노무현, "인도도 핵 갖는데 북한은 왜 안되나?"
  親정부 언론인들 앞에서 미국이 불공정하다고 불평-위기리크스 電文.
  
  
   연합뉴스에 따르면, 노무현 전 대통령은 2006년 8월 한겨레, 경향, 서울신문 등 親정부적 언론사 간부들과 비공개로 만나 "북한은 인도의 상황과 비슷한데 인도는 核 보유가 용인되고 북한은 왜 안 되는지 이해하기 어렵다. 미국이 핵무기를 갖고 있다고 해서 우리가 불안하게 느끼는 게 있느냐"는 취지의 발언으로 北核을 비호하는 발언을 하였다고, 위키리크스가 폭로한 美 외교電文이 전하였다.
  
   주한 미국대사관이 본국에 보고한 2006년 8월19일자 電文에 따르면 盧 전 대통령은 그해 8월13일 한국의 몇개 신문사 간부들과의 만찬 회동에서 "미국은 북한을 악랄한 존재로 여겨 문명의 규정(민주주의와 시장경제 등)을 강요할 것"이라고 전제하고 "여기서 중요한 것은 공정성의 문제"라며 이같이 말했다는 것이다. 盧 전 대통령은 "한국의 국방력 강화는 북한이 아니라 일본과 중국을 견제하기 위해 군사적 태세를 갖추는 것"이란 '충격적' 견해를 피력했다고 이 電文은 보고하였다. 노무현은 또 취임 후 국방부를 방문하였을 때 조롱을 받는 기분이 들었다면서 국방개혁은 윤광웅 국방장관이 없었더라면 추진할 수 없었을 것이라고 했다. 그는 또 급변사태시 북한으로 들어가 사태를 장악한다는 5029 작전계획이 문제가 있다면서 세부 사항을 고쳐야 한다는 생각도 피력하였다.
  
   이 電文은 또 조선, 중앙, 동아일보의 영향력을 감소시켜야 한다는 대통령의 의지를 담았다. 대통령은 그렇게 하는 데 자신의 인기가 떨어지는 것도 감수하겠다고 했다. 보고자는 주한미국 대사관 간부 조셉 윤인데, 대화록을 참석자로부터 제공 받았다고 했다.
  
  위키리크스 폭로 電文에 따르면 2006년 10월 노무현 대통령은 북한 간첩단 수사를 하고 있던 김승규 국정원장을 직접 불러 해임시켰다. 그는 북한 간첩단 수사를 방해하고 북한의 핵개발은 비호한 셈이다. 현직 대통령의 利敵행위이다.
  
   아래 原文을 싣는다.
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  C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002827
  
  SIPDIS
  
  SIPDIS
  
  E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
  TAGS: PREL PGOV KS
  SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ROH'S INFORMAL COMMENTS ON OPCON, NORTH
  KOREA, USG, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
  
  Classified By: A/DCM Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
  
  ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: On August 13, President Roh
  Moo-hyun hosted a dinner for several newspapers which are
  considered "friendly" to the Roh Administration, including
  Hankyoreh, KyungHyang and Seoul Shinmun. Over the course of
  the dinner, Roh made frank comments on a number of issues,
  including OPCON, the U.S.-ROK alliance, North Korea, FTA and
  domestic politics. In Korea, there is no such thing as
  off-the-record, especially when journalists are involved.
  Some of the discussion is now making the rounds. The
  following transcript was given to us by an editor who
  participated in the dinner.
  
  ¶2. (C) Roh's penchant for frank talk has gotten him in
  trouble many times. This is no exception. Roh's open
  admission that he sees ROK forces as aimed at countering the
  Japanese and Chinese, rather than the North Korean forces is
  astounding. Many Koreans would say they are not surprised
  that he has such views, but they are still shocked that he
  would verbalize them with the press. Roh's virtual admission
  that he is a lame duck is depressing to many in the
  Administration, who believe that there's still some work to
  do with seventeen months left in Roh's term. The main image
  that comes across from these remarks is a president who feels
  he has been defeated and under appreciated. End Summary and
  Comment.
  
  -OPCON-
  
  ¶3. (SBU) The OPCON transfer is being pursued based on our
  discussions with the United States. The conservative press,
  however, is assuming the offensive on the issue, although
  they called for it ten year ago. (Roh expressed his
  hostility towards the conservative media.) It is important
  to follow the official statements of the United States
  government. It is rare for the U.S. government to express
  its position on the U.S.-ROK alliance because its statements
  could become the subject of debate. But, the Department of
  Defense and Department of State are coming out and expressing
  their positions. We should not postpone our consultations
  with the U.S. on the issue. Many of the critics question the
  issue of the ROK military capabilities. But we are trying to
  promote the ROK,s military capabilities to have a prepared
  defense posture against Japan and China, not against North
  Korea. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is in great
  need of equipping itself with the defense equipment that
  Japan has. Talk on the North Korea deterrent misses the main
  point of the issue. (Roh talked about the backwardness of
  North Korea by mentioning what he saw in Pyongyang.) There
  will not be a defense gap after the OPCON transfer. The
  fundamental nature of military sovereignty is to exercise
  what we have.
  
  -OPLAN 5029-
  
  ¶4. (SBU) We have to rework the details of OPlan 5029. The
  current plan fundamentally focuses on U.S. forces going into
  the North and taking control of the situation. The situation
  would become serious if this happens to be the case. China
  does not want U.S. forces coming near its border with the
  North. There is also the concern that the U.S. and China
  will compete over North Korea (without discussing this with
  the ROK) if there is an emergency situation in the country.
  The North has not yet mentioned this during inter-Korean
  military talks, but it is necessary to be prepared for a
  situation where the North brings up the OPCON transfer issue
  during military talks.
  
  -NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE AND SIX PARTY TALKS-
  
  ¶5. (SBU) There is nothing that we can do at the moment. We
  have no choice but to pass the issue to the next
  administration. Meanwhile, we have to manage the situation
  so that it will not change for the worse. I feel frustrated.
  Chief Secretary Song Min-soon says that we should still do
  what we can, but that,s how I feel right now.
  
  ¶6. (SBU) The United States is trying to bring about a
  collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime, so it is difficult to
  communicate our position. On the other hand, North Korea is
  stubborn. South Korea is stuck in the middle. We do not
  have enough information on North Korea so there were many
  times when our judgments had been inaccurate. The National
  Intelligence Service (NIS) also does not know much about the
  North. The official inter-Korean channel is the most
  accurate source of information for us. We had tried in the
  past to use unofficial channels to get information, without
  any success. We were also unable to verify whether the
  unofficial channel was what Kim Jong-il wanted. I still
  think that there would be a chance if we meet Kim Jong-il
  like last year,s meeting between then-Unification Minister
  Chung Dong-young and Kim Jong-il. That is why I would like
  to keep Minister Lee Jong-seok I think he is the most
  reliable channel in directly dealing with the North. If a
  new person replaces him, it would be difficult to judge what
  the North is thinking.
  
  ¶7. (SBU) It does not seem that China is seriously worried
  about the North acquiring nuclear weapons. They do not seem
  to evaluate the North,s nuclear technology very highly.
  
  ¶8. (SBU) The North Korean threat has more to do with the
  North,s relations with other countries rather than its
  nuclear technology. The North Korean case is similar to the
  Indian case, but I do not understand why India is allowed to
  have nuclear weapons (while the North is not). Do the South
  Korean people feel insecure because the United States has
  nuclear weapons? In addition, India and Iran are interested
  in acquiring nuclear weapons, while North Korea is interested
  in selling its nuclear technology.
  
  ¶9. (SBU) Q: What would happen if the United States and China
  authorize South Korea to negotiate with the North?
  
  ¶A. That will never happen with the United States. If there
  was such a possibility, the United States would directly
  negotiate with the North. The U.S. perceives North Korea as
  barbarous. It is like the U.S. is trying to enforce the
  rules of civilization (i.e., democracy, market economy) on
  savages. But the more important issue here is the question
  of fairness. The United States does not treat the North
  fairly.
  
  -U.S. ADMINISTRATION-
  
  ¶10. (SBU) It is difficult to talk with the Bush
  administration on security issues. I was more convinced on
  this matter after recently seeing the United States,
  attitude toward Israel. The situation was OK from the
  Chung-Kim meeting to the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, but the
  situation changed after the United States took up the BDA
  issue.
  
  ¶11. (SBU) Strangely, I think President Bush personally likes
  me. I think this is an asset.
  
  -DOMESTIC POLITICS-
  
  ¶12. (SBU) The issue of defense reforms is a very difficult.
  I would not have thought of pursuing defense reforms if it
  were not for Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung. The
  researchers at the defense-related governmental think-tanks
  were all hired by their predecessors. We have to change
  these people, but that is difficult at the moment.
  
  ¶13. (SBU) When I first went to the Ministry of National
  Defense (MND) after I came into office, I got the impression
  that MND officials were mocking me. When I heard their
  simple comparison of the ROK,s and North Korea,s military
  capabilities, I received the impression that these people
  were thinking that I was just an ordinary person visiting the
  MND. The ROK military,s perception is much behind the times.
  
  ¶14. (SBU) I had not been worried about my popularity until
  recently. Because of this it would be difficult to carry out
  any reforms during the time that is left, so I am thinking
  about just managing affairs. I am even thinking about
  publicly declaring this to the South Korean public.
  
  ¶15. (SBU) I do not know what I have done wrong. If it is a
  question of style, there is nothing much we can do about it.
  I would like someone to specifically point out what I,m
  doing wrong. Issues like polarization, irregular employment,
  income distribution are all problems where we see progress,
  but it is true that these problems remain unresolved. This
  would be the same with the next administration. I have
  carried out reforms within the administration and have worked
  toward changing the Blue House system. The only new issue
  that has emerged during my tenure is the issue of the adult
  video gambling rooms. But the nature of the issue prevents
  the Blue House from getting directly involved in handling the
  problem.
  
  ¶16. (SBU) Right now, I feel conflicted between the thought
  of giving up and doing my best to improve the situation
  before I leave office. It is true that I go back and forth
  between these two thoughts. That does not mean, however,
  that I am inattentive to state affairs and management.
  
  ¶17. (SBU) Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A (three largest
  circulating newspapers) all try to drag me down. The press
  reflects the power of the people, but these three newspapers
  have become synonymous with political power. The press needs
  to be broad-minded in order to reflect the power of the
  people, but these three do not even follow this principle. I
  ask my people to give me a report every morning on what these
  papers say. I will make sure that the influence of these
  three newspapers fall, even if this means my popularity rate
  will fall as well. This will also be better for my successor.
  
  ¶18. (SBU) It is less of a burden for me because the OPCON
  transfer issue is becoming more of an issue than the
  U.S.-Korea FTA issue.
  
  ¶19. (SBU) It would be more difficult for me if 1,000 people
  who had shared my thoughts were to have demonstrations
  calling for my resignation than 10,000 conservatives
  demonstrating.
  
  -US-ROK FTA-
  
  ¶20. (SBU) This is an option where we can be winners. It is
  possible to respond to potential agricultural damages.
  One-third of the agricultural industry is competitive, the
  other third would become competitive through governmental
  assistance, and the last third is not competitive.
  
  ¶21. (SBU) It is also important how we are treated by
  stronger countries. The United States picked South Korea as
  a FTA partner among 25 countries that had proposed a FTA with
  the U.S. (Roh joked afterwards that some people could call
  him pro-American if they heard him say this.)
  STANTON
  http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06SEOUL2827.html
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  노무현, 간첩사건 수사중인 金昇圭 국정원장 불러, "그만두시지요"
  
  趙甲濟
  
   在美 블로거 안치용씨는 위키리크스가 공개한 외교電文을 인용, 김승규 국정원장이 2006년 10월26일(미국시간)에 辭意(사의)를 표명한 데는 노무현 당시 대통령의 요구가 있었고, 이는 당시 국정원이 수사하던 386 간첩단 사건과 관련이 있다는 匿名(익명)의 정보원의 주장을 보도하였다.
  
   버시바우 주한 미국대사는 2006년 11월1일자 '새 국정원장에 김만복' 이라는 제목의 외교電文에서 김만복 새 국정원장 지명자의 프로필 등을 설명하면서 김승규 국정원장의 사퇴 이유에 대해서도 언급했다.
  
   버시바우 대사는 '김승규 사퇴를 둘러싼 의혹들' 이란 소제목 하에 노무현 대통령이 전쟁터에서 말을 갈아타지 않는다고 말하고 있지만 2006년 10월25일(미국시간, 한국시간으론 26일)일 열린 청와대 내부회의에서 노무현 대통령이 김승규 국정원장의 사퇴를 요구했었다고 보고했다.
  
   이 電文은 비판론자들이 "김만복 차장을 원장으로 승진시킨 것은 초기단계인 간첩사건 수사를 은폐하려는 증거이다"고 주장하고 있다고 소개하였다. 몇 사람들은 간첩사건 수사와 김승규 원장의 辭意가 부분적으로 관련이 있다고 생각한다고 보고하기도 하였다.
  
   버시바우 대사의 電文 내용은 상당히 정확한 것임이 확인되었다. 노무현 대통령이 10월26일 안보장관 회의 직후 김승규 원장을 따로 불러 다른 설명 없이 "그만두시지요"라고 말하였고, 金 원장도 "고맙습니다"고 말한 뒤 다음 날 사표를 썼다고 한다. 사실상 해임이지만 자진사표로 처리되었다. 정부내 386 운동권 출신이 간첩 사건에 연루되어 있다는 보도가 나오던 시점이었다. 김 원장은 盧 당시 대통령으로부터는 사건 수사와 관련하여 압력을 받은 게 없다고 한다. 그는 청와대內 운동권 출신들이 대통령을 압박, 자신을 사퇴시킨 것으로 이해하고 있다.