to get off. Having left my personal car up on the edge of the strip since the previous day, I suggested to Rhee that we might drive down. He assented readily. I drove down from Suwon down to Taejon.

HESS: As you probably learned later, Mr. Truman was at his home in Independence when he received word from Secretary Acheson of the invasion, that was on Saturday, Independence time, and he flew back on Sunday and held a meeting at Blair House with his top advisers, both that Sunday evening and the next evening, on Monday. When were you first informed of the decisions that had been reached by that group as to what actions the United States was going to take dealing with the invasion?

MUCCIO: Well, during the evacuation the first F-80s that came there were under instructions to not do anything except see that the evacuation was not impeded. Then you had decision to give all-out materiel assistance to the Korean forces, South Korean forces, including air support. Then the next step was for permission to move air support, or interdiction, into the north.

HESS: North of the 38th parallel.

MUCCIO: North of the 38th parallel. And those three successive steps, you have to keep in mind, took place before ground forces were committed.

I'd been home in late May to report on the buildup in the north, and Rhee had put considerable effort in selling the idea that they needed more backing, including defense against air attacks. And the Koreans had gotten word that we were cannibalizing P-51s in Japan and they wanted to know why they couldn't get some P-51s. That was one thing that I raised in these talks back in Washington. And at one of the OCB meetings General Davis represented the Army--no, General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer represented the Army, Davis represented the Air Force.

Anyway, when I raised this question of P-51s, the defense representatives said that they were not interested in the defense of Korea and they would not give any additional support unless State got a change in the NSC [National Security Council] policy position, vis-a-vis Korea. And it had already been decided that State would move in that direction and I pointed out at this meeting that all of these planes would be cannibalized before the NSC policy position could possibly be changed. I asked General Davis if he couldn't send word to General [George E.] Stratemeyer to put some aside. Davis replied, 'I cannot instruct General Stratemeyer to do that, but if he sees fit to put a few of these planes aside until the last moment, it would be all right with us.' He said, 'You can, when you get back to Tokyo, just mention it.'

When I went in to see General Stratemeyer he said, 'Fine, I agree with you, but you know who's boss around here.'

HESS: Meaning General MacArthur?

MUCCIO: Yes. So, I said, 'Well, I'll go up and see what we can do there.' And I went upstairs to see General MacArthur. I left General MacArthur with the impression that he agreed to this suggestion that twenty or thirty P-51s be put aside and not cannibalized until Washington had a chance to change the NSC 7-1.

I waited a week, and ten days, and finally queried General MacArthur and got word back, 'I shall not lift a finger until instructed.'

That was just about two weeks before the fight broke out. When the fight did break out, we decided to give them some P-51s. Some Korean pilots who had had experience flying with the Chinese and with the Japanese, were sent over to Japan to be checked out on the P-51s. And they came back with some American and Australian pilot volunteers. That was the beginning of the air effort in Korea.

HESS: How many planes did they bring back that had not been cannibalized, do you recall? A somewhat smaller number than might have been had the General acted?

MUCCIO: Well, I'm not sure. I know that there were eleven Korean pilots checked out and in addition to those planes, our own boys and the Australian boys were flying P-51s, and later on, also F-80s. We turned over to the Koreans a certain number of P-51s at that time.

HESS: And when Mr. Truman and his advisers decided to act as they did in the defense of Korea, of course, the action was taken through the United Nations.

MUCCIO: Well, some of the U.S.-U.N. action was taken more or less simultaneously, let's put it that way. I think we made a very definite effort and I think Truman and Acheson should be commended for that in giving as much UN flavor as possible to the operation that was underway there. But we were moving along there so fast that whether the left hand was able to follow the right is a question.

HESS: What was their reasoning at that time to work through the United Nations?

MUCCIO: Well, the United Nations had been seized with the Korean problem since '47 when the U.S. had thrown it in the UN lap. UNCURK [United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea] was still on site in Korea when the Communists crossed the 38th parallel. And one very fortunate development was that we'd reported from Korea that more and more of the problems that the United Nations Commission was looking into was the question of the buildup of armed forces, and suggested that the representatives of the seven countries on this committee needed military advisers. And Australia was first, Australia, and I think Canada was first to get their men actually in place in Korea. This military advisory group had been along the front for about a week and came back to Seoul that Saturday eve. It was most fortuitous that they were able to report, and this had a very, very important bearing on the discussions that came up in the General Assembly of the United Nations that fall. They were able to report that they had seen no evidence of any kind of an offensive buildup in South Korea. This had a hell of a lot more impact on the so-called neutral nations of the General Assembly than any report that the United States might have made.

HESS: Now that bears on the subject that there was quite a bit of talk at the time and still today, as you mentioned previously about John Foster Dulles, the question of just who invaded whom.

What other examples, or false examples actually, did the north give to say that they were the ones that had been invaded, or that they were not the invaders? What evidence did they try to put out other than the photograph of John Foster Dulles?

MUCCIO: It's so far back I'd have to refresh my memory a bit. It's hard to realize that this is over twenty years ago now.

HESS: Quite awhile back isn't it?

MUCCIO: Yes.

HESS: All right, what other recollections come to mind dealing with July of 1950?

MUCCIO: Well, I'd like to digress a bit to mention one thing that I was preoccupied about. Our boys came into Korea in the depth of summer, and would be fighting in those rice paddies under very unsanitary conditions (this was certainly a forerunner of what we are facing in Vietnam today.) I think the medical record of our operations in Korea are of the highest order, and very, very commendable. I'd lived in China for many years and I knew of how difficult it is to keep sanitation and health conditions plausible. Tokyo and the medical authorities did a magnificent job. For instance they started a program and the Koreans got a lot of men to vaccinate and inoculate all refugees at checkpoints as these refugees moved south, all of them. Tokyo sent over, because there was no refrigerating facilities available to South Korea at the time, sent over first 25,000 units for vaccination and inoculation of typhoid and smallpox, a day. And then they stepped it up to 50,000 a day and as the South Koreans got into position. And they took steps about chemically treating water, for instance, in the few places where they could get water. And I think it's a marvel that no epidemic of any kind broke out that summer with these hundreds of thousands of refugees moving, and our own forces moving in the other direction.

And then we went on to the magnificent medical facilities for our wounded and the wounded of our allies. We had various international medical teams. The U.S. military medical units, South Korean, and various hospital ships on either side of the peninsula so that the seriously wounded could be lifted by helicopter right out of there. And I think that the number of lives saved through those facilities is phenomenal. It's something that I don't think has ever been adequately conveyed to the American people and the people of the world.

HESS: What are your observations on the support given to President Rhee's government by the people of South Korea? You have mentioned previously that the North Koreans may well have had the intention of swooping into Seoul, capturing the government and then saying, 'He is really just a puppet, he really does not have the support of the people.' Well they did not capture the President, but they made things pretty hot in South Korea for a time.

MUCCIO: Some of the things that baffled me, for instance, when we started to move into Korea you had equipment, vehicles, and ammunition and armaments dumped off at Pusan and put on the trains and all moved up the M.L.R. While we were still in Taejon, the railway yards, one of the most important in Korea, were jammed with gasoline, ammunition, all kinds of equipment. Why the hell the Communists didn't blow that up I don't know. Why didn't they blow up Taegu and Pusan? Why didn't they blow up some of those railway bridges? And it's something that I've given a great deal of thought to and I've never been able to come up with any definite conclusion. There is one thing I do know is that Kim Tai Son, who was head of the metropolitan police in the Seoul area, in February and later on April, broke up two chains of North Korean spies and saboteurs. Now, it could be that these losses had not been reported back to Pyongyang or the reports of the distrust that the Korean people allegedly had for their own government were misunderstood and misanalyzed up north, or possibly a combination of both of those factors. But time and again I just couldn't understand why the hell the North Koreans didn't block one or two of the tunnels and one or two of the bridges between Seoul and Pusan.

HESS: Do you think that they were waiting for an uprising among the South Koreans?

MUCCIO: I think that they were so sure of themselves and that the South Korean authorities were so corrupt and so rotten that they hadn't done anything. I think the bounceback of the Korean military, for instance, from that punch that they received there in June and early July and then had their forces reorganized and get back in there and start fighting, is really something phenomenal.

HESS: Let me make a very brief comparison of what we are facing in Vietnam today with what we faced in Korea. In Vietnam we are really fighting two enemies, so it would seem. The forces from the north plus rebel elements from the south.

MUCCIO: From the south, yes.

HESS: Now, in the Korean fighting we were fighting mainly, until the Chinese came in, forces from the north. Was there any evidence of South Korean Communists at that time?

MUCCIO: Oh, sure there was a certain amount of that, yes, all the time. We had in Korea this self-styled Moscow Communist Cho Bong-Am. He was a member of the National Assembly, he was an anathema to Syngman Rhee. There were several others in the National Assembly that Rhee kept accusing of being in contact with the north. That goes way back to '45 and during the war of course, was accentuated.

HESS: But when the fighting started these people didn't take up arms against our forces?

MUCCIO: There was a minimal amount of that. For instance . . .

HESS: Whereas with the Viet Cong in Vietnam today it's a maximum effort.

MUCCIO: Yes. Because such groups had been in existence in Vietnam organized during World War II. It was in existence when the French tried to knock out Ho Chi Minh, which they never...

HESS: Never did.

MUCCIO: ...were able to do. And that organization is longstanding in Vietnam. And in Korea the...

HESS: It hadn't developed.

MUCCIO: Everyone was against the Japanese for instance. Then the Russians and the Americans came in and initially the South Koreans felt that the Americans were just replacing the overlordship of the Japanese.

HESS: We have already mentioned today that at one point our policy was not to move north of the 38th parallel. And taking just an excerpt from Dean Acheson's book Present at the Creation, one of the points where you are mentioned in the book, he says that:

On July 13 the problem was further complicated by President Syngman Rhee's announcement that Korean forces would not stop at the parallel and the reply of the U.S. Army spokesman that U.S. forces would stop there and would compel South Korean troops to do likewise. I hastily cabled Ambassador Muccio to do all that he could to stop such public statements and discussion, which prejudiced the position of the United States.
Was this a thorn in your side at this time?
MUCCIO: Well was that July 13th, 1950?

HESS: July the 13th, 1950, when obviously at this time Syngman Rhee, President Rhee, announced that his forces would not stop at the parallel. And Dean Acheson advised you to do all you could to stop such public statements on the part of President Rhee. Was that quite a problem for you at that time?

MUCCIO: Well, we had recurring problems with old man Rhee. We just couldn't shut him up. The Koreans, when we finally--see we--our last military unit left June 29, 1949.

HESS: What was the feeling at that time when the military units left?

MUCCIO: Well, in that fall the Chinese Communists took control of all mainland China. The Koreans were down in the depths of despair. The whole idea, and this cropped up again, when the Chinese Communists came into the fight, 'Well, if the Nationalists can't stop the Chinese Communists what chance do we have?' And it became psychological. And I recommended a 'show of flag' and that's when the St. Paul and two destroyers came up and visited Pusan and Inchon.

Well, the Admiral invited Rhee and the Cabinet, the diplomatic corps and pressmen ' . down on board. And at the end of the luncheon the Admiral asked Rhee if he wouldn't like to welcome the complement of the ship over the loudspeaker system. Well, Rhee started out very nicely on how much he appreciated his visit and all that, and he gradually warmed himself up and right over this loudspeaker system on the St. Paul he declared war against the Communists throughout the world. I mean that's the sort of thing that kept cropping up with Rhee regularly.

HESS: He'd get carried away with himself, would he?

MUCCIO: Yeah, that's what I had in mind when I mentioned that when he was in his logical moments he had a wonderful historical perspective, but when he got emotional he reverted to the old guerrilla, the old revolutionary.

HESS: Is that a more or less an oriental frame of mind, or is that common with the oriental people?

MUCCIO: I think it's common with age. Please bear that in mind when you go through this. Rhee was at least ten years older than I--well, fifteen years older than I.

HESS: Well, back to the days of the invasion, shortly after the invasion Mr. Truman announced that the Seventh Fleet was going to protect Formosa from an invasion by the Communists from the mainland, and also was going to prevent the Nationalists on Formosa from invading the mainland. What is your view, do you think that the Nationalist Chinese troops should have been used in some manner, whether that manner be an invasion of the mainland in 1950, or used in Korea, as Chiang Kai-Shek offered them several times, for use with the United Nations forces in Korea. Should those troops have been used?

MUCCIO: No.

HESS: Why?

MUCCIO: In the first place, I don't think they would fight any better than they fought on the mainland. If they wouldn't fight for their own patrimony, why the hell would you expect them to fight for the Koreans. And then the Chinese historically have been anathemas to all of these surrounding countries. They're scared of the Chinese more than they are of the so-called Communists. Whether they--I'm a little mixed up here, but they are just as scared of the Chinese, irrespective of whether they are Nationalist or Communists.

HESS: On that point, just speaking from historical context, do the Korean people have a greater antipathy for the Chinese or the Japanese?

MUCCIO: Oh the Japanese, but it is much more recent.

HESS: Is it about equal though do you suppose?

MUCCIO: When was it, the Chinese-Japanese war, when was that, 1895?

HESS: I don't recall.

MUCCIO: Then the Japanese knocked the Chinese out of Korea, and it was about ten years later when they knocked the Russians out of Korea.

HESS: Some historians have pointed out that even if Chiang's forces had never left the Island of Taiwan, not been used in Korea, but if Mr. Truman had not made this pronouncement that we are going to keep the Communists in China, we're going to keep Chiang on Taiwan, that it would have made a threat towards the southern coast of China. And China would have had to have held some of their forces on the coast opposite Taiwan as a deterrent to this possible threat of Chiang's. But when Mr. Truman said we will move the Seventh Fleet in here and we will not allow these people this way and we will not allow Chiang to invade the mainland, it freed Chinese troops in China to eventually come around into Korea. What is your view of that?

MUCCIO: I think the Chinese, under the Communists, proved during the Korean fighting, that in certain types of fighting they were very well-organized and very well disciplined and very well-controlled, which Chiang Kai-Shek was unable to do with very, very many Chinese.

HESS: Well, it's 12:30, we've been going at it quite a while and I would like for you to go over the statement on Wake Island before we got into that.

We've got a good many things to discuss from this point on until the Inchon invasion on September the 15th, and then the very important conference on October the 15th. The entry of the Chinese Communists into the war in the latter part of October and early part of November, conditions between then and April. Relationship between President Truman and General MacArthur, and then the dismissal of General MacArthur in April of '51. So, let's leave that until another time and then call this a day. Would that be all right?

MUCCIO: That's fine.

HESS: All right.

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript| Additional Muccio Oral History Transcripts | List of Subjects Discussed | Top of the Page]

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On the way there I was going over in my mind the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 . . . . And then I thought about Mussolini's entrance into Ethiopia and Haile Selassie's protest to the League of Nations on that invasion. I also thought about Hitler's march into the Saar Valley, which could have been stopped by the French and the British if they had acted in unison on the subject. Then Hitler's march into Austria and his overthrow of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and it occurred to me that if the Russian totalitarian state was intending to follow in the path of the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini, they should be met head on in Korea . . . .

I was sure that they [the Russians] had trained the North Koreans in order to create a communist state in Korea as a whole and that their intention was to overthrow the Republic of Korea which had been set up by the United Nations with the Russians' approval. . . . The conclusion that I had come to was that force was the only language that the Russian dictatorship could understand. We had to meet them on that basis . . . .

President Harry S. Truman
Presidential memoirs interview, August 21, 1953
Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-presidential Files
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Division of Korea
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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The Korean peninsula, first divided along the 38th parallel, later along the demarcation lineThe division of Korea into North Korea and South Korea stems from the 1945 Allied victory in World War II, ending Japan's 35-year occupation of Korea. In a proposal opposed by nearly all Koreans, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to temporarily occupy the country as a trusteeship with the zone of control demarcated along the 38th Parallel. The purpose of this trusteeship was to establish a Korean provisional government which would become 'free and independent in due course.'[1] Though elections were scheduled, the two superpowers backed different leaders and two states were effectively established, each of which claimed sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula.

The Korean War (1950-1953) left the two Koreas separated by the DMZ, remaining technically at war through the Cold War to the present day. North Korea is a communist state, often described as Stalinist and isolationist. Its economy initially enjoyed a substantial growth but, unlike its neighbour the People's Republic of China's, collapsed in the 1990s. South Korea eventually became a capitalist liberal democracy and one of the largest economies in the world.

Since the 1990s, with progressively liberal South Korean administrations, as well as the death of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung, the two sides have taken small, symbolic steps towards a possible Korean reunification.[attribution needed]

History of Korea
Jeulmun Period
Mumun Period
Gojoseon, Jin
Proto-Three Kingdoms:
Buyeo, Okjeo, Dongye
Samhan
Ma, Byeon, Jin
Three Kingdoms:
Goguryeo
Sui wars
Baekje
Silla, Gaya
North-South States:
Unified Silla
Balhae
Later Three Kingdoms
Goryeo
Khitan wars
Mongol invasions
Joseon
Japanese invasions
Manchu invasions
Korean Empire
Japanese rule
Provisional Gov't
Division of Korea
Korean War
North, South Korea

List of monarchs
Military history
Naval history
Timeline

Korea Portal
Contents [hide]
1 Historical Background
1.1 Korea under Japanese Rule (1910-1945)
1.2 End of World War II (1939–1945)
2 After World War II
2.1 In the South
2.2 In the North
2.3 Establishment of two Koreas
2.4 Korean War
3 After the Korean War (1953–present)
4 See also
5 Notes
6 References
7 External links

[edit] Historical Background

[edit] Korea under Japanese Rule (1910-1945)
Main article: Korea under Japanese rule
As Russo-Japanese War ended in 1905, Korea became a nominal protectorate, and in 1910 it was annexed by Japan.

[edit] End of World War II (1939–1945)
Main article: World War II

In November 1943, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek met at the Cairo Conference to discuss what should happen to Japan's colonies, and agreed that Japan should lose all the territories it had conquered by force because it might become too powerful. In the declaration after this conference, Korea was mentioned for the first time. The three powers declared that they, 'mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent” (Cairo Conference). For some Korean nationalists who wanted immediate independence, the phrase 'in due course' was cause for dismay. Roosevelt may have proposed to Stalin that 3 or 4 years elapse before full Korean independence; Stalin demurred, saying that a shorter period of time would be desirable.[citation needed] In any case, discussion of Korea among the Allies would not resume until victory over Japan was nearly imminent.

With the war's end in sight in August 1945, there was still no consensus on Korea's fate among Allied leaders. Many Koreans on the peninsula had made their own plans for the future of Korea, and few of these plans included the re-occupation of Korea by foreign forces. Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945, Soviet leaders invaded Manchuria, as per Josef Stalin's agreement with Harry Truman during the Potsdam conference.[1] However, the American leaders worried that the whole peninsula might be occupied by the Soviet Union, and feared this might lead to a Soviet occupation of Japan.[citation needed] Later events showed these fears to be unfounded. The Soviet forces would arrive in Korea before the American forces, but they occupied only the northern part of the peninsula, halting their advance at the 38th parallel, which was in keeping with their agreement with the United States. On August 10, 1945 two young officers – Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel – were assigned the task of creating an American occupation zone. Working on extremely short notice and completely unprepared for the task, they used a National Geographic map to decide on the 38th parallel; they chose it because it divided the country approximately in half but would leave the capital Seoul under American control. No experts on Korea were consulted and the two men were unaware that forty years previous, Japan and Russia had discussed sharing Korea along the same parallel; Rusk later said that had he known, he 'almost surely' would have chosen a different line.[2] Regardless, the decision was hastily written into General Order Number One for the administration of postwar Japan.

As a colony of Japan, the Korean people had been systematically excluded from important posts in the administration of Korea. The general Abe Nobuyuki, the last Japanese Governor-General of Korea, was in contact with a number of influential Koreans since the beginning of August 1945 to prepare the hand-over of power. On August 15, 1945, Lyuh Woon-Hyung, a moderate left-wing politician, agreed to take over. He was in charge of preparing the creation of a new country and worked hard to build governmental structures. On September 6, 1945, a congress of representatives was convened in Seoul. The foundation of a modern Korean state took place just three weeks after Japan's capitulation. The government was predominantly left wing, caused in part by the many resistance fighters who agreed with many of communism's views on imperialism and colonialism.

[edit] After World War II

[edit] In the South
Main article: United States Army Military Government in Korea
On September 7, 1945, General MacArthur announced that Lieutenant General John R. Hodge was to administer Korean affairs, and Hodge landed in Incheon with his troops the next day. The 'Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea' sent a delegation with three interpreters, but he refused to meet with them.

With their focus overwhelmingly being on Japan, the American military authorities paid much less attention to Korea and soldiers generally did not want to be assigned there.[citation needed] While Japan was put under the administration of civilians, Korea was placed under the direct administration of military units.[citation needed] Little changed in the administration of the country; officials then serving under the Japanese authorities remained in their positions. The Japanese governor was not dismissed until the middle of September and many Japanese officials stayed in office until 1946. These decisions angered most Koreans since these same Japanese had helped exploit Koreans. Adding to this anger was the American military's choice to give many governmental positions to Koreans who had betrayed their country by collaborating with the Japanese rulers. [citation needed]

The US occupation authorities in southern Korea viewed many indigenous attempts at government as a communist insurgency [citation needed] and refused to recognize the 'Provisional Government'. However, an anti-communist named Syngman Rhee, who moved back to Korea after decades of exile in the US, was considered an acceptable candidate to provisionally lead the country since he was considered friendly to the US. Under Rhee, the southern government conducted a number of military campaigns against left-wing insurgents who took up arms against the government and persecuted other political opponents. Over the course of the next few years, over between 30,000 [3] and 100,000 people would lose their lives during the war against the left-wing insurgents. [4] In August 1948, Syngman Rhee became the first president of South Korea, and U.S. forces left the peninsula.

[edit] In the North
In August 1945 the Soviet Army established the Soviet Civil Authority to rule the country until a domestic regime, friendly to the USSR, could be established. Provisional committees were set up across the country putting Communists into key positions. In March 1946 land reform was instituted as the land from Japanese and collaborator land owners was divided and handed over to poor farmers. Kim Il-sung initiated a sweeping land reform program in 1946. Organizing the many poor civilians and agricultural laborers under the people's committees a nationwide mass campaign broke the control of the old landed classes. Landlords were allowed to keep only the same amount of land as poor civilians who had once rented their land, thereby making for a far more equal distribution of land. The north Korean land reform was achieved in a less violent way than that of China or Vietnam. Official American sources stated, 'From all accounts, the former village leaders were eliminated as a political force without resort to bloodshed, but extreme care was take to preclude their return to power.'[5] This was very popular with the farmers, but caused many collaborators and former landowners to flee to the south where some of them obtained positions in the new south Korean government. According to the U.S. military government, 400,000 northern Koreans went south as refugees. [6]

Key industries were nationalized. The economic situation was nearly as difficult in the north as it was in the south, as the Japanese had concentrated agriculture in the south and heavy industry in the north.

In February 1946 a provisional government called the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was formed under Kim Il-sung, who had spent the last years of the war training with Soviet troops in Manchuria. Conflicts and power struggles rose up at the top levels of government in Pyongyang as different aspirants maneuvered to gain positions of power in the new government. At the local levels, people's committees openly attacked collaborators and some landlords, confiscating much of their land and possessions. As a consequence many collaborators and others disappeared or were assassinated. It was out in the provinces and by working with these same people's committees that the eventual leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, was able to build a grassroots support system that would lift him to power over his political rivals who had stayed in Pyongyang. Soviet forces departed in 1948.

[edit] Establishment of two Koreas
With mistrust growing rapidly between the formerly allied United States and Soviet Union, no agreement was reached on how to reconcile the competing provisional governments. The U.S. brought the problem before the United Nations in the fall of 1947. The USSR opposed UN involvement.

The UN passed a resolution on November 14, 1947, declaring that free elections should be held, foreign troops should be withdrawn, and a UN commission for Korea should be created. The Soviet Union, although a member with veto powers, boycotted the voting and did not consider the resolution to be binding.

In April 1948, a conference of organizations from the north and the south met in Pyongyang. This conference produced no results, and the Soviets boycotted the UN-supervised elections in the south. There was no UN supervision of elections in the north. On May 10 the south held elections. Syngman Rhee, who had called for partial elections in the south to consolidate his power as early as 1947, was elected, though left-wing parties boycotted the election. Widespread corruption was reported in the elections and the Republic of Korea began life without a great deal of legitimacy. On August 13, he formally took over power from the U.S. military.

[edit] Korean War
Main article: Korean War
In the North, Democratic People's Republic of Korea was declared on September 9, with Kim Il-sung as prime minister. This division of Korea, after more than a millennium of being unified, was seen as unacceptable and temporary by both regimes. From 1948 until the start of the civil war on June 25, 1950, the armed forces of each side engaged in a series of bloody conflicts along the border. In 1950, these conflicts escalated dramatically when North Korean forces attacked South Korea, triggering the Korean War and effectively making the division permanent. An armistice was signed ending hostilities and the two sides agreed to create a three-mile wide buffer zone between the states, where nobody would enter. This area came to be known as the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ.

[edit] After the Korean War (1953–present)
Main articles: Korean Demilitarized Zone and Korean reunification
North and South Korea have never signed a formal peace treaty and thus are still officially at war; only a ceasefire was declared. South Korea's government came to be dominated by its military and a relative peace was punctuated by border skirmishes and assassination attempts. The North failed in several assassination attempts on South Korean leaders, most notably in 1968, 1974 and 1983; tunnels were frequently found under the DMZ and war nearly broke out over the axe murder incident at Panmunjeom in 1976. In 1973, extremely secret, high-level contacts began to be conducted through the guise of the Red Cross, but ended after the Panmunjeom incident with little progress having been made.

In the late 1990s, with the South having transitioned to democracy, the success of the Nordpolitik policy, and power in the North having been taken up by Kim Il-sung's son Kim Jong-il, the two nations began to engage publicly for the first time, with the South declaring its Sunshine Policy.

Recently, in effort to promote reconciliation, the two Koreas have adopted an unofficial Unification Flag, representing Korea at international sporting events. The South provides the North with significant aid and cooperative economic ventures, and the two governments have cooperated in organizing meetings of separated family members and limited tourism of North Korean sites. However, the two states still do not recognize each other,[citation needed] and the Sunshine Policy remains controversial in South Korea.

The apportionment of responsibility for the division is much debated, although the older generation of South Koreans generally blame the North's communist zeal for instigating the Korean War.[citation needed] Many in the younger generation see it as a byproduct of the Cold War, criticizing the US role in the establishment of separate states, presence of US troops in the South, and hostile policies against the North.[citation needed]

[edit] See also
History of North Korea
History of South Korea
Korean reunification
Workers' Party of Korea for information on the formation of North Korea

[edit] Notes
^ J. Samuel Walker, 'Prompt and Utter Destruction'. The University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill.
^ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas. Basic Books, p. 6.
^ Arthur Millet, The War for Korea, 1945-1950 (2005)
^ Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, Viking Press, 1988, ISBN 0-670-81903-4
^ Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press, 1981, 607 pages, ISBN 0691093830
^ Allan R. Millet, The War for Korea: 1945-1950 (2005) P. 59

[edit] References
Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas : A Contemporary History. Addison-Wesley, 1997, 472 pages, ISBN 0-201-40927-5
Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. Princeton University Press, 1981, 607 pages, ISBN 0691093830

[edit] External links
South Korean Ministry of Unification (Korean and English)
North Korean News Agency (Korean and English)
Korea Web Weekly (English)
NDFSK (Mostly Korean; some English)
Koreascope (Korean and English)
Rulers.org, has list of Post-World War 2 US and Soviet administrators (in English)
Retrieved from 'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_Korea'
Categories: All pages needing cleanup | Wikipedia articles needing factual verification since July 2007 | All articles with unsourced statements | Articles with unsourced statements since February 2007 | History of Korea | History of North Korea | History of South Korea | Foreign relations of South Korea | Foreign relations of North Korea | Territorial disputes of South Korea

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HENRY STIMSON'S DIARY AND PAPERS:
Part 8
July 21 thru July 25, 1945

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The following are excerpts from Sec. of War Henry Stimson's diary and papers that have relevance to the atomic bombing of Japan. This is by no means a complete collection of such references from Stimson's diary and papers. These excerpts are published here with the authorization of the Yale University Library. The diary and papers can be found in the Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn. The diary and papers can also be found in the Library of Congress, Washington, DC and in the Center For Research Libraries, Chicago, IL.
For information about the prior Henry Stimson diary and papers, click Stimson Diary and Papers, Part 1.

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[I have included some explanatory and contextual comments for the excerpts. My writing is in brackets and italics, as I have done with this paragraph.]

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[THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE: STIMSON GETS THE A-BOMB SCHEDULE]

July 21, 1945 Diary Entry [Stimson and Truman receive the full report of the atomic bomb test]:

'At eleven thirty five General [Leslie] Groves' special report was received by special courier. [Groves was the general in charge of the Manhattan Project]. It was an immensely powerful document, clearly and well written and with supporting documents of the highest importance. It gave a pretty full and eloquent report of the tremendous success of the test and revealed far greater destructive power than we expected in S-1. ...I made an appointment with the President for as soon as he could see me, which was at three-thirty.'

'At three o'clock I found that [Army Chief of Staff Gen. George] Marshall had returned from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to save time I hurried to his house and had him read Groves' report and conferred with him about it.'

'I then went to the 'Little White House' and saw President Truman. I asked him to call in Secretary [of State James] Byrnes and then I read the report in its entirety and we then discussed it. They were immensely pleased. The President was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the [Potsdam] Conference and being present to help him in this way.'

'I then left the 'Little White House', picked up [Harvey] Bundy [Special Assistant to Stimson], and went to the Prime Minister's [Churchill's] house where we conferred with him and Lord Cherwell [Churchill's closest advisor]. I turned over the paper [Groves' report] to Churchill and he began reading it but was interrupted a few minutes before five in order to hurry to the Big Three Conference at five o'clock. He asked me to return on the following morning to finish up the report.'

[A copy of Groves' report, written on July 18, 1945, can be found in the Nuclear Files web site at www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1945/450718-groves-trinity.html.]

'Massage and dinner, and then in the evening about ten-thirty two short cables came in from [George] Harrison [Special Consultant to Stimson] indicating that operations [for use of the atomic bomb on Japan] would be ready earlier than expected, and also asking me to reverse my decision as to one of the proposed topics [Gen. Groves' request to make the city of Kyoto the primary a-bomb target]. I cabled, saying I saw no new factors for reversing myself but on the contrary the new factors seemed to confirm it.'

[Stimson continued to reject Kyoto as an atomic bomb target. For more information on this, see the June 1, 1945 diary entry at Stimson Diary Part 5. For the Harrison cables, see U.S. Dept. of State, 'Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945', vol. 2, pg. 1372.]

[In a letter to his wife the morning of July 22nd, Stimson was still elated over the full report on the atomic bomb test:]

'The great bright spot to me is the news which has come to me from home from the great secret that has cheered everybody from the President down.' (Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn., microfilm reel 113).

July 22, 1945 Diary Entry [Churchill's reaction to the full report of the a-bomb test]:

'Called on President Truman at nine-twenty. The foregoing day I had left with him my paper on reflections as to our relations with Russia, copy of which is hereto attached. [The paper was 'Reflections on the Basic Problems Which Confront Us'; see the July 19 diary entry in Stimson Diary Part 7 for more information and excerpts]. I told him that this paper was in no sense an official paper - that it did not even contain my matured opinions, but that it represented an analysis which I thought was correct and a program of what I hoped might sometime be done. With that understanding he asked me to see it and I left it with him and this morning I picked it up. He gave it to me and stated that he had read it and agreed with it.'

'I also discussed with him Harrison's two messages. He was intensely pleased by the accelerated timetable. As to the matter of the special target [Kyoto] which I had refused to permit, he strongly confirmed my view and said he felt the same way.

'At ten-forty Bundy and I again went to the British headquarters and talked to the Prime Minister [Churchill] and Lord Cherwell for over an hour. Churchill read Groves' report in full. He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three [Truman, Churchill, and Stalin] yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said 'Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn't understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting'. Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and that he felt the same way. His own attitude confirmed this admission. He now not only was not worried about giving the Russians information of the matter [i.e., telling them the U.S. had the atomic bomb] but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations. The sentiment of the four of us [Stimson, Churchill, Bundy, and Cherwell] was unanimous in thinking that it was advisable to tell the Russians at least that we were working on that subject and intended to use it if and when it was successfully finished.'

[Stimson was not allowed to attend the Big Three meetings, but, like Churchill, he had also noticed a change in the President. On the 22nd Stimson's aide Col. William Kyle recorded in his notes, 'The Secretary [Stimson] had a favorable visit with the President and mentioned that Mr. Truman has changed considerably since the first conference he had with the Secretary in Berlin [at the Potsdam Conference]. (Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn., microfilm reel 128, 'Notes of the Trip of the Secretary of War, July 6 to July 28, 1945, inclusive', pg. 41).]

'At twelve-fifteen I called General [Henry 'Hap'] Arnold [the General in charge of the Army Air Force] over, showed him Harrison's two cables, showed him my answer to them and showed him Groves' report, which he read in its entirety. He told me that he agreed with me about the target which I had struck off the program. He said that it would take considerable hard work to organize the operations now that it was to move forward.' [The order to use the a-bombs as soon as the bombs were ready was given to the Air Force just three days later; a copy of the order, written by Groves and signed by Gen. Thomas Handy, can be found at the Nuclear Files web site at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1945/450725-handy-spaatz.html].

July 23, 1945 Diary Entry:

'At ten o'clock Secretary Byrnes called me up asking me as to the timing of the S-1 program. I told him the effect of the two cables [from Harrison] and that I would try to get further definite news. I dictated a cable to Harrison asking him to let us know immediately when the time [for the use of the a-bomb on Japan] was fixed.'

'At ten-fifteen Ambassador [to Moscow W. Averell] Harriman arrived and he and [Assistant Sec. of War John] McCloy, Bundy, and I had a talk over the situation [relations with Russia], Harriman giving us the information of yesterday afternoon's meetings. He commented on the increasing cheerfulness evidently caused by the news from us [about the atomic bomb], and confirmed the expanding demands being made by the Russians. They are throwing aside all their previous restraint as to being only a Continental power and not interested in any further acquisitions, and are now apparently seeking to branch in all directions.'

'At eleven o'clock I went down to the 'Little White House' to try to see the President or Byrnes. I am finding myself crippled by not knowing what happens in the meetings [between Truman, Churchill, and Stalin] in the late afternoon and evening. This is particularly so now that the program for S-1 is tying in [with] what we are doing in all fields. When I got there I found Byrnes out, and I asked for the President who saw me at once. I told him that it would be much more convenient for me to form my program on the military side if I could drop in early every morning and talk with him or Byrnes of the events of the preceding day. He told me at once to come; that he would be glad to see me every morning and talk over these matters with me. I then told him of matters that came up in the conference with Mr. Harriman this morning which I just referred to, and told him that I had sent for further more definite information as to the time of operation [when the a-bomb would be ready for Japan] from Harrison. He told me that he had the warning message which we prepared on his desk [The Potsdam Proclamation surrender demand for Japan; see the July 2, 1945 Diary Entry in Stimson Diary, Part 6], and had accepted our most recent change in it, and that he proposed to shoot it out as soon as he heard the definite day of the operation [when the a-bomb would be ready for Japan]. We had a brief discussion about Stalin's recent expansions and he confirmed what I have heard. But he told me that the United States was standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the information as to S-1. He evidently thinks a good deal of the new claims of the Russians are bluff, and told me what he thought the real claims were confined to.'

'After lunch and a short rest I received Generals Marshall and Arnold, and had in McCloy and Bundy at the conference. The President had told me at a meeting in the morning that he was very anxious to know whether Marshall felt that we needed the Russians in the war or whether we could get along without them, and that was one of the subjects we talked over. [Until now Truman had said getting Russia into the war against Japan was what he came to Potsdam for; see Truman's July 18, 20, and 22 letters to his wife Bess in The Truman Diary]. Of course Marshall could not answer directly or explicitly. We had desired the Russians to come into the war originally for the sake of holding up in Manchuria the Japanese Manchurian Army [so that Japan could not move them to the Japanese mainland to fight U.S. troops in an invasion]. That now was being accomplished as the Russians have amassed their forces on that border, Marshall said, and were poised, and the Japanese were moving up positions in their Army. But he pointed out that even if we went ahead in the war without the Russians, and compelled the Japanese to surrender to our terms, that would not prevent the Russians from marching into Manchuria anyhow and striking, thus permitting them to get virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms. Marshall told us during our conference that he thought thus far in the military conference they had handled only the British problems and that these are practically all settled now and probably would be tied up and finished tomorrow. He suggested that it might be a good thing, something which would call the Russians to a decision one way or the other, if the President would say to Stalin tomorrow that 'inasmuch as the British have finished and are going home, I suppose I might as well let the American Chiefs of Staff go away also' that might bring the Russians to make known what their position was and what they were going to do, and of course that indicated that Marshall felt as I felt sure he would that now with our new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan.'

'There was further talk about the war in the Pacific in the conference. Apparently they have been finding it very hard to get along with [Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Douglas] MacArthur, and Marshall has been spending most of his time in conferences in smoothing down the Navy.'

'I talked to Marshall about the preparation of S-1 and he gave us a bad picture of the rainy season weather in Japan at this time and said that one thing that might militate against our attack was the low ceiling and heavy clouds, although there were breaks and good days in between.'

'In the evening I received a telegram from Harrison giving me the exact dates as far as possible when they expected to have S-1 ready, and I answered it with a further question as to further future dates of the possibility of accumulation of supplies.' [Harrison's telegram informed Stimson that regarding use of the a-bomb on Japan, there was 'some chance August 1 to 3, good chance August 4 to 5 and barring unexpected relapse almost certain before August 10.' (U.S. Dept. of State, 'Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945', vol. 2, pg. 1374.)].

July 24, 1945 Diary Entry:

'At nine-twenty I went to 'The Little White House' and was at once shown into the President's room where he was alone with his work, and he told me about the events of yesterday's meeting [with Churchill and Stalin] with which he seemed to be very well satisfied. I then told him of my conference with Marshall and the implication that could be inferred as to his feeling that the Russians were not needed [in the war against Japan]. I also told the President of the question which Marshall had suggested might be put to Stalin as to the Americans going home, and he said that he would do that this afternoon at the end of the hearing, but he told me that there had been a meeting called by [the President's Chief of Staff Admiral William] Leahy of the Military Staffs to meet either this afternoon or I think tomorrow morning.'

'I then showed him the telegram which had come last evening from Harrison giving the dates of the [atomic bomb] operations. He said that was just what he wanted, that he was highly delighted and that it gave him his cue for his warning. He said he had just sent his warning to [Chinese president] Chiang Kai-shek to see if he would join in it, and as soon as that was cleared by Chiang he, Truman, would release the warning and that would fit right in time with the [atomic bomb] program we had received from Harrison.'

[The 'warning' was the document Stimson had put together which came to be called the Potsdam Proclamation, in which the U.S., China, and Great Britain demanded 'unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces'. It noted that 'There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest', and warned that 'stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals'. No mention was made of three of the key elements for ending the war: the emperor's fate, the atomic bomb, and Russia's plans to declare war on Japan. A copy of the Potsdam Proclamation can be found on the Nuclear Files web site at www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1945/450726-potsdam.html. See also U.S. Dept. of State, 'Foreign Relations of the U.S., The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945', vol. 2, pg. 1474-1476].

'I then spoke of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the condition of their dynasty [i.e., retention of their emperor, whom most Japanese believed was a god], and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning [the Potsdam Proclamation] was important and might be just the thing that would make or mar their acceptance, but that I had heard from Byrnes that they preferred not to put it in, and that now such a change was made impossible by the sending of the message to Chiang. I hoped that the President would watch carefully so that the Japanese might be reassured verbally through diplomatic channels if it was found that they were hanging fire on that one point. He said that he had that in mind, and that he would take care of it.' [At the top of this page of his typewritten diary is Stimson's handwritten notation 'Tell H.T. of importance of Emperor in warning - Byrnes keep it out'.]

[To do all he could to get Japan to surrender, Stimson's original version of the Potsdam Proclamation contained the following sentence in paragraph 12:

'This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression.'
That sentence was removed by President Truman and Sec. of State Byrnes before the Potsdam Proclamation was sent to Japan. A copy of Stimson's original version can be found in the latter part of www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/1945/450702-stimson-draft.html at the excellent Nuclear Files web site.]

'We had a few words more about the S-1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets [Kyoto]. He again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act [a-bombing Kyoto, Japan's cultural center] might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria [which Russia was about to invade, as part of the Yalta Conference agreement with the U.S. and Great Britain].'

[Stimson had been excluded from the Potsdam Conference meetings, and with the a-bomb schedule set he felt his usefulness at the conference was over. In a letter to his wife on July 24, Stimson summarized his feelings about his limited role:]

'The President has been uniformly kind and accessible; I see him every morning without any difficulty and he has been greatly delighted with the [atomic bomb] news I have been able to give him... but not being at the formal meetings has taken away the excitement which usually stimulates such an occasion, and I have no direct responsibility for the carrying on of the business.' (Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn., microfilm reel 112).
[On July 25th Stimson left Potsdam.]

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Why were Hiroshima and Nagasaki chosen for the atomic bombings?

First answer by 72.226.56.110. Last edit by 72.226.56.110. Question popularity: 38 [recommend question]

Answer

The Japanese refused to surrender so Truman thought it was necessary to bomb Hiroshime. After the Japanese still hadn't surrendered, Nagasaki was bombed, forcing Japan to admit defeat because their war effort could not continue to succeed after the attack

Answer

Hiroshima

Hiroshima, Japanese city, situated some 8M km. (500 mi.) from Tokyo, on which the first operational atomic bomb was dropped at 0815 on 6 August 1945. Nicknamed 'Little Boy??a reference to Roosevelt?the bomb was 3 m. (9 ft. 9 in.) long, used uranium 235, had the power of 12.5 kilotons of TNT, and weighed 3,600 kg. (nearly 8,000 lb.).

Much discussion by a Target committee had preceded the decision to make Hiroshima the first target. To be able to assess the damage it caused, and to impress the Japanese government with the destruction it was expected to wreak, it was necessary to choose a city that had not yet been touched by the USAAF?s strategic air offensives. Kyoto was also considered but its unrivalled beauty ruled it out.

The bomb was delivered by a US B29 bomber, nicknamed Enola Gay, from the Pacific island of Tinian. Dropped by parachute it exploded about 580 m. (1,885 ft.) above the ground, and at the point of detonation the temperature probably reached several million degrees centigrade. Almost immediately a fireball was created from which were emitted radiation and heat rays, and severe shock waves were created by the blast. A one-ton (900 kg.) conventional bomb would have destroyed all wooden structures within a radius of 40 m. (130 ft.). Little Boy destroyed them all within a radius of 2 km. (1.2 mi.) of the hypocentre (the point above which it exploded). The terrain was flat and congested with administrative and commercial buildings, and the radius of destruction for the many reinforced concrete structures was about 500 m. (1,625 ft.), though only the top stories of earthquake-resistant buildings were damage or destroyed. Altogether an area of 13 sq. Ikm. (5 sq. mi.) was reduced to ashes and of the 76,000 buildings in the city 62.9% were destroyed and only 8% escaped damage.

Within 1.2 km. (.74 mi.) of the hypocentre there was probably a 50% death rate of the 350,000 people estimated to have been in Hiroshima at the time. Hiroshima City Survey Section estimated a figure of 118,661 civilian deaths up to 10 August 1946 (see Table). Add to this a probable figure of 20,000 deaths of military personnel and the current figure?for people are still dying as a result of the radiation received?is in the region of 140,000. Among those who survived, the long-term effects of radiation sickness, genetic and chromosome injury, and mental trauma have been catastrophic, even unborn children having been stunted in growth and sometimes mentally retarded.

Nagasaki

Nagasaki, Japanese city on which the second operational atomic bomb was dropped. Nicknamed 'Fat Man' (a reference to Churchill), the bomb, which used plutonium 239, was dropped by parachute at 1102 on 9 August by an American B29 bomber from the Pacific island of Tinian. It measured just under 3.5 m. (11 ft. 4 in.) in length, had the power of 22 kilotons of TNT, and weighed 4,050 kg. (nearly 9,000 lb.). The aircraft's first target was the city of Kokura, now part of Kitakyushu, but as it was covered by heavy cloud the aircraft was diverted to its second target, Nagasaki.

Unlike Hiroshima, Nagasaki lies in a series of narrow valleys bordered by mountains in the east and west. The bomb exploded about 500 m. (1,625 ft.) above the ground and directly beneath it (the hypocentre) was a suburb of schools, factories, and private houses. The radius of destruction for reinforced concrete buildings was 750 m. (2,437 ft.), greater than at Hiroshima where the blast caused by the bomb was more vertical. But because of the topography, and despite the Nagasaki bomb being more powerful, only about 6.7 sq. km. (2.6 sq. mi.) of Nagasaki was reduced to ashes compared with 13 sq. km. (5 sq. mi.) of Hiroshima. Of the 51,000 buildings in the city 22.7% were completely destroyed or burt, with 36.1 % escaping any damage.

Among the 270,000 people present when the bomb was dropped, about 2,500 were labour conscripts from Korea and 350 were prisoners-of-war. About 73,884 were killed and 74,909 injured, with the affected survivors suffering the same long-term catastrophic results of radiation and mental trauma as at Hiroshima.

Answer
the targets for the abombs of world war 2 were choosen for a difent number of reasons the choice centered around the population of the surrounding area as well as the targets importance to the people of japan. america wanted to drop the bombs in the area of japan that whould have the greatest impact and have the leats amout of casualities. one of the targets that was choosen but not picked was the palace and another was a school area.

Answer

The Target Committee at Los Alamos on May 10?11, 1945, recommended Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and the arsenal at Kokura as possible targets. The committee rejected the use of the weapon against a strictly military objective because of the chance of missing a small target not surrounded by a larger urban area. The psychological effects on Japan were of great importance to the committee members. They also agreed that the initial use of the weapon should be sufficiently spectacular for its importance to be internationally recognized. The committee felt Kyoto, as an intellectual center of Japan, had a population 'better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon.' Hiroshima was chosen because of its large size, its being 'an important army depot' and the potential that the bomb would cause greater destruction because the city was surrounded by hills which would have a 'focusing effect'.

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson struck Kyoto from the list because of its cultural significance, over the objections of General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project. According to Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, Stimson 'had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier.' On July 25 General Carl Spaatz was ordered to bomb one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki as soon after August 3 as weather permitted and the remaining cities as additional weapons became available.
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US-CHINA: QUEST FOR PEACE
Part 4: 38th Parallel leads straight to Taiwan
By Henry C K Liu

Part 1: Two nations, worlds apart
Part 2: Cold War links Korea, Taiwan
Part 3: Korea: Wrong war, wrong place, wrong enemy

An exhausted US colonel, lacking adequate maps and working deep into the night on August 10, had thirty minutes to dictate the critical Paragraph 1, which outlined the terms of the Japanese surrender in World War II, terms that would shape the future of the Far East and set the stage for the Korean War and the Taiwan crisis. The 38th Parallel wasn't a good division. In fact the colonel knew it was quite undesirable, but it did bisect the peninsula and it could keep the Soviets at bay - so he drew the line that would have devasting consequences.

On August 10, military planners in the US War Department Operations Division began to outline surrender procedures in General Order No 1, which general MacArthur would transmit to the Japanese Government after its surrender. The first paragraph of the order specified the nations and commands that were to accept the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East. The Policy Section of the Strategy and Policy Group in the Operations Division drafted the initial version of the order.

Under pressure to produce a document as quickly as possible, members of the Policy Section began to work late at night on August 10. They discussed possible surrender zones, the allocation of American, British, Chinese and Soviet occupation troops to accept the surrender in the zone most convenient to them, the means of actually taking the surrender of the widely scattered Japanese military forces, and the position of the USSR in the Far East. They quickly decided to include both provisions for splitting up the entire Far East for the surrender and definitions of the geographical limits of those zones.

The chief of the policy section, colonel Charles H Bonesteel, had thirty minutes in which to dictate Paragraph 1 to a secretary, as the Joint Staff Planners and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee were impatiently awaiting the result of his work. Bonesteel thus somewhat hastily decided who would accept the Japanese surrender. His thoughts, with very slight revision, were incorporated into the final directive. Bonesteel's prime consideration was to establish a surrender line as far north as he thought the Soviets would accept. He knew that Soviet troops could reach the southern tip of Korea before American troops could arrive. He knew also that the Soviets were on the verge of moving into Korea, or were already there.

The nearest American troops to Korea were on Okinawa, 600 miles away. Bonesteel's problem therefore was to compose a surrender arrangement which, while acceptable to the Soviets, would at the same time prevent them from seizing all of Korea. If they refused to confine their advance to North Korea, the US would be unable to stop them. Thus the subsequent existence of South Korea was essentially the result of Soviet good will.

At first, Bonesteel had thought of surrender zones conforming to the provincial boundary lines. But the only map he had in his office was hardly adequate for this sort of distinction. The 38th Parallel, he noted, cut Korea approximately through the middle. If this line was agreeable to president Harry Truman and to the Soviet leader, generalissimo Joseph Stalin, it would place Seoul and a nearby prisoner of war camp in American hands. It would also leave enough land to be apportioned to the Chinese and the British if some sort of quadripartite administration became necessary. Thus he decided to use the 38th Parallel as a hypothetical line dividing the zones within which Japanese forces in Korea would surrender to appointed American and Russian authorities.

Former secretary of state Dean Rusk wrote years later:
'During a meeting on August 14,1945, colonel Charles Bonesteel and I retired to an adjacent room late at night and studied intently a map of the Korean peninsula. Working in haste and under great pressure, we had a formidable task: to pick a zone for the American occupation. . .Using a National Geographic map, we looked just north of Seoul for a convenient dividing line but could not find a natural geographic line. We saw instead the 38th Parallel and decided to recommend that. . . [The State and War Departments] accepted it without too much haggling, and surprisingly, so did the Soviets . . . [The] choice of the 38th Parallel, recommended by two tired colonels working late at night, proved fateful.'

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff telegraphed the general order to general MacArthur on August 14 and directed that he furnish an estimated time schedule for the occupation of a port in Korea. Among the items it specified, General Order No 1 stated that Japanese forces north of the 38th Parallel in Korea would surrender to the Russian commander, while those south of the parallel would surrender to the commanding general of the US expeditionary forces.

As Washington waited for Moscow's reaction to president Truman's message, there was a short period of suspense. Russian troops had entered Korea three days before the president accepted the draft of General Order No 1. If the Russians failed to accept the proposal, and if Russian troops occupied Seoul, brigadier general George A Lincoln, chief of the strategy and policy group, suggested that American occupation forces move into Pusan. Stalin replied to Truman on August 16,1945, saying nothing specifically about the 38th Parallel but he offered no objection to the substance of the president's message.

The new dividing line, about 190 miles across the peninsula, sliced across Korea without regard for political boundaries, geographical features, waterways, or paths of commerce. The 38th Parallel cut through more than 75 streams and 12 rivers, intersected many high ridges at variant angles, severed 181 small cart roads, 104 country roads,15 provincial all-weather roads, eight better-class highways, and six north-south rail lines. It was, in fact, an arbitrary separation, symbolic of the unnatural notion of two Koreas. South of the 38th Parallel, the American zone covered 37,000 square miles and held some 21,000,000 people.

North of the line, the USSR zone totaled 48,000 square miles and had about 9 million people. Of the 20 principal Korean cities,12 lay within the American zone, including Seoul, the largest, with a population of nearly 2 million. The American zone included six of Korea's 13 provinces in their entirety, the major part of two more, and a small part of another. The two areas, North and South Korea, complemented each other both agriculturally and industrially. South Korea was mainly a farming area, where fully two-thirds of the inhabitants worked the land. It possessed three times as much irrigated rice land as the northern area, and furnished food for the north. But North Korea furnished the fertilizer for the southern rice fields, and the largest nitrogenous fertilizer plant in the Far East was in Hungnam. Although North Korea also had a high level of agricultural production, it was deficient in some crops. The political barrier imposed serious adverse effects on the natural symbiosis of the divided zones.

South Korea in 1940 produced about 74 percent of Korea's light consumer goods and processed products. Its industry consisted of some large and many small plants producing textiles, rubber products, hardware and ceramics. Many of these plants had been built to process raw materials from North Korea.

North Korea, a largely mountainous region contains valuable mineral deposits, especially coal. Excellent hydroelectric plants, constructed during the last 10 years of Japanese domination, ranked with the largest and best in the world. Because of its power resources, North Korea housed almost all of Korea's heavy industry, including several rolling mills and a highly developed chemical industry. In 1940, North Korea produced 86 percent of Korea's heavy manufactured goods. The only petroleum processing plant in the country, a major installation designed to serve all of Korea, was located in the north, as were seven of eight cement plants. Almost all the electrical power used by South Korea came from the north, as did iron, steel, wood pulp and industrial chemicals needed by South Korea's light industry.

Sharp differences between North and South had traditionally been part of the Korean scene. South Koreans considered their northern neighbors crude and culturally backward. North Koreans viewed southerners as lazy schemers. During the Japanese occupation, Koreans in the north had been much less tractable than those in the south. Differences in farming accounted for some of the social differences in the two zones. A dry-field type of farming in the North opposed a rice-culture area in the South to produce marked variations in points of view. In the South were more small farms and a high tenancy rate, while in the North larger farms and more owner-farmers prevailed.

All of those economic and cultural differences the 38th Parallel promised to exacerbate.

In this famous address to Congress on March 12, 1947, known as the Truman Doctrine Speech, president Truman stressed the moralistic duty of the US to combat totalitarian regimes worldwide. His speech specifically called for US$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, both of which he considered to be threatened by communist insurrections as a result of British withdrawal. Congress responded to Truman's appeal by allocating both the requested financial aid and US troops to administer postwar reconstruction.

The Truman Doctrine eventually led to the Marshall Plan, spending $13 billion (out of a 1947 GDP of $244 billion or 5.4 percent) to help Europe recover economically from World War II and to keep it from communism. The most significant aspect of the Marshall plan was the US guarantee of US investors in Europe to exchange their profits in European currencies back into dollars. This established the dollar as the world's reserved currency and laid the foundation for dollar hegemony for over half a century. In the same speech, to justify the high cost of combating communism in Europe, Truman said: 'The United States contributed $341 billion toward winning World War II.'

Today, the US spends about $400 billion a year, or 4 percent of its of GDP, on its defense budget, not counting the open-ended cost of the Iraq War and occupation so far. All in all, if the US were to spend 4 percent of its GDP annually on foreign economic aid, US security might well be better enhanced.

Professor Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago has pointed out that declassified Soviet documents do not support the existence of any plan by North Korea of a wholesale invasion of the South, only a limited military operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula - jutting southward from the 38th Parallel on Korea's west coast, reachable from the South only by sea or by an overland route through North Korean territory. This is where the Korean War conventionally dated from June 25, 1950, began, and where fighting between the South and North began on May 4, 1949, in a battle started by the South, according to the most reliable accounts.

According to Soviet documents, Kim Il-sung first broached the idea of an operation against Ongjin to Soviet ambassador T F Shtykov on August 12,1949. This came on the heels of the biggest Ongjin battle of 1949, initiated on August 4 by the North to dislodge South Korean army units holding Unpa Mountain, a salient above the 38th Parallel which the South had attacked in a previous battle. The coveted summit commanded much of the terrain to the north. The North sought, in the words of the American commander of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) 'to recover high ground in North Korea occupied by [the] South Korean Army.' Before dawn, it launched strong artillery barrages and then at 5:30 am, 4,000 to 6,000 North Korean border guards attacked the salient. They routed the South Korean defenders, destroying two companies of Republic of Korea soldiers and leaving hundreds dead.

Virtual panic ensued at high levels of the South Korean government, leading President Syngman Rhee and his favored high officers in the army to argue that the only way to relieve pressure on Ongjin was to drive north to Chorwon - which happened to be about 20 miles into North Korean territory. Rhee, who began his political career by forming a government-in-exile in Nationalist Shanghai, was meeting in a southern Korean port with Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] on forming an anti-communist military alliance.

He returned immediately to Seoul and dressed down his defense minister for not having 'attacked the North' after the Ongjin debacle. The American ambassador and the Korean Military Advisory Group commander both intervened, since an attack on Chorwon would lead to, in the words of the latter, 'heavy civil war and might spread'. The South did not move against Chorwon, but attacks from both sides across the 38th Parallel on the Ongjin peninsula continued through the end of 1949.

Professor Cumings wrote: 'All this is based on unimpeachable American archival documentation, some of which was reproduced in the 1949 Korea papers of the Foreign Relations of the US and which I treated at length in my 1990 book. When we now look at both sides of the Parallel with the help of Soviet materials, we see how similar the Soviets were in seeking to restrain hotheaded Korean leaders, including the two chiefs of state. Indeed, two key Soviet Embassy officials seeking to restrain Kim used language almost identical to that which John Foster Dulles used with Rhee in his June 1950 discussions in Seoul (both, upon hearing Kim or Rhee declaim their desire to attack the other side, 'tried to switch the discussion to a general theme', to quote from document No 6). We see that Kim Il-sung, like southern leaders, wanted to bite off a chunk of exposed territory or grab a small city - all of Kaesong for example, which is bisected by the 38th Parallel, or Haeju city just above the Parallel on Ongjin, which southern commanders wanted to occupy in 1949-50.'

The issue of socialist world revolution had been settled by the Stalin-Trotsky dispute before World War II, with Stalin's strategy of 'socialism in one country' accepted as official Soviet policy. Stalin never expected the Chinese communists to gain control of China and urged them to cooperate as a minority polity with the Kuomintang (KMT). This Soviet posture fit with general Marshall's attempt to forge a coalition government in post-war China. But the march of history made irresistible throughout the oppressed world the struggle against Western imperialism, a dilapidated system weakened by two world wars of inter-capitalist rivalry.

Much of the national bourgeoisie in colonized nations, co-opted for over a century into the role of submissive compradors, after World War II took up the banner of defending capitalism, under the wing of a new economic imperialism emanating from the US to replace collapsing European colonial empires. This new imperialism smeared indigenous anti-imperialist struggles as part of a fantasized centrally directed world communist revolution that fueled justification for the Cold War. The Cold War was America's pretext to inherit the Franco-British empire, which Germany tried twice to seize without success. Reactionary nationalist leaders such as Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee used anti-communism as a ticket to get US financial and military aid to advance their own agenda.

From 1945 to 1950, the Soviets repeatedly avoided confrontation with the US. Soviet conditions required a long period of peace for the reconstruction of the war-decimated Soviet economy. Soviet policies assigned indigenous communist struggles in the colonial world the role of fending for themselves with their own meager resources, with only moral support from the USSR, seasoned with practical constraints based on geopolitical realpolitik. Stalin's priorities were essentially local and practical: he was determined that the outcome of the war must provide absolutely dependable arrangements for the geopolitical security of the Soviet state in the form of a classical sphere of influence, an understanding he had reached with president Roosevelt, both hoping the US-USSR war-time alliance would continue into peace-time mutual acceptance of separate spheres of influence. Both camps saw their separate ideology as a necessary basis for the security of their separate domestic political survival.

Under Truman, in response to indigenous liberation struggles in former European empires, the US turned away from a bipolar regional sphere of influence, the principle by which the Kremlin expected to exercise political influence over its immediate neighbors - and instead favored a universal approach that gave the West a pretext to meddle in the Soviet sphere in the name of freedom. The US policy of containment then turned into a reactionary global strategy against social progress in the name of anti-communism. The notion of a Soviet strategy for socialist world revolution was entirely the paranoid fantasy of National Security Council Report 68, furnished as a counterpoint pretext for US global hegemony.

Since imperialist expansion violates the American self-image, the US invariably must demonize its targets of aggression, with charges such as 'axis of evil' in order to link nations deemed obstructively hostile to US imperium, such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea - nations that otherwise have no military alliance or even political similarity. Two new major post-war US allies, Germany and Japan, former adversaries in the war against fascist militarism, were nurtured into what society would have become if fascism had won the war and eventually normalized its excesses. And this is clearly shown by Rainer Werner Fassbinder, the talented and insightful post-war German filmmaker, in his thought-provoking productions.

Evgueni Bajanov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Institute for Contemporary International Problems, studied recently declassified Soviet archives and wrote in his article: 'Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-50,' that Stalin was worried about an attack from South Korea, and did everything to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul. Through 1947-48, Soviet leaders still accepted the possibility of an eventual unification of Korea under a dominant South, and refused to sign a separate friendship and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. In the beginning of 1949, the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang began to alert the Kremlin to the growing number of violations of the 38th Parallel by South Korean police and armed forces. On February 3,1949, Soviet ambassador to North Korea Shtykov bitterly complained that the North Koreans did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient numbers of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South.

Receiving Kim Il-sung in the Kremlin on March 5, 1949, Stalin showed an open concern about growing pressure from the opponent in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel and emphatically told Kim: 'The 38th Parallel must be peaceful. It is very important.'

After Kim's return to Korea, the situation did not improve. On April 17,1949, Stalin warned his ambassador of an imminent attack from the South. The Soviet ambassador confirmed that a large-scale war was being prepared by Seoul with the help of Americans and raised alarm about the inability of North Korean troops to withstand the aggression. In May-August 1949, the Kremlin and Pyongyang continued to exchange data about a possible attack from the South. The USSR was clearly afraid of such an attack, and was nervous not knowing how to prevent the war. Stalin repeatedly castigated ambassador Shtykov for failing to do everything in his power to maintain peace on the 38th Parallel.

While Stalin tried to prevent a full-scale civil war in Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, demanding support to continue the civil war to liberate the South as a matter of ideological imperative. On March 7,1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow, Kim Il-sung said: 'We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means.'

The Soviet leader disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the Soviet-US agreement on the 38th Parallel, and the possibility of American intervention. Stalin added that only if the adversary attacked Pyongyang could they try military reunification by launching a counterattack. 'Then,' Stalin explained, 'your move will be understood and supported by everyone.'

On September 11,1949, Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending instructions to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political and international aspects of a possible attack on the South. The embassy gave a negative view on the matter on September 14, and on September 24 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Politburo rejected the North Korean appeal to start an all-out civil war, concluding that the North Korean army was not prepared for such an attack militarily, that 'little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle,' and that an unprovoked attack by the North 'would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs'.

At the same time of the exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang, Mao Zedong, in his new status as leader of China, was visiting the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data the Soviet leader never mentioned to his Chinese guest any decision to support a full-scale civil war, nor his invitation to Kim Il-sung to come to Moscow. Kim and his delegation spent most of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was the ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means. Thereafter, Stalin gave his approval to an all-out civil war and outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared.

Stalin changed his mind on Korea because of:
1) The victory of the communists in China.
2) The Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb, first tested by Moscow in August 1949.
3) The establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West.
4) A perceived weakening of Washington's positions and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia over Korea as implied by secretary of state Dean Acheson's speech.

Stalin might have also concluded that the US had decided to embark on a Cold War and that a US-Soviet condominium envisioned by FDR was no longer possible. Still, Stalin had only aimed at a strengthening of the North to balance massive US military aid to the South for a protracted but controlled confrontation, not expecting the North to overrun the South's military so quickly and easily.

Stalin did not consult Mao in advance of his decision because he wanted to work out the plans for the long-range unification of Korea without Chinese interference and objections, and then he would present Beijing with a fait accompli, which Mao would have no choice but to accept as a given fact, and assist. While in Moscow, Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan, for which Soviet help on the nearly non-existent Chinese navy was necessary, but Stalin reacted negatively to the idea. It would have been hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans reunify their country before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country. Also, Korea was more critical to Soviet security than Taiwan.

China had been involved in working out revolutionary unification strategy in Korea by the late 1940s. Mao supported Kim's desire to liberate the South on principle and even promised to help with troops eventually if necessary. However, Mao recommended patience, to wait until the Chinese completed their own revolutionary civil war. In the beginning of May 1949, Kim Il-sung had meetings with Chinese leaders. Mao warned Kim not to advance to the South in the near future. He cited the unfavorable situation in the world and the preoccupation of China with its own civil war. Mao recommended postponing a full-scale civil war in Korea until all China was reunited under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

After Kim's April 1950 visit to the USSR, of which declassified records showing Mao as knowing nothing, Stalin authorized the Soviet ambassador in Beijing to tell the Chinese leadership the following: 'Korean comrades visited us recently. I'll inform you shortly about the results of our conversations.' Simultaneously Kim Il-sung requested a visit to Beijing to execute Stalin's instructions: to continue with civil war plans only if China supported the idea. On the eve of the visit, Kim said to the Soviet ambassador that he did not intend to ask anything from the Chinese since 'all his requests had been met in Moscow.'

In April 1950, leaders of the guerilla movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang to work out a program of action for before and after the full-scale civil war. On May 12, 1950, Kim Il-sung informed the Soviet ambassador that his General Staff had already started to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to start the campaign in June but was not sure that preparations could be completed by that time. By the end of May, the armaments that had been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan of a full-scale civil war was ready. Kim insisted on commencing action in June, not in July as Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that large-scale preparations could be detected by the South; and that in July, rain would slow the advancement of troops.

While making final preparations for the full-scale civil war, the North continued proposing initiatives on the peaceful unification of Korea as a last effort. Initially, the North wanted to strike at the Ongjin peninsula, but at the last moment the strategy was changed. It was believed that Seoul had learned about the pending attack and had beefed up its defenses of Ongjin. The North Koreans now sought Moscow's support for operations along the whole border. The final period, May-June 1950, before the attack is not well documented in Soviet materials declassified to date, and additional research in the archives by historians is required to get a clearer and more detailed picture of the final preparations for the war.

Some evidence suggests that the North had originally wanted merely to stop repeated hostile incursions from the South, but the unanticipated rapid collapse of the South Korean military in the early days of the campaign led the North to change its strategy to an all-out war of hot pursuit to take control of the entire peninsula - a task it had not planned to undertake originally and for which it did not have proper logistic support. Accordingly, the North's advance south ran out of steam after US intervention and turned into disastrous disarray after the US landing at Inchon three months later.

While China supported Korean reunification as a general principle, Chinese leaders were distressed and offended by the fact that the North Koreans did not consult with them and did not pay heed to their advice of caution. On July 2, 1950, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in a conversation with Soviet ambassador N V Roshchin complained that the North Koreans had underestimated the probability of American military intervention, ignoring Mao's warnings against adventurism back in May 1949 and 1950. Zhou passed on Mao's advice to the North Koreans to create a strong defense line in the area of Inchon, because American troops could land there.

In Chinese history, an expeditionary campaign to Korea in the 7th century by Tang dynasty forces had landed at Inchon with great success. The Chinese leadership feared landing operations by Americans behind North Korean lines in other parts of the Korean peninsula as well. In this conversation, Zhou confirmed that if the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel, Chinese troops of Korean ethnicity would engage the opponent. Three Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden, known as Shengyang, in Manchuria as a contingency. Zhou inquired if it would be possible to cover these troops with Soviet air support. On July 20, North Korean troops captured Taejon, taking US major general William Dean prisoner. On July 29, Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader on Taiwan, offered to send 33,000 soldiers to Korea, but the UN, under US control, declined the offer, as that would bring the Chinese civil war into Korea.

According to Roy E Appleman of the Center of Military History, US Army, (South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu), MacArthur's daring landing at Inchon was based on intelligence reports that the enemy, as a result of unanticipated battlefield success in the drive south, had neglected his rear. The information added that the North's military advance was dangling on a thin logistical thread that could be quickly cut in the Seoul area, that the enemy had committed practically all his forces against the US Eighth Army in the south, and had no trained reserves and little power of recuperation.

MacArthur stressed strategic, political and psychological reasons for the landing at Inchon and the quick recapture of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. It would capture the imagination of Asia, restore US prestige and win support for the UN Command, he argued. MacArthur pointed to a huge wall map and told a planning conference - in order to overcome Navy doubts based on difficult tidal conditions at Inchon - that Inchon would be the anvil on which the hammer of lieutenant general Walton H Walker's Eighth Army from the South would crush the North Koreans.

The Navy was apprehensive that tides in the restricted waters of the channel and the harbor must have a maximum depth of 33 feet. World War II landing craft that were to be used required 23 feet of tide to clear the mud flats, and the Landing Ships with Tank (LSTs) required 29 feet of tide - a favorable condition that prevailed only once a month over a period of three or four days. The narrow, shallow channel necessitated a daylight approach for the larger ships. Accordingly, it was necessary to schedule the main landings for the late afternoon high tide. A night approach, however, by a battalion-sized attack group was to be made for the purpose of seizing Wolmi-do during the early morning high tide, a necessary preliminary to the main landing at Inchon itself.

MacArthur and his planners had selected September 15 for D-day because there would then be a high tide giving maximum water depth over the Inchon mud flats. Tidal range for September 15 reached 31.2 feet at high and minus 0.5 feet at low water. Only on this day did the tide reach this extreme range. No other date after this would permit landing until September 27 when a high tide would reach 27 feet. On October 11-13, there would be a tide of 30 feet. Morning high tide on September 15 came at 0659, forty-five minutes after sunrise; evening high tide came at 1919, twenty-seven minutes after sunset. The Navy set 23 feet of tide as the critical point needed for landing craft to clear the mud flat and reach the landing sites.

Another consideration was the sea walls that fronted the Inchon landing sites. Built to turn back unusually high tides, they were 16 feet in height above the mud flats. They presented a scaling problem except at extreme high tide. Since the landing would be made somewhat short of extreme high tide in order to use the last hour or two of daylight, ladders would be needed. Some aluminum scaling ladders were made in Kobe, Japan, and there were others of wood. Grappling hooks, lines and cargo nets were readied for use in holding the boats against the sea wall. All considered, it was an uncommonly daring operation and its success was a testimony to the excellence of the US military.

Air strikes and naval gunfire raked Wolmi-do and, after this three rocket ships moved in close and put down an intense rocket barrage. The landing crafts straightened out into lines from their circling and moved toward the line of departure. Just as the ship's loud speaker announced: 'Landing force crossing line of departure,' MacArthur came on the bridge of the Amphibious Force Flagship USS Mt McKinley. It was 0625. The first major amphibious assault by American troops against an enemy since Easter Sunday, April 1,1945, at Okinawa was under way. About one mile of water lay between the line of departure and the Wolmi-do beach. The US X Corps expeditionary troops arriving off Inchon on September 15 numbered over 70,000 men.

On September 6, the US daily intelligence summary included a report of the Nationalist Chinese Ministry of Defense G-2 on Taiwan that if the war turned against the North and moved into Northern territory, elements of marshal Lin Piao's Chinese Fourth Field Army probably would be committed by Beijing. This report further indicated that such troops would not be used as Chinese units but would be integrated into the North Korea People's Army. The US Far East Command learned in mid-September of an alleged conference in mid-July in Beijing where it was decided to support North Korea - short of war. Premier Zhou was quoted, however, as having said that if the North Koreans were driven by US forces back to the Yalu, Chinese forces would enter Korea.

US Far East Command intelligence, in commenting on this report, said that the Chinese communist authorities apparently were worried over Korea and would regard a US advance to the Yalu as a 'serious threat to their regime'. In a little more than a week, MacArthur's troops were in the capital, Seoul, and they had cut off the bulk of the North Korean forces around Pusan.

On September 27, the US Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to destroy the enemy army and authorized him to conduct military operations north of the 38th Parallel. On October 7, US troops crossed the Parallel. The same day, the UN General Assembly approved, 47-5, an American resolution endorsing the action. On the last day of September, the daily intelligence summary reported on an alleged high-level conference in Beijing on August 14, at which it had been decided to provide 250,000 Chinese troops for use in Korea.

In general, Moscow and Beijing held convergent views on the strategy and tactics of the war, until the US landing at Inchon, when the perspective in China started to change. In a conversation with Soviet ambassador Roshchin on September 21, premier Zhou stated that there were those in China who worried that the Korean War would drag on and would require costly sacrifices on the part of China. China's authorities provided Soviet intelligence with information showing Kremlin policy in Korea in a bad light.

At one point, Moscow was informed by Beijing that the British consul in the Chinese capital had reached the conclusion that the USSR and the US had colluded in Korea, trying - with the help of the war there - to prevent China from liberating Taiwan, completing the civil war and becoming a power in Asia. (Roshchin cable to Moscow, July 13, 1950, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii AVP RF). In the 1970s, during the Sino-Soviet split and US-China rapprochement, Taiwan played its Soviet card by trying to develop a rapprochement of its own with the USSR.

Harvard historian and Russian specialist Adam Ulam concluded that Soviet support for the attack on South Korea was not to gain control over South Korea, 'a negligible prize, certainly not worth the risk incurred in authorizing the operation'. Instead, Ulam suspected that Stalin could have foreseen that Washington would protect Taiwan should war break out in Korea, and that Mao, faced with the possibility of a renewed civil war on the mainland, would thus require Soviet support.

'It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Korean imbroglio was instigated by the Russians for the specific purpose of discouraging the Chinese Communists from breaking away from Soviet tutelage,' Ulam wrote. (The Communists: The Story of Power and Lost Illusions: 1948-1991 (New York and Toronto: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 81-82).

On October 1,1950, Stalin came to the conclusion that China had to come to the rescue of the collapsing North Korean defense. On that day he sent an urgent message to Mao and Zhou asking them 'to move to the 38th Parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give our Korean comrades a chance to organize under the protection of your troops' military reserves to the north of the 38th Parallel.' Stalin added that Pyongyang was not informed of this request. It did not take Mao long to respond to Stalin's cable, declining on the ground that Chinese troops were not strong enough and a clash between China and the US would ruin Beijing's plans for peaceful reconstruction and could drag the USSR into a war with Washington. Instead, he suggested that the North Koreans accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.

Stalin, notwithstanding earlier signals to the US of no direct Soviet intervention in Korea, tried to convince Beijing that the US would not dare to start a big war and would agree on a settlement on Korea favorable to the socialist bloc. Under such a scenario, China would also solve the Taiwan issue. He added that even if the US provoked a big war, 'let it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the United States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the continent in the form of Rhee's Korea.'

Stalin informed Kim Il-sung about his attempts to persuade China and called upon the North Koreans 'to hold firm to every piece of their land'. However, on October 12, 1950, the Soviet leader told Kim that China had refused again and that Korea had to be evacuated. On the next day, however, Stalin had better news: The Chinese, after long deliberation and discussion, had agreed to extend direct military aid to North Korea. Moscow, in exchange, agreed to arm the Chinese troops and to provide them with air cover. However, Soviet supplies of military material to both North Korea and China never matched that provided to South Korea by the US.

According to available sources, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Two members of the Chinese leadership sympathetic to Moscow, Gao Gang, who was in charge of Manchuria, and general Peng Dehuai, finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was that if all of Korea was occupied by the US, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution. Those who opposed participation, on the other hand, complained about Soviet refusal to participate directly in a conflict initially encouraged by Moscow. Memory was still fresh about the Soviet deal with the Chinese Nationalists to recognize Outer Mongolia's independence in exchange for keeping Chinese communists from entering Manchuria, so that the Soviets could dismantle Manchurian industrial assets for shipping back to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese communists had to fight with captured Japanese remnant 1930s equipment to liberate Manchuria from newly US-equipped Nationalist forces, to whom the Soviets had delivered control of Manchuria after they accepted Japanese surrender. Nationalist troops were airlifted by the US into Manchuria with Soviet concurrence. The Manchurian Campaign turned into the PLA's first victory in conventional warfare in the long civil war. It saw the destruction, surrender or desertion of 400,000 of the KMT's finest troops, together with their newest weapons and armor when the campaign was over. Some even suggested that China should accept the American advance, even risking occupation by the US of Manchuria - because in that case, a war between Moscow and Washington would break out and China could stay away from unneeded trouble or even be the balancer of power.

On October 3, 1950, China's then foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, summoned Indian ambassador Sardar K M Panikkar in Beijing and told him that if US or UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel, China would send troops to defend North Korea. He said this action would not be taken if only South Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel, as China would not interfere with the Korean civil war. This information was communicated quickly by the Indian ambassador to his government, which in turn informed the US and the UN.

Washington immediately dispatched the message to general MacArthur in Tokyo. Representatives of other nations reported similar statements coming from Chinese officials in Beijing. Then, on October 10, Beijing Radio broadcast a declaration of Chinese intentions in a statement to the same effect. On October 15, the US Department of the Army informed MacArthur's headquarters of another report from a reliable source that Moscow was preparing a surprise for American troops when they approached the northern Korean border.

Ten days earlier, on October 5, for the first time, US Far East Command intelligence listed the number one priority in terms of enemy capabilities as being the 'Reinforcement by Soviet Satellite China'. But this estimate did not long remain its first priority; it dropped to second place the next day, to third place on October 9, and remained there through October 13. On October 14, the intelligence estimate again raised the reinforcement of North Korea to first priority. There it remained during the Wake Island Conference between president Truman and general MacArthur.

The US Far East Command daily intelligence summary for October 14 carried a lengthy analysis of the problem and presumably represented the official view of major general Charles A Willoughby, Far East Command G-2. This intelligence estimate accepted a total strength of 38 Chinese divisions in nine armies in Manchuria, which Chinese refer to as the Northeast, or dongbei. The region borders Inner Mongolia to the west, Russia to the north and North Korea to the east, and is comprised of Jilin, Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces. The intelligence report expressed the view that the USSR would find it convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the Chinese provide the troops if there was to be intervention.

It went on to say that the interest of all intelligence agencies was focused on the 'elusive Lin Piao' and the Yalu River. One significant paragraph stated:

'Recent declarations by CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) leaders, threatening to enter North Korea if American forces were to cross the 38th Parallel, are probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail. [Italics supplied.] The decision, if any, is beyond the purview of collective intelligence: it is a decision for war, on the highest level; i.e. the Kremlin and Peiping [Beijing]. However, the numerical and troop potential in Manchuria is a fait-accompli. A total of 24 divisions are disposed along the Yalu River at crossing points. In this general deployment, the grouping in the vicinity of Antung is the most immediately available Manchurian force, astride a suitable road net for deployment southward.'
This same report pointed to the recent fall of Wonsan as a serious loss to the enemy and one jeopardizing his entire defense structure. It went on to say: 'This open failure of the enemy to rebuild his forces suggests that the CCF and Soviets, in spite of their continued interest and some blatant public statements, have decided against further expensive investment in support of a lost cause.'

Meanwhile, President Truman on October 10 had announced his intention to fly to the Pacific for a meeting with General MacArthur over the coming weekend to discuss 'the final phase of UN action in Korea.' The conference between the President, General MacArthur, and selected advisers of each took place on Wake Island, Sunday, October 15. Most of the talk concerned plans for the rehabilitation of Korea after the fighting ceased.

General MacArthur said he expected formal resistance to end throughout North and South Korea by Thanksgiving Day and that he hoped to get the Eighth Army back to Japan by Christmas. In response to President Truman's question, 'What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?' official notes of the conference indicate that General MacArthur replied substantially as follows:

'Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand with hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 200,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be greatest slaughter.'
General MacArthur then discussed briefly the chance of Russian intervention, holding the view that it was not feasible and would not take place. He said the Eighth Army would be back home by Christmas.

General MacArthur later challenged the accuracy of the official notes of the conversations at the Wake Island Conference. He maintained that the question concerning possible Chinese or Soviet intervention was low on the President's agenda, and that while he replied that the chances of such intervention were 'very little,' he added that this opinion was purely speculative and derived from the military standpoint, while the question fundamentally was one requiring a political decision. His view, he stated, was also conditioned by the military assumption that if the Chinese did intervene, US forces would retaliate, and in a peninsular war could create havoc with their exposed lines of communication and bases of supply. He said, in effect, that he took it for granted that Chinese knowledge of this capability would be a powerful factor in keeping them from intervening. Militarily, MacArthur was right: a peninsula war greatly discounts the numerical advantage of large army against a technologically superior smaller force with air superiority.

The statement of Zhou Enlai to the Indian ambassador on October 3, the announcements made over Beijing radio, the timing of Chinese troop movements as learned from intelligence, taken in connection with later events, made it seem reasonably clear that China had decided by early October on intervention in North Korea if UN troops other than South Korea's crossed the 38th Parallel.

Whether Chinese leaders believed the UN Command would cross the Parallel is unknown, but there is at least one good reason to think the North Korean Government believed the UN Command would stop at the 38th Parallel. Kim Il-sung, commander in chief of the North Korea People's Army, in an order to the army dated October 14, 1950, stated in part, 'Other reasons that we have failed are that many of us felt that the 38th Parallel would be as far as the US Forces would attack. . .'

Within a few days after the lead elements of the US forces crossed the 38th Parallel at Kaesong on October 9, lead elements of the Chinese 'volunteers' were crossing the Yalu River at the Manchurian border into North Korea. The first of these troops apparently crossed the boundary on October 13 or 14. Four Chinese armies, each of three divisions, then crossed the Yalu River between October 14 and 20. Two of them, the 38th and the 40th, crossed from An-tung, Manchuria, to Sinuiju, North Korea; the other two, the 38th and 42nd, crossed from Chi-an, Manchuria, to Manpojin, North Korea. All four armies were part of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army and upon arrival in Korea were subordinated to the XIII Army Group. The 1st Motorized Artillery Division, two regiments of the 2nd Motorized Artillery Division, and a cavalry regiment also crossed into Korea at An-tung about October 20-22 in support of the four armies already across.

At the time that general MacArthur was telling president Truman and his top advisers on Wake Island on October 15 that there was very little likelihood the Chinese would intervene, and that, if they did, no more than 60,000 could get across the Yalu, and that his air force would destroy them - approximately 120,000 Chinese soldiers either had already crossed, were in the act of crossing, or were moving from their assembly and training areas to the crossing sites for the purpose of crossing.

China entered the war officially on October 27. About 20,000 Chinese and that many North Koreans attacked South Korean and American forces in the region stretching from Unsan to Huichon about 55 miles south of the Yalu. The Republic of Korea (ROK) 6th Division was forced to withdraw from positions they had established a day earlier on the Yalu. They and the 7th and 8th Divisions were put on the defensive. A regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division was trapped near Unsan. More troops and equipment were being brought in from China daily. China also announced that it sent 50,000 troops to Tibet on October 19.

US State Department experts on the USSR, George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, urged the Joint Chiefs against crossing the 38th Parallel. They believed that the USSR and China would join the war - if US invaded North Korea. But the hawks - Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk (who drew the 38th Parallel and who later got the US involved in the Vietnam War) and John Allison - won the day and talked Truman into siding with MacArthur over the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

October 1950 was a month of rapid daily critical developments:

South Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel on October 1, the day MacArthur called upon North Korea to surrender. The ROK 3rd Division on Korea's east coast pursued North Korean troops across the 38th Parallel with no resistance. A US Army observation plane had airdropped orders to them to enter North Korea. The 3rd Division had pursued the enemy since they began retreating following the US Inchon landing.

The Capital Division followed soon after on October 3. On the same day, Premier Zhou Enlai informed the Indian ambassador to Beijing that China would intervene in the Korean War if US or UN forces cross the 38th Parallel. On the next day, India warned the UN that China told them it would enter the war if UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel.

That same day, October 4, general MacArthur issued 'United Nations Command Operations Order 2' which was the plan for UN forces to cross into North Korea. ROK troops were already 20 to 30 miles north of the 38th Parallel on the east coast at this time. The 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was airlifted to Kimpo Air Base. It became part of US I-Corps.

On October 3, the US Eighth Army issued its attack order across the 38th Parallel, calling for the US I-Corps to seize a line west of the Imjin River. I-Corps would then conduct operations northward, the main effort being spearheaded by the 1st Cavalry Division. The US 24th Division and ROK 1st Division were to protect the Corps' flanks and form a reserve. UN Command air forces began a three-day bombing campaign against Wonsan in North Korea and roads between Antung and Pyongyang. Aircrews claimed they knocked out a 100-mile long convoy moving heavy guns and other military supplies coming from Manchuria.

The UN authorized UN Command forces to cross the 38th parallel on October 7, the same day US forces crossed the 38th Parallel. Following a debate on 'the future of Korea after the defeat of communism', the UN General Assembly voted to 'reunify and rehabilitate' Korea. Under the false impression that the US had won the war, part of the resolution gave UN forces permission to go into North Korea.

The US and Great Britain promised to leave the country when the fighting ended. On October 8, the day US forces crossed the 38th Parallel, Mao Zedong ordered Chinese 'volunteers' to cross the Korean border. On October 10, South Korean troops captured Wonsan.

On October 16, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu and entered Korea. On October 19, UN forces captured Pyongyang, capital of North Korea. Chinese forces began their offensive maneuvers in Korea on October 25, two days before the official date of China's entry to the Korean War. On October 27, Chinese and North Korean forces attacked in mass.

Chinese forces began a massive offensive on November 1. MacArthur informed the UN on November 5 that China was fighting in Korea in force. On November 22, Chinese Forces in North Korea said: 'Chinese do not want to fight Americans' when they turned 27 wounded US prisoners over to UN forces near Yongbon on the central front. US Army intelligence dismissed China's intentions behind the release.

China's strategy in Korea aimed to transmit two messages: First, China would not permit US occupation of North Korea, and second, China's main concern continued to be Taiwan, and like the US, China wanted to limit the fighting in Korea. The second message was reinforced by Beijing's acceptance of an invitation to go to the UN to discuss the Taiwan situation and, hopefully, the Korean War and to cease hostility temporarily.

Historian Stephen E Ambrose wrote that MacArthur planned to sabotage the peace negotiations by launching a surprise ground offensive on November 15, 1950, which would have coincided with the announced arrival date of the Chinese delegates at the UN. The Chinese delegates, however, were delayed. On November 11, MacArthur learned of the delay, and later that the Chinese delegation would arrive at the UN on November 24. MacArthur put off his offensive, finally beginning it on the morning of November 24. Thus the headlines that greeted the Chinese delegates when they arrived at the UN declared that MacArthur again promised to have the boys 'home by Christmas', after they had all been to the Yalu. The Americans were once again marching to the Chinese border, this time in greater force.

The Europeans were incensed. The French government charged that MacArthur had 'launched his offensive at this time to wreck the negotiations' and the British New Statesman declared that MacArthur had 'acted in defiance of all common sense, and in such a way as to provoke the most peace-loving nation.' The Chinese delegation returned to Beijing, convinced of US duplicity.

The failure of the negotiations did not upset Truman, but the failure of MacArthur's offensive did. MacArthur had advanced on two widely separated routes, with his middle wide open. How he could have done so, given the earlier Chinese intervention, remains a mystery to military analysts. The Chinese command poured tens of thousands of troops into the gap and soon sent MacArthur's divided troops fleeing for their lives. In two weeks, Chinese forces cleared much of North Korea, isolated MacArthur's units into three bridgeheads, and completely reversed the military situation.

The real beneficiary was Japan. In response to Korea, Truman pushed through a peace treaty with Japan, signed in September 1951, which excluded the USSR and established US military bases, allowed for Japanese rearmament and unrestricted industrialization. It also encouraged a Japanese boom by dismissing British, Australian, Chinese, Southeast Asian and other demands for reparations. Truman extended American bases around the world, hemming in both the USSR and China. By March 1951, the two sides were again at the 38th Parallel where China did not want to venture further south. The Truman administration, having been burned once, was ready to negotiate. MacArthur sabotaged the efforts to obtain a cease-fire by crossing the 38th Parallel and demanding an unconditional surrender from Chinese forces. Truman decided to remove the general at the first opportunity.

Korean War truce talks did not begin until July 10, 1951. Although the talks started slowly, on November 27, 1951, the two sides agreed on the 38th Parallel as the line of demarcation and almost immediately military operations slowed down. When general Mark Clark assumed command of UN forces in Korea, on May 12, 1952, he was confronted with a military deadlock on the front lines, stalled armistice negotiations, and a violent prisoner of war situation on the island of Koje-do, off the southern coast of South Korea. Believing that the communists only understood force, Clark stepped up military pressure on the enemy to break the stalemate at Panmunjom. Consistent with the defensive nature of Chinese intervention, Chinese forces never ventured more than 50 miles south of the 38th Parallel, beyond strategic battles for Seoul.

Back on December 7, 1950, Stalin and Mao had agreed to present at the UN conditions for a cease-fire. On January 8, 1951, in a cable announcing the further advance of Chinese troops, Stalin wrote: 'From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades on the capture of Seoul. This is a great victory of popular patriotic forces over forces of reaction.' On January 19, marshal Peng Dehuai, commander of China's 'volunteers, reported to Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao's plan of a rest and thorough preparation for the final assault, though Pak Hon-yong, an early rival to Kim Il-sung, tried to hurry things up. It was also agreed that the North Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese participation was needed.

On April 21 1951, less than three months before the start of truce talks on Korea, the US Defense Department announced the appointment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group for Taiwan, on whose recommendation the U.S. resumed direct military aid to the Nationalists. On May 18, Dean Rusk, then assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, set the course for US-China policy for the next two decades when he stated: 'The regime in Peiping [Beijing] ... is not the government of China. . .We recognize the national government of the Republic of China, [which will] ... continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.' On May 18, the UN unanimously adopted a US-sponsored resolution calling for 'every state' in the world to withhold arms or strategic materials from communist China. The diplomatic cost of Korea for China was enormous.

By June 1951, the question of an armistice was raised by North Korea and China. A prominent feature of this period was constant bargaining between Stalin and Mao about Soviet military supplies and Soviet air cover. Mao kept pressing Stalin to honor Soviet promises, Stalin continued to rebuff Mao, sometimes with visible irritation. In June 1951, Kim Il-sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow, where they convinced Stalin, short of all-out Soviet armament and air support, of the necessity of an armistice-seeking policy.

It was also decided to insist on restoration of the border line along the 38th Parallel and on a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao suggested raising the issue of Taiwan but did not receive support from Stalin. Simultaneously, China requested from the USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin agreed to 20 divisions, though explaining that it was 'physically impossible and totally unthinkable' to provide it within one year. Disagreements over Korea became one of the major causes of the later Sino-Soviet split. A month later, on July 10, 1951, truce talks began between a US-led delegation and North Korean-Chinese representatives.

In 1960, Michigan University Professor Allen S Whiting published his landmark study, China Crosses the Yalu, which has strongly influenced a whole generation of Western scholars. Using Western intelligence sources and Chinese journal and newspaper information, Whiting argued that unlike the Soviet Union, China had not directly participated in the planning for the North Korean invasion of the South. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whiting believed, Beijing tried to terminate the conflict through political settlement, and only after the attempts for a political solution failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin necessary military preparations in early September.

Whiting emphasized that after the Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing tried through both public and private channels to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th Parallel. Beijing entered the war only after all warnings had been ignored by Washington and general Douglas MacArthur and, therefore, in the Beijing leadership's view, the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was in severe jeopordy. Whiting thus concluded that Beijing's management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese perception of America's threat to China's national security.

At a press conference on November 30, 1950, president Truman confirmed that he had been actively considering using atomic bombs in Korea since the beginning of the war. Truman called for a worldwide mobilization against communism and, in response to a question, declared that if military action against China was authorized by the UN, MacArthur might be empowered to use the atomic bomb at his discretion. Truman casually added that there had always been active consideration of the bomb's use, for after all it was one of America's military weapons. The comments provoked worldwide reaction and British prime minister Clement Attlee rushed to Washington to express his concern. Truman reluctantly reassured him that the US had 'no intention' of using atomic weapons in Korea except to prevent a 'major military disaster', meaning a US defeat.

While Truman tried in vain to use his atomic supremacy to US advantage in North Korea, it was not clear that tactical atomic warfare against the people's liberation army would produce decisive results militarily. If the US had used tactical nuclear bombs and Chinese forces kept on coming, it would demonstrate the bomb's ineffectiveness as a last resort weapon and reduce its deterrent effect in strategic arenas. It was a test US military planners were unwilling to face, since the gain would be minor and the loss would be colossal. After all, the need to drop the second atomic bomb on Japan was proof enough that the US had realized that the first bomb did not work as intended as a strategic wonder weapon to end a war immeditately.

Little Boy was the first nuclear weapon used in warfare. It exploded approximately 1,800 feet over Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, 1945, with a force equal to 13 kilotons of TNT. Immediate deaths were officially estimated to be between 70,000 to 140,000, with 90 percent of the city's 750 square kilometers leveled. According to a new local government survey released in October 1999, 541,817 people were killed by the bomb. Of this figure, 372,705 people are considered to have suffered from direct exposure to radiation from the 13-kiloton uranium bomb.

Fat Man was the second nuclear weapon used in warfare. Dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, on August 9, 1945, Fat Man devastated more than two square miles of the city and caused approximately 70,000 deaths because it was dropped on an industrial plant, not in the center of the city. While Little Boy was a uranium gun-type device, Fat Man was a more sophisticated and powerful plutonium implosion weapon that exploded with a force equal to 20 kilotons of TNT. Total immediate casualties from the two bombs exceeded 200,000 with innumerable long-term devastation.

Five days after the second bomb, on August 14, Japan surrendered unconditionally, but only after obtaining tacit acknowledgement of the condition on the retention of the Emperor, a condition that Japan had presented, and the US rejected, two months earlier in peace exploration efforts through third-party diplomatic channels.

Elements of MacArthur's command actually reached the Yalu River marking the border between China and Korea by late October 1950. But these forces were divided into two commands, X Corps and Eighth Army, which had practically no communication with each other and which seemed to invite an enemy offensive to destroy them separately. On November 24, Chinese forces struck hard, and MacArthur's divided troops were pushed back across the 38th Parallel in a matter of weeks.

MacArthur called for an extension of the war into China that he claimed would pave the way to victory in Korea and an end to communism in Asia. He openly called for the bombing of Chinese bases in Manchuria, the blockading of the Chinese coast, and the introduction of Nationalist Chinese forces from Taiwan into the war. On December 8, 1950, the US Commerce Department announced a total economic embargo on China. It remained in place for 21 years.

Truman, five days into the South Korean collapse (Handwritten Note, June 30, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files ):

'Was briefed . . . [on the Pentagon teleconference with general Douglas MacArthur] at seven o'clock. Called [secretary of the army Frank] Pace and [secretary of defense Louis] Johnson and told them to consider giving MacArthur the two divisions he asked for and also to consider the advisability of accepting the two divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist Government . . . What that will do to Mau Tze Tung [Mao Zedong] we don't know. Must be careful not to cause a general Asiatic war. Russia is figuring on an attack in the Black Sea and toward the Persian Gulf. Both prizes Moscow has wanted since Ivan the Terrible who is now their hero with Stalin & Lenin.'
Geopolitics seemed to be all Truman was thinking about - not anti-communism.

MacArthur's racist attitude toward Asians was well known. Vernice Anderson, personal secretary to the ambassador at large, Philip C Jessup, who later served as judge and president of the International Court of Justice, told Oral History interview, February 2, 1971:

'While in Tokyo we were guests of General Douglas M. MacArthur in his guest apartments in the Embassy compound. The Jessups had one apartment, I had an adjoining one, in a building separate from the Embassy residence. During our stay we saw some of the General, of course, and a good deal of his staff. One night about 10 p.m., when returning from dinner, my Army chauffeur by mistake went to the General's personal residence. When our car pulled-up, the M.P.'s at the front door came to attention, clanking their guns on the doorstep. I hurriedly explained to the chauffeur that this was not my residence, but that I lived in the next building. I was horrified for fear of awakening the General, who religiously retired at 9 p.m. after an early dinner and a nightly movie. We understood from the local staff that the General never deviated from this routine, that he never dined with guests or stateside visitors, despite their rank, and that he had never broken bread with an Oriental. What is more, they told us that the General knew the name of every movie he had seen in the last five years!'
At the beginning of the Korea War, MacArthur was appointed commander of UN military forces in South Korea, while retaining his command of Allied forces in Japan. After driving the North Korean forces back over the 38th Parallel, MacArthur received president Truman's permission to press into North Korea and advance all the way to the Yalu River-the border between North Korea and communist China-despite warnings that this might provoke Chinese intervention.

When China did intervene, causing the UN forces to fall back in disarray, MacArthur criticized the strategy of 'limited war' and pressed for permission to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria with nuclear bombs and to use Nationalist Chinese troops against Chinese communist troops. Truman refused such permission and finally (after MacArthur had made the dispute public) removed him from command in April 1951. On his return to the US, MacArthur was given a hero's welcome and invited to address a joint session of Congress with his 'old soldiers never die' speech. An attempt to nominate MacArthur for the presidency was unsuccessful in 1952.

MacArthur conceived of the Korean war as a holy war; he kept talking about 'unleashing Chiang Kai-shek,' then holed up in his island fortress on Taiwan, and launching atomic strikes, all of which made Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the other UN countries involved very nervous. For Harry Truman and the Joint Chiefs, Korea was an exercise in containment, but that made it a very frustrating war for the military. It meant that in this war the US was not aiming for total military victory, but for limited military and ambiguous political results.

There is a tradition in American government that the military is subordinate to the civilian leaders. Generals do not make statements about foreign or even military policy without first clearing them with their political superiors. But MacArthur, used to ruling as proconsul in Japan, ignored the chain of command, and began writing public letters about what the US should do in Korea. He sent a letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), saying that Formosa [Taiwan] would be a logical place to launch an offensive campaign against China and that the US should keep Taiwan as an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' to protect US interests in the Pacific.

After China entered the war - something MacArthur had assured Truman would never happen and if it did, he could handle it with ease - MacArthur in reply to a letter from house of representatives speaker Joseph W Martin wrote that the US could only win in Korea by an all-out war, and this meant bombing the Chinese bases in Manchuria, going nuclear and invading the Chinese mainland.

The General wanted to reunify Korea, unleash Chiang for an attack on the mainland, and fight communism in Asia rather than in Europe. 'Here in Asia,' he wrote, 'is where the communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest. Here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words, that if we lose the war to communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable.'

Aside from the problem of a soldier challenging presidential supremacy by trying to change foreign policy set by the president, the debate centered on Europe-first vs Asia-first. The US establishment, which has always been Euro-centric, abandoned MacArthur. Truman promptly relieved MacArthur of all his commands, which evoked a firestorm of protest from conservatives who believed Truman to be soft on communism.

The US Constitution commits control of foreign policy to the president and not to the military. As Truman explained, avoidance of World War III, while containing communist expansion was a subtle line to walk, but that was the policy the US had decided upon, for better or worse. No soldier, not even a five-star general who had spent most of his life in the far reaches of the empire, could challenge that policy without disturbing an essential element of the US system. Truman resisted MacArthur's attempt to defy the Constitution and in the process paid a political price of letting the Republicans control the government subsequently for eight years.

The commander of US forces in Asia was let out to pasture to be the titular chairman of a defense contractor, to 'fade away' in the luxurious penthouse of the Waldorf Tower in New York, while the retired supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe, Dwight D Eisenhower, became president. The British House of Commons cheered when they heard MacArthur had been relieved. Governments all across Europe applauded Truman's actions. Taiwan saw it as a setback to getting US backing for an invasion of mainland China.

The Korean war ended up being a see-saw affair that saw UN forces retreat from North Korea to the Pusan perimeter in southeastern Korean and then forge forward again across the 38th Parallel, only to be driven south once more by the Chinese forces. On July 10, 1951, after 13 months of intensive fighting, the two sides began armistice talks, which dragged on for more than two years as the fighting raged on for the purpose of strengthening negotiation positions. The cease-fire was ultimately signed on July 27, 1953, after president Eisenhower ended the 'neutralization' of the Formosa Strait on February 2, in his State of the Union message, announcing that he was 'issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China' from possible attack by Nationalist forces, adding that 'we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.'

The human cost of the Korean War was catastrophic. In the first month of their operation alone, the US Strategic Air Command groups dropped 4,000 tons of bombs, albeit with disappointing effect in halting the North Korean advance. Besides high explosives, the bombers used napalm extensively. In retirement, general Curtis LeMay of the US Air Force described the devastation with militaristic gusto: 'We eventually burned down every town in North Korea. . .and some in South Korea too. We even burned down [the South Korean city of] Pusan -- an accident, but we burned it down anyway.'

Estimates of the casualties vary widely, but there is reason to believe that besides the three and a half million military dead, wounded and missing on both sides, more than two million civilians died in Korea. In the end, the border dividing the two countries remained exactly where it had been before the war started.

The war began as a 'fatherland liberation and unification' struggle and was transformed to a 'patriotic war against foreign aggressors. ' In his 1952 book, The Hidden History of the Korean War, I.F. Stone, using publicly available reports, showed that the official US version of the origin of the Korean War was false. Rather than the war having been the result of a surprise attack by North Korea, Syngman Rhee had engaged in continuous conflict with US assistance that eventually provoked a counterattack from the North and this turned into a surprised rout for South Korean forces. But the book was dismissed as biased propaganda until substantiated by declassified documents decades later.

The major decisions that shaped US response in Korea and continued to influence its responses to alleged communist aggression during the two decades that followed were taken by a small group during the first days of the Korean fighting and these decisions solidified into a Cold War policy. The basic decisions were taken unilaterally, for Truman had not consulted his European or Asian allies before acting and had not sought approval from Congress beyond a select few Congressional leaders. The US found itself at war without the constitutionally required congressional declaration of war.

Everett Drumright, counsellor of the US Embassy in Korea, wrote in a report on July 5, 1950 (Papers of Harry S Truman: Selected Records Relating to the Korean War):

'During and after the initial North Korean breakthrough there was much confusion, a great deal of straggling, and the ROK forces lost or abandoned most of their heavy equipment, including anti-tank guns, howitzers, mortars, machine guns, etc. By the time the ROK forces lined up on the south bank of the Han [River]. . .they had from 20,000 to 25,000 poorly organized and ill-equipped forces to face a formidable enemy with tanks, heavy artillery, airplanes and the Seoul victory. One grievous error was the premature blowing of the Han River pedestrian bridge. This was done early on the morning of the 28th [of June]. It could have been postponed several hours without harm and the Koreans could have evacuated a lot of personnel and equipment ...'
The shock was not so much that the North counterattacked so suddenly, but that the South had collapsed so quickly.

From the perspective of the US, the Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950 with an 'unprovoked' attack from the North. Within seventy-two hours, faced with the imminent collapse of South Korean forces, the US decided to intervene on the side of South Korea. President Truman announced on June 27 that the US would come to the rescue of South Korea and send the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to 'neutralize' the area.

The Korean civil war quickly changed into an international crisis. The Soviet reply on June 29, 1950, to an aide-memoire from the US government delivered to the Soviet deputy foreign minister by the US ambassador (Alan Kirk) on June 27, 1950, that 'the United States Government asks assurance that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack,' reads as follows:

'1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet Government, the events taking place in Korea were provoked by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border regions of North Korea. Therefore the responsibility for these events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who stand behind their back.

'2. As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. And now as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

'3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to participate in meetings of the Security Council. In spite of its full willingness, the Soviet Government has not been able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council inasmuch as, because of the position of the Government of the United States, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council, which has made it impossible for the Security Council to take decisions having legal force.'
Administrative assistant to the president, George Elsey, wrote in Memorandums for the Rrecord in Secretary of State's Briefing Book: 'At 1 o'clock in the afternoon the Department of State received a report from the Ambassasor Kirk of his interview with [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko, [who declined to elaborate on the above statement,] which the Department interpreted as making it appear unlikely that the Soviet Union intended to commit its forces to Korea.'

Counselor George Kennan, whose idea of containment formed the core of NSC Report No 68, stated ('Princeton Seminar' comment from contemporaneous note, February 13, 1954 Papers of Dean Acheson):

'My record on [the Soviet response to the US diplomatic note delivered by Ambassador Alan Kirk] . . . is this- . . . It was unprovocative, and appeared to be dictated primarily by a resolve to keep Moscow's responsibility in the affair entirely disengaged in the formal sense. At the same time we got word of a highly bellicose and inflammatory statement issued by [Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister] Chou En-lai, constituting the nearest thing in communist practice (the communist governments never declare war) to a declaration of war against us and calling on the peoples of the East to rise up against us.

'While it seemed to me that this statement must have bent the bow of [Soviet-Chinese] . . . relations pretty far and might turn out to be something of a blunder on the part of the Chinese communists, it indicated - when taken together with the Moscow reply - a pretty clear pattern of Soviet intentions: namely, to keep out of this business themselves in every way but to embroil us to the maximum with their Korean and Chinese satellites.'
Declassified documents have since shown that Kennan's interpretation of China's intention and role had no factual basis.

Elsey continues:

'At five in the afternoon a meeting was held of the National Security Council . . . As a result of the decisions reached, the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] at 7:00 in the evening dispatched a directive to General Douglas MacArthur authorizing him - a. to use his air and naval forces to support the ROK (South Korean) units and against targets in North Korea; b. to use army service and communication units in Korea only, except that combat units could be used in order to retain a port and an air field in the Pusan area. . .General MacArthur was informed that this commitment of U>S. forces did not involve a decision to engage in war with the USSR if Soviet forces intervened in Korea. If Soviet forces intervened, he was to defend himself, take no action to aggravate situation, and report to Washington.'
Stephen Ambrose, in his Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, Chapter 7, Korea, writes:

'Much of this was wishful thinking. It was partly based on the American Air Force's strategic doctrine and its misreading of the lessons of air power in World War II, partly on the racist attitude that Asians could not stand up to Western guns, and partly on the widespread notion that Communist governments had no genuine support. Lacking popularity, the Communists would be afraid to commit their troops to battle, and if they did, the troops would not fight.

The question of who would fight and who would not was quickly answered. The North Koreans drove the South Koreans down the peninsula in a headlong retreat. American bombing missions slowed the aggressors not at all. The South Koreans fell back in such a panic that two days after Truman sent in the Air Force he was faced with another major decision: He would either have to send in American troops to save the position, which meant accepting a much higher cost for the war than he had bargained for, or else face the loss of all Korea, at a time when the Republicans were screaming: Who lost China?'
Elsey then writes:

'President Truman in his press conference on June 29, 1950: 'We are not at war. . . The Republic of Korea was set up with the United Nations' help. It is a recognized government by the members of the United Nations. It was unlawfully attacked by a bunch of bandits. . .The United Nations Security Council held a meeting and passed on the situation and asked the members to go to the relief of the Korean republic. And the members of the United Nations are going to the relief of the Korean Republic to suppress a bandit raid on the Republic of Korea.'
The press conference was interesting, naturally, because there were many Korean questions. One question which had later significance ran as follows: 'Mr. President, would it be correct, against your explanation, to call this a police action under the United Nations?' The President replied: 'Yes. That is exactly what it amounts to.'

On August 11, 1954, Zhou Enlai again urged liberation of Taiwan, warning that 'foreign aggressors' who intervene will face 'grave consequences.' On September 3, Chinese communists began shelling the small Nationalist-held offshore island of Jinmen (Quemoy) in the Taiwan Strait, and the Nationalists returned fire. The next day, secretary of state John Foster Dulles ordered the US 7th Fleet back to the Strait. Four days later, the Nationalists begin large-scale air strikes against the Chinese mainland.

On September 8, the US joined seven other countries in signing a regional defense treaty, establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). On December 2, the US entered into a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC), pledging 'their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area', and the ROC in turn made clear that it would not attack mainland China without first consulting the US.

On December 8, Zhou Enlai warned that the US would face 'grave consequences' if it did not withdraw all military forces from Taiwan, adding that Chinese liberation of Taiwan was entirely in the purview of China's sovereignty and purely a internal affair of China. The Defense Treaty was not abrogated until 1979 when the US recognized the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China.

In the spring of 1955, president Eisenhower sent a mission to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu because these island were exposed militarily to mainland invsaion. Chiang Kai-shek refused to withdraw. Subsequently Eisenhower provided the Nationalists with air-to-air missiles that provided Taiwan with air superiority over the Taiwan Straits, and sent to Quemoy and Matsu 8-inch howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells. The resulting military situation in the strait began to look more favorable for the Republic of China (ROC) in 1956 and 1957 with the 1957 decision to place Matador missiles on Taiwan. These surface-to-surface weapons were capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads up to 600 miles.

Such developments, when combined with the US reduction of its representation to the US-PRC Geneva talks from ambassador to charge d'affaires in early 1958, led China to believe that the situation in the strait was menacing.

The renewed threat to the islands came after Soviet ICBM developments had changed the world's balance of forces decisively in favor of the communist bloc, but it came when the reliability of the Soviet deterrent on behalf of China was being questioned within the Chinese defense establishment. At the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in November 1957, Mao clashed with Khrushchev on Soviet nuclear policy. The dispute was not centered on whether a nuclear war could be won, as reported in the West, but on the deterrent effectiveness of nuclear weapons that Mao thought favored nations with large populations, such as China. This view is still held also by a large segment of the US nuclear establishment.

In 1958 the Chinese domestic politics around the Great Leap Forward affected Chinese foreign policy. Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies. The 'soft' foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to which China had subscribed in the mid-1950s gave way to a hard line in 1958. From August 23 through October of 1958, the communist government resumed a massive artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, and threatened invasion. Chinese patrol boats blockaded Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist supply efforts. This was accompanied by a renewed declaration of intent to liberate Taiwan. Quemoy, which lies about 10 kilometres from the mainland, had repeatedly been used by the Nationalists to mount raids on mainland China.

Recently published Chinese documents suggest that Mao launched the attack in part to show his independence from the USSR. Khrushchev visited Beijing between July 31 and August 3, 1958, and the shelling of Quemoy began shortly after Khrushchev left Beijing. Not until Beijing signaled its intention to limit the level of military commitment to the strait did the USSR make an unambiguous statement in support of China. In a letter to president Eisenhower, Khrushchev wrote that an American attack on China would be viewed as an attack on the USSR. On October 5, 958, Khrushchev reiterated this position in a Tass interview.

As commitments by the US to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the Eisenhower administration deployed a large naval contingent in the Taiwan Strait. Senior US officials, including the president and secretary of state Dulles, publicly affirmed the US commitment to defend Taiwan and to counter threats in the Taiwan Strait. American naval aircraft also helped the Nationalist air force establish control of the region's airspace.

As tension mounted between the US and China, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff developed plans for nuclear strikes at the Chinese cities of Shanghai, Guangzhou and Nanjing. These plans were consistent with the public statements by Dulles, who on January 12, 1954, had threatened 'massive retaliation' against Communist aggression and expressed willingness to go 'to the brink' of war to stop such aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff war plans for defense of the islands moved automatically into proposed nuclear strikes on Shanghai and Canton (Guangdong), among other mainland China targets, which would have resulted in millions of non-combatant casualties.

The bombardment abated, then virtually ceased and on September 6, 1958, Zhou Enlai proposed a resumption of ambassadorial-level talks with the US in order to arrange a conclusion to the crisis. The crisis ended on October 6, 1958, when China's minister of national defense, marshal Peng Dehuai, offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Nationalists and announced that the PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week. Chinese leaders were careful throughout the crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with US forces. China, however, continued to declare its ultimate intention to extend their sovereignty over Taiwan and the offshore islands.

Beijing saw two messages from this second crisis in the strait. One was that the USSR could probably serve as a deterrent to US nuclear attack on the mainland, but not as a nuclear shield for PRC confrontation with the US over Taiwan. The second was that as long as the PRC relied on the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the USSR would limit Chinese military actions against US interests to only those that suited Soviet goals and objectives. Such dependence provided a strong argument that China needed its own independent nuclear forces. The Chinese were criticizing Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' policies toward the US, which included a permanent separation of Taiwan from China.

Disagreements and uncertainties over Taiwan led to the unilateral abrogation by the Soviets of the October 1957 agreement by which the USSR was to supply China with a nuclear bomb and technical assistance in the production of nuclear weapons. After June 20, 1959, the PRC had to continue its strategic weapons program without direct assistance from the USSR. And five years later, on October 15, 1964, China carried out its first successful nuclear test, a 22 kiloton device.

During three of the presidential debates, held for the first time in 1960, Republican candiate Richard M Nixon assailed Democratic candidate John F Kennedy for his lack of willingness to defend Quemoy and Matsu. The extensive discussion of the Quemoy-Matsu issue led directly to a controversial dispute between the candidates over policy toward Cuba. The Kennedy staff, seeking to take the offensive after his allegedly soft position on Quemoy and Matsu, put out a provocative statement about strengthening the Cuban fighters for freedom that eventually led the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

In 1974, after the Nixon visit to China, the US removed the two squadrons of F-4 Phantoms that were stationed on Taiwan, as well as the U2 spy planes and all nuclear weapons. This reduced the US military presence to communications and logistics. The US stopped providing material military aid to Taiwan in June 1973, though it continued a program of military sales which Nixon promised to wind down. Under following administrations, military sales to Taiwan have continued.

Next: The crisis over Taiwan independence

Henry C K Liu is chairman of the New York-based Liu Investment Group.

(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

Jan 9, 2004

[다시 보는 한국역사]<10·끝>카이로선언과 김구

1932년 4월 윤봉길 의사의 의거 이후 한국 독립운동의 강력한 후원자가 된 중국의 장제스 총통(오른쪽)과 백범 김구가 1933년 5월 난징군관학교에서 비밀회동할 때 모습. 백범은 이런 돈독한 관계를 바탕으로 1943년 7월 장제스와의 비밀회담을 통해 그해 11월 27일 카이로선언에서 제3세계 국가 중 유일하게 한국의 독립을 보장한다는 내용을 끌어냈다.

《제2차 세계대전 종전 이전 100여 식민지 민족들은 활발히 독립운동을 전개하면서 연합국에 전후 독립을 보장받기 위해 진력했다.

그런데 1943년 11월 27일 미국 영국 중국의 연합국 수뇌들의 카이로회담과 카이로 선언에서는 유일하게 ‘코리아’의 독립만 공동으로 보장돼 전 세계에 공포됐다. 왜 이렇게 됐을까? 이것은 한국 근대역사의 수수께끼이다.

그 해답의 열쇠는 백범 김구에게 있다.》

백범은 윤봉길 의사의 중국 상하이(上海) 훙커우(虹口) 공원 의거 후 8년을 임시정부와 함께 유랑하다가 1940년 충칭(重慶)에 정착하자 바로 1940년 9월 17일 광복군을 창설하고, 10월 임시정부 주석에 취임했다. 백범은 연합국과의 외교를 중시해서 1941년 6월 전후 한국의 독립 보장과 임시정부의 승인을 중국 장제스(蔣介石) 총통과 미국 프랭클린 루스벨트 대통령에게 요청했다. 미국은 영국의 의견을 물은 결과 한국의 독립이 인도 독립을 자극할 것이라고 보아 동의하지 않았다. 이에 장제스도 이를 유보했다.

○英, 인도에 영향우려 한국독립 반대

백범 김구(왼쪽)와 윤봉길 의사가 중국 상하이 훙커우 공원 거사 직전 함께 찍은 출정 기념사진. 뒤에 대한민국임시정부 태극기가 걸려 있다.

그러나 백범은 불굴의 투지로 광복 후 서울에서의 대한민국 건국을 준비하는 대한민국 건국강령(조소앙 초안)을 1941년 12월 의정원에서 채택하도록 했다. 일본이 1941년 12월 8일 진주만을 기습해 태평양전쟁을 도발하자 백범은 임시정부 주석 이름으로 이틀 뒤인 12월 10일 대(對)일본 선전(宣戰)성명을 발표해 일제에 대한 재(再)선전포고를 공표했다.

백범은 1942년 충칭에서 열린 3·1절 기념대회에 각국 기자들과 외국인들을 초청해 공개적으로 중국 미국 영국 소련에 △한국의 독립 보장 △임시정부 승인 △한국을 27번째 참전국으로 인정 등을 요구했다. 중국 측이 맨 처음 반응을 보여 쑨커(孫科) 국회의장이 이를 지지하고 공개적으로 미국과 영국에 그 승인을 공개 요청했다.

백범은 1942년 5월 좌파 김원봉의 조선의용대를 광복군 제1대로 편입하여 좌우의 ‘군사통일’을 달성하고, 10월에는 의정원에 김규식 김원봉의 민족혁명당 등 좌파 정당 및 단체들을 참여시켜 ‘의회통일’을 달성했다. 또한 헌법도 개정하여 임시정부도 좌우연합의 ‘연합정부’로 개편키로 합의했다.

백범은 이러한 준비를 하면서 그와 특별한 관계에 있는 장제스의 힘을 빌려 미국 영국을 설득시킬 수 있다고 보았다. 장제스도 백범에게 특별한 도움의 보상을 주고 싶었다. 일찍이 1932년 1월 28일 일본군이 10만 병력과 비행대로 상하이를 공격한 상하이 사변이 일어났을 때, 중국군은 중앙군 등 30만 명을 투입하여 만 1개월간 치열한 시가전을 벌이며 항전했으나 패전하여 일본군에 상하이를 점령당하고 외곽으로 후퇴했다. 4억 중국인들이 치욕과 울분에 떨고 있을 때, 1932년 4월 29일 상하이 훙커우 공원에서 백범 김구가 편성한 특공대 한인애국단의 ‘고려 청년’ 윤봉길이 상하이 점령 일본군사령부 사령관 이하 군정 수뇌 7명을 섬멸해 버렸다.

장제스는 이에 감동해 중국의 각지 군관학교를 순회 강연하면서 ‘고려 청년’ 윤봉길은 중국군 30만 명이 해내지 못한 일을 해냈다고 격찬했다. 장제스는 훙커우 공원 의거 이전에는 한국 독립운동에 호의가 없었다. 그러나 훙커우 공원 의거 후에는 완전히 달라졌다.

처음으로 김구-장제스 비밀회담이 있었고, 백범의 한국 독립군 장교 훈련 요청에 장제스는 쾌히 응낙하였다. 이에 중국군관학교 뤄양(洛陽)분교에 한국인 장교훈련반이 개설되었으나 일본 측의 위협과 압력으로 1년 후 폐쇄됐다. 그러나 장제스는 여전히 백범과 친밀하고 끈끈한 동지적 관계를 간직하고 있었다. 이러한 상태에서 백범이 불굴의 투지로 한국 독립의 국제적 보장을 요구하며 간절한 협조를 요청해 오니 그를 도울 방도를 찾게 되었다.

○美, 신탁통치案 계획하다 中제의에 당황

일본의 무조건 항복과 한국의 독립을 보장한 카이로선언의 주역. 1943년 11월 8일 카이로에서 환담 중인 장제스 중국 총통, 루스벨트 미국 대통령, 처칠 영국 총리와 장 총통의 부인 쑹메이링 여사(왼쪽부터).동아일보 자료 사진

이 무렵 영국의 윈스턴 처칠 총리는 전후 식민지 독립이 인도 독립을 고취할 것을 염려해 외교장관을 루스벨트 대통령에게 보내서 종전 후 한국에는 완전 독립을 승인하지 않고 신탁통치를 한다는 합의를 1943년 3월 27일 끌어냈다. 이 소식은 ‘시카코 선’지에 보도돼 백범과 임시정부도 알게 됐다.

백범과 임시정부는 이 소식에 경악해 전 역량을 동원한 외교활동을 전개했다. 백범은 특히 절친한 관계에 있는 장제스에게 꼭 도와줄 것을 요청했다.

1943년 6월경 마침내 기회가 왔다. 루스벨트 대통령이 장제스에게 미영중소의 연합국 정상회담을 제의해 온 것이다. 미국과 영국은 중국군 5개 사단을 동원해 공격해서 버마 루트를 열고 중국군을 증모하여 버마를 점령한 일본군을 중국 전선에 묶어 둔 채로 호주에 후퇴해 있는 맥아더의 태평양군단을 반격전으로 돌릴 작정이었다. 미국은 중국의 적극적인 협조가 필요했다.

최근 발굴된 중국 측 자료 ‘총재접견한국영수회담기요(總裁接見韓國領袖會談紀要)’에 의하면, 카이로 회담을 앞두고 1943년 7월 26일 장제스는 백범의 요청에 응해 백범 등 한국 요인 6명을 비밀리에 공관으로 초빙했다. 참석자는 김구 조소앙 김규식 이청천 김원봉 그리고 통역으로 참석한 안원생 등이었다.

이 자리에서 백범은 종전 후 한국의 완전 독립을 주장하고 국제 공동관리의 신탁통치를 반대하며 중국 측의 지지와 지원을 요청했다. 장제스는 “영국과 미국 측은 이 국제 공동관리 논조를 확실하게 갖고 있으므로, 장래 쟁집(爭執)이 반드시 매우 많을 것이다. 그러므로 한국 내부의 정성 통일과 공작 표현이 반드시 필요하다. 중국 측은 힘써 싸우겠다(역쟁·力爭)”고 약속했다.

카이로회담에서 미국은 한국 문제에 대해 미영중 3국 공동의 신탁통치안을 둘째 날 제안할 예정이었다. 영국의 동의는 이미 받았고, 중국도 물론 동의하리라고 봤다. 그런데 중국의 장제스는 회담 첫째 날인 11월 23일 한국 독립의 약속을 선언에 발표하자고 기습적으로 제안했다.

루스벨트와 처칠은 매우 당황했다. 처칠은 회담에서 한국 독립 문제 논의 자체를 반대했다. 하물며 한국 독립 보장을 카이로선언에 넣는다는 것은 단연코 반대였다. 그러나 루스벨트는 장제스의 각별한 요청에 따라 절충에 나설 수밖에 없었다. 루스벨트는 장제스에게 부탁할 사항이 많아 카이로회담을 주선한 처지였기 때문이다. 루스벨트는 토론 끝에 장제스의 주장을 받아들여 한국의 독립을 보장하고, 처칠과 자신의 주장인 ‘적당한 시기’ 또는 ‘적당한 절차를 거쳐서’라는 조건을 넣어 1943년 11월 27일(공식적으로는 12월 1일) 세계에 선언했다.

○김구, 신탁통치 우려 ‘적당한 시기’ 표현 반대

백범과 모든 한국인들은 매우 기뻤다. 인도 독립운동 지도자 네루는 왜 한국만 독립이 보장되고 인도는 무시되었는가를 통탄했다.

그러나 백범은 기쁨과 동시에 ‘적당한 시기’라는 문구가 신탁통치를 의미하는 것이 아닐까 염려해 1943년 12월 5일 각국 기자회견을 열고 “‘적당한 시기’가 어떻게 해석되든지 간에 이 표현을 반대하며, 일본이 패전하면 한국은 즉시 독립돼야지 그렇지 않을 때는 상대가 누구든지 역사적인 독립전쟁을 계속하겠다”는 성명을 발표했다. 백범은 광복군을 미군과 합작하여 특수훈련을 시켜서 연합군의 한반도 상륙 때 선발대로 상륙시키는 내용의 국내 진입 작전을 준비했다. 백범은 일제가 패망하고 조국이 광복하는 최후의 일각까지 모든 것을 조국과 민족에 바치며 독립투쟁을 하다가 광복을 맞게 됐다.

카이로 회담에서 열강의 한국 국제 공동 신탁통치 합의가 사전 봉쇄되고 도리어 ‘카이로선언’에 한국 독립이 보장된 것은 백범과 임시정부의 외교 활동이 쟁취한 대성과였다.

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씨가 마른 보수 대권주자군, 한동훈-이준석 연대가 돌파구?

가장 큰 오해: "미국이 分斷에 책임 있다"

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