<길이 후손에 물려줄 영광된 통일 조국의 앞날을 내다보며 신념과 긍지를 지닌 근면한 국민으로서 민족의 슬기를 모아 줄기찬 노력으로 새 역사를 창조하자.>
(국민교육헌장 중 일부)

<공산주의자들과 타협이나 양보는 패배를 뜻하는 것이며 패배는 곧 죽음을 말하는 것이다.>
(서울대학교 졸업식 치사)

<사이비 국제주의로 흘러 조국과 민족을 망각하는 정신적 無국적자를 만들어서는 안 되겠다>
(전국 대학 총학장 및 교육감 회의 유시에서)

<먼 훗날, 소가 밭을 가는 오늘의 현실을 아득한 전설이 되게 하자.>
(1967년 대통령 연두교서에서)

<대통령으로서 처음에 취임하던 그 당시나 오늘 이 시점에 있어서나 내 가슴 속에 풀리지 않고 맺혀 있는 하나의 소원이 있다면 그것은 우리도 어떻게 하든지 남과 같이 잘 살아 보아야겠다는 念願입니다.>
(대통령 취임 3주년 기자회견에서)

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
55. Draft Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H?, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret. Prepared by Haig no approved or final minutes were found. There are a very few handwritten and typewritten corrections which have been incorporated unto the text printed here. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 9:38 until 10:45 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
Washington, March 4, 1970.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Acting Chairman, Admiral Moorer
Director Helms
Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Porter
OEP Director Lincoln
Assistant Secretary Green
Laurence Lynn
B/General Alexander M. Haig
The meeting was convened at 9:40 a.m. by the President. He called upon Director Helms for an update on the current intelligence situation.

Helms: During 1969 North Korea has retrenched in its unconventional warfare operations against South Korea. The North Koreans have considerable conventional naval and air power which was modernized by Soviet equipment between 1966 and 1968. North Korean ground forces are equipped with what is primarily obsolete Soviet equipment. They total 25 divisions of which 14 are forward along the DMZ. Reportedly this year they have reduced their strength by [to?] 350,000 as compared to South Korean forces of over half a million. The North Koreans are short on transportation but strong in modern air power. One of the most significant factors in the North Korean force posture has been the impact of maintaining this force upon North Korea’s economic development. Between 15 and 20 percent of North Korea’s gross national product is allocated to Defense and over 20 percent of North Korea’s males are in uniform contributing to a severe labor shortage.

Helms estimated that North Korea has no intention of initiating conventional operations against South Korea in the foreseeable future, adding that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese Communists are encouraging such operations. Kim Il Sung’s strategy in the unconventional warfare area commenced in 1964 when he initiated the intensifying UW campaign against the ROK. This campaign was probably initiated to discourage U.S. support for the ROK, especially as a result of U.S. domestic reaction. By 1969, however, Sung was unsuccessful in generating dissonance in South Korea and thus decided on a change in tactics if not strategy. 1969 reflected the lowest incident rate of UW harassments of any period since 1964. While Sung has not renounced violence, he appears to be shifting away from this tactic.

The ROK are now better prepared than in the past to counter North Korean UW initiatives. They have developed a sophisticated counter-infiltration system which includes a national coordinating committee and ancillary operational control centers. The coastal surveillance capabilities have been markedly improved and they have constituted 20 counter infiltration battalions backed up by efficient ROK militia. Perhaps the major factor in the ROK effectiveness has been the dislike of the South Koreans for the Sung regime and the establishment of strong anti subversion laws.

President: The President then asked Dr. Kissinger to review the options available for future U.S. military presence in South Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: Dr. Kissinger pointed out that there had been two concurrent studies on our defense posture in South Korea: one within the interdepartmental framework and the second a systems analysis type study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.22. See Document 52. He emphasized that while the conclusions were not identical, they were nearly parallel. U.S. military strength in Korea totalled some 64,000. The present combined strength consists of 20-1/3 ROK divisions of which 2-1/3 are in South Vietnam. Thus, the total posture includes 18 ROK active divisions plus 2 U.S. divisions. The combined strength outnumbers the North Koreans almost two to one although North Korea is much stronger than the ROK in both air and sea power. The ROK supports its combat soldiers at approximately twice the level of the North Koreans. Our studies considered two scenarios: one would provide an analysis of forces required to defend against only a North Korean attack. The second considered the first requirement to meet a combined North Korean/CPR attack. Against the North Korean attack alone the combined U.S.–ROK force levels could withstand such an attack and halt it north of Seoul. Against a combined North Korean/CPR attack the 18 ROK divisions, together with the two U.S. divisions, could sufficiently delay such an attack until additional forces could be deployed.

Dr. Kissinger emphasized that there was some disagreement on how many ROK divisions were actually needed to maintain a sustained defense against an attack emanating from North Korea alone. He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe 19 ROK divisions were necessary and that others felt a force level somewhat lower would be satisfactory.

Dr. Kissinger emphasized that we look at five force postures:

(1) 2 U.S. divisions plus 18 ROK divisions
(2) 2 U.S. brigades plus 18 improved ROK divisions
(3) One U.S. division plus 18 improved ROK divisions
(4) One U.S. division plus 16 improved ROK divisions
(5) A residual U.S. force plus 18 improved ROK divisions.
He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with postures 4 and 5 above. Dr. Kissinger also emphasized that the problem is not one of purely military strength but also has definite political overtones. It is likely that the U.S. military could be reduced to 1/3 division plus 19 improved ROK divisions. However, the problem involves the impact on deterrents and what level of U.S. presence is necessary to insure that the North Koreans remain deterred. A second factor is the problem of costs which were summarized on the Table at Tab A.33. Attached but not printed. Another factor impinging upon costs would be the status of the forces removed from Korea for example, if we removed 20,000 troops we would realize savings of $20 million. If these troops were held on active duty, on the other hand, our savings would be $450 million if they were deactivated.

Dr. Kissinger also emphasized that for the time being we should attempt to keep ROK forces in Vietnam and that our actions in South Korea could influence their willingness to do so. An additional problem involves the positioning of our remaining U.S. forces. Presently there is one division on line and one back. The question now is should we pull back from the DMZ to reduce friction or should we draw forces from both the line and the rear. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that most disagreed that we should thin out our forces on the DMZ but keep some combat power south of Panmumjom. State favors a force of only one battalion, while the JCS favors a brigade-sized force. [2 lines not declassified] A final question would involve the magnitude of our counter insurgency programs. The big issue, however, is the degree of U.S. presence involving answers to the following specific questions:

(1) The size of our force
(2) The degree of modernization of the ROK divisions and
(3) The timing of U.S. withdrawals.
All agree that we should consult with the South Koreans, especially in view of their presence in South Vietnam. Precise timing, however, involves a decision as to whether or not we should consult before their presidential elections or wait until after the elections.

Admiral Moorer: Admiral Moorer stated that the JCS considers that the minimum U.S. posture should be 1-1/3 U.S. divisions plus 18 improved ROK divisions, plus modernization of ROK air and naval forces and the retention of U.S. air and naval strength in the ROK. He emphasized that the ROK equipment is deteriorating and that North Korean air strength poses a considerable threat.

Secretary Rogers stated that State favors a drawdown of U.S. strength in two phases. The first phase would be an immediate drawdown and the second would be additional reductions after the ROK divisions return from Vietnam. He emphasized that State preferred to see U.S. troops withdrawn by numbers rather than by designated division or TONE unit. State also favors consultations immediately. The size of the reductions should depend on the assistance we can give to the modernization of the ROK and the level that our Congress would support. State believes that we should:

(1) Decide in principle on the reduction
(2) Start consultations, then make the final decision and
(3) Initiate Congressional consultations.
Secretary Rogers emphasized that we must keep President Park on board throughout, since this is the first step of the Guam Doctrine44. Better known as the Nixon Doctrine see footnote 3, Document 35. and his support will be essential. Since his elections take place in May of 1971, our consultations should start immediately.

Ambassador Porter affirmed that he could start consultations immediately.

The Vice President pointed out that he had spoken to the ROKs in Manila55. As part of a 3-week visit to Asia during December 1969 and January 1970, Agnew represented Nixon at the inauguration ceremonies for President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice President Fernando Lopez, held at Manila on December 30. and that they emphasized emphatically that we should not reduce our presence in South Korea. Indeed, they expressed a willingness to send more ROK troops to South Vietnam if we would not draw down on our strength in the ROK. Finally, they offered free of charge whatever additional facilities the U.S. Government might need in view of phaseouts elsewhere.

Secretary Packard emphasized that the important problem is Congressional willingness to support 18 or 19 improved ROK divisions. He stated that if we draw down now we must have provided for the modernization of the ROK. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want to proceed cautiously. Mr. Packard’s fear is how we can get Congressional support for ROK modernization without withdrawing sizeable U.S. forces, in the order of magnitude of 20,000.

Secretary Rogers affirmed that State also favored 20,000, adding that Congress will move in the face of such a reduction and the savings that would result.

Admiral Moorer stated that the drawdown must be early in the fiscal year if we are to realize any savings.

Dr. Kissinger stated that some of the modernization could be realized from the equipment of U.S. forces being withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The President stated that the key factors are:

(1) There must be some withdrawal. We cannot keep 64,000 U.S. troops in Korea forever.

(2) We must work out the program carefully and relate it intimately to our April decision on the next withdrawal from Vietnam.

(3) We must control the debate on the Hill with respect to our involvement.

(4) We must avoid the impression that we are withdrawing from our responsibilities by emphasizing that our drawdown has to be accompanied by ROK modernization. In summary, the President stated that the preferable course is to think in terms of our April Vietnam tranche and the timing and requirement for consultations with President Park and the role of the Congress as well.

The Vice President recalled Lee Kuan Yew’s remarks to the effect that U.S. credibility to execute its commitments is a crucial point. Rhetoric is not enough. We must be positively postured to follow through. He emphasized that the situation in Laos suggested that we should keep strong forces nearby in the Far East, pointing out that Asian leaders are very fearful of U.S. intentions. The President stated that the Vice President’s remarks were very pertinent, and we cannot give the impression that we are leaving the area. Thus we need careful thought on how to do it.

Secretary Rogers added that President Park applauded the Nixon Doctrine but added: “Don’t do it to me.”

Under Secretary of State Richardson stated that we should not think that our forces in Korea are available for deployment elsewhere. The President stated that the best way to accomplish our reduction is to get President Park to ask for it. He inquired of Ambassador Porter whether or not this could be done. Ambassador Porter responded affirmatively, adding that we could probably get Park to do so providing we can give him assurances on modernization.

The President stated we must not weaken our forces there precipitously. It is simply a question of U.S. support of U.S. divisions.

OEP Director Lincoln added that in late 1947 we reduced our strength and the North Koreans attacked. Under Secretary Packard stated that we must have a Congressional commitment.

Dr. Kissinger stated we must decide on the level of our reduction, then the Under Secretaries Committee can prepare a game plan on how to proceed to include instructions to Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis. Secretary Rogers added it should be a tentative decision since consultation may result in problems with President Park or the Congress.

The Vice President cautioned that what we draw down will never go back and the President agreed, adding that we should keep in mind that [less than 1 line not declassified]. The President stated we might consider increments of 10,000 now and 10,000 later, with the support needed under such a procedure. The President stated that this is the first five-year perceptive study. We have had 64,000 troops in Korea since 1953 and someone should have looked at it long before now. We must stop temporizing with these issues and must view the problem from the long range. In essence, what we are looking for is not a way to get out of Korea but a way to be able to stay in by means of a long-range, viable posture. We are faced with increasing emphasis on domestic spending here at home. Thus, we have to find a way to continue playing a role by drawing down our strength somewhat or else the Congress will refuse to support anything.

Secretary Rogers inquired about [3 lines not declassified].

The meeting was adjourned at 11:30 hours.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H?, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret. Prepared by Haig no approved or final minutes were found. There are a very few handwritten and typewritten corrections which have been incorporated unto the text printed here. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 9:38 until 10:45 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

2 See Document 52.

3 Attached but not printed.

4 Better known as the Nixon Doctrine see footnote 3, Document 35.

5 As part of a 3-week visit to Asia during December 1969 and January 1970, Agnew represented Nixon at the inauguration ceremonies for President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice President Fernando Lopez, held at Manila on December 30.



National Security Decision Memorandum 4811. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1󈞞. Top Secret Nodis. Haig initialed the NSDM. Telegram 43550 to Seoul, March 25, transmitted a summary of this NSDM. (Ibid., Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69𔃃/70)
Washington, March 20, 1970.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT
U.S. Programs in Korea
Following NSC review of U.S. policy and programs toward Korea, the President has decided to reduce the U.S. military presence in Korea by 20,000 personnel by the end of FY 71. The President has also directed that the following priority actions be taken to implement his decision.

1. Consultations with President Park. The President directs that consultation be undertaken with President Park22. Telegram 1550 from Seoul, March 28, provided a summary of the discussion between Park and Porter. According to the telegram, “Park then repeated he would like to know before agreeing to procedures [Porter] had outlined extent of modernization U.S. envisages. To this [Porter] replied I understood his desire for more precise information, but kind of detail he is seeking is not yet available but is being developed.” (Ibid.) In telegram 1634 from Seoul, April 1, Porter reported his conversation with Chung Il Kwon, who “began to probe about figures and magnitudes of program we envisage.” Porter noted that “I took same line as previously, told him all that would be developed in good time if they would come forward with positive response to our proposals.” (Ibid.) to inform him of the President’s intentions and explore with him the timing and conditions of withdrawal. The President wishes the objective of this consultation to be the creation of a situation in which U.S. withdrawals result from President Park’s initiative in view of present ROK strength and the agreed need for future improvements in ROK forces. The Under Secretaries Committee shall submit a plan, based on the conditions outlined below, for consultations with President Park to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs no later than April 1, 1970.

2. Conditions for Consultation. The President has decided that consultations with President Park shall be based on the following conditions:

(a) Subject to approval of the Congress, the U.S. will attempt to provide annual average military assistance to Korea over FY 71󈞷 at a level of $200 million per year comprised either of grant MAP of $200 million per year or its equivalent in grant MAP at a lower level, such as $160 million per year, supplemented by equipment and other supplies excess to U.S. needs.

(b) The U.S. will increase its economic assistance to Korea by continuing PL?, Title I at or above a level of $50 million per year, depending on the availability of surplus commodities, in addition to currently-planned aid, provided that the ROK assumes, to the extent feasible, a larger defense burden through a MAP transfer or military sales program.

(c) Further withdrawals of substantial numbers of U.S. personnel beyond the 20,000 personnel decided upon are not now planned, though they may be considered when substantial ROK forces return from Vietnam or compensating improvements in ROK forces are well underway.

Upon completion of initial consultations with President Park, these conditions will be revised as necessary.

3. Other Preparations for Consultation. The President has also directed that concurrently with consultations with President Park:

(a) The Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for consultation with the Congress on the feasibility of increasing MAP for Korea to the levels noted above.

(b) The Department of Defense will develop a plan for the withdrawal of military personnel, noted above, and the disposition of remaining forces in such manner as to reduce the U.S. presence in the DMZ to the minimum consistent with our continuing responsibility for the security of the UN area at Panmunjon.

4. The Korea Program Memorandum. Following initial consultations with President Park and the Congress, the President has directed the preparation of a five-year Korea Program Memorandum covering U.S. policy and programs for Korea, including:

(a) ROK Military Forces—The President directs that the U.S. support improvements to the ROK forces to the maximum extent possible within the available resources. The objective of these improvements shall be to develop ROK forces capable of deterring or conducting a defense against a conventional or unconventional attack by North Korea. For this purpose, a five-year force structure and resource plan for the development of the ROK armed forces toward this goal shall be prepared by the Department of Defense based on the assistance levels in 2 (a).

(b) U.S. Military Forces—The President directs that the Department of Defense develop a five-year force structure, resource and personnel plan for U.S. forces in or clearly related to Korea. In this plan, the feasibility and timing of further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Korea should be thoroughly evaluated.

(c) Other U.S. Programs—The President directs that the Department of State and other agencies develop five-year resource and personnel plans covering their programs in or related to Korea.

As envisaged in NSDM 4,33. See footnote 3, Document 37. the Korea Program Memorandum based on these plans will serve to guide agency planning in regard to Korea and be periodically revised as necessary.

5. Organization. The President directs that these plans be prepared under the direction of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and, upon completion, submitted to the President.44. See Document 70.

Henry A. Kissinger

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1󈞞. Top Secret Nodis. Haig initialed the NSDM. Telegram 43550 to Seoul, March 25, transmitted a summary of this NSDM. (Ibid., Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69𔃃/70)

2 Telegram 1550 from Seoul, March 28, provided a summary of the discussion between Park and Porter. According to the telegram, “Park then repeated he would like to know before agreeing to procedures [Porter] had outlined extent of modernization U.S. envisages. To this [Porter] replied I understood his desire for more precise information, but kind of detail he is seeking is not yet available but is being developed.” (Ibid.) In telegram 1634 from Seoul, April 1, Porter reported his conversation with Chung Il Kwon, who “began to probe about figures and magnitudes of program we envisage.” Porter noted that “I took same line as previously, told him all that would be developed in good time if they would come forward with positive response to our proposals.” (Ibid.)

3 See footnote 3, Document 37.

4 See Document 70.
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Page 150
Persons
Chung Il Kwon (Chong Il-kwon)Chung Il Kwon (Chong Il-kwon), Prime Minister of the ROK until December 19, 1970
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.Colonel, Brigadier General in November 1969 Major General in March 1972 Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1969 until June 1970 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970
Kissinger, Henry A.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Porter, William J.Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Abbreviations & Terms
DMZDemilitarized Zone
FYfiscal year
MAPMilitary Assistance Program
NSCNational Security Council
NSDMNational Security Decision Memorandum
Nodisno distribution
PLPublic Law
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
UNUnited Nations



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969?
Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969?, Document 58



58. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969?, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Top Secret. On April 29, Rogers sent a draft of this letter to Nixon under a covering memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it. Rogers noted that the “Under Secretaries Committee has recommended that, following one or two more talks between Porter and Park, you should brief congressional leaders and ask for their backing. In view of the problems that could arise should Park remain adamant, we believe you should respond to Park first.” On May 25, Kissinger forwarded Rogers’s memorandum and draft letter to President Nixon under a covering memorandum with the recommendation that he sign the letter. The Department transmitted the text of Nixon’s letter in telegram 81354 to Seoul, May 27. (All ibid.)
Washington, May 26, 1970.

Dear President Park:

I have received and studied carefully your letter of April 2022. See Document 57. commenting on my proposal, presented through Ambassador Porter, to withdraw 20,000 United States troops from Korea by the end of June 1971. Let me in this response put my proposal in perspective.

In our discussions during your visit to California last August,33. See Document 35. I explained my policy toward Asia, and I greatly appreciated then as I do now your agreement with its fundamental features. The maintenance of treaty obligations is basic to this policy. Specifically, so far as Korea is concerned, the United States is committed in the case of armed attack against your country to act in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between our Governments. All the world, and specifically North Korea and Communist China, are aware of this. That commitment was reaffirmed in our meeting.

It is also my policy that as the strengths and capabilities of our Allies increase it is reasonable to expect them to assume more of the responsibility for their own defense and specifically to provide the bulk of the manpower required for that purpose.

Over the past several years the Republic of Korea under your leadership has made great progress in developing its economic and military strength, progress completely overshadowing that of the North. The contribution made by your military forces in Vietnam attests to this remarkable development. Despite this increased economic and military strength, the number of American troops in the Republic has not declined from the level which prevailed when the Republic was far less able to assume the primary burden for its defense. In fact, the number today is somewhat larger than that prevailing at any time over the past ten years.

I am not proposing a total withdrawal of United States forces such as the one in 1949 to which you referred in your letter. On the contrary, the 20,000 men to be withdrawn constitute less than one-third of our current forces in the Republic of Korea. The forces remaining will provide not only substantial United States military capacity but also clear evidence of a United States commitment. So far as a deterrent is concerned, it will remain clear to North Korea and to Communist China that the United States has not retreated from Korea or the Pacific area.

I recognize that the level of military assistance for Korea provided by the Congress under the last military assistance appropriation has been less than we considered desirable. Part of the reason for the Congressional attitude towards military assistance has undoubtedly been a feeling by the Congress and the public that with the progress made by recipients of such assistance they should assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense.

Subject to Congressional approval, I propose to provide substantially higher military assistance over the period 1971󈞷 for Korean modernization. Moreover, provided your Government assumes a larger defense burden we are also prepared to consider some increased economic assistance. This assistance would be available during the very period which you see as crucial to Korea’s continuing economic progress and protection from the North.

I plan to brief the Congress on my proposal and seek to enlist their support so that the processes of modernization of the Korean armed forces can begin as soon as possible. An initiative from you showing that Korea is ready to assume more of the burden of its own defense will add to Korea’s image and to Congressional and public support for these greater appropriations.

You may be assured, Mr. President, that I would not have made this proposal except after the most careful study of all the factors involved and specifically of those mentioned in your letter. I would not have made it had I believed that it would adversely affect the Republic of Korea which we consider so important to the security of Asia and of the Free World, and in which we have such an immense national investment.

Therefore, Mr. President, I hope that you will be able to agree that my proposal is in the interests of both our countries and that you will find it possible to take the lead in presenting it to your country and to the world as a natural and proud consequence of the remarkable progress achieved by your country.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Nixon

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969?, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Top Secret. On April 29, Rogers sent a draft of this letter to Nixon under a covering memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it. Rogers noted that the “Under Secretaries Committee has recommended that, following one or two more talks between Porter and Park, you should brief congressional leaders and ask for their backing. In view of the problems that could arise should Park remain adamant, we believe you should respond to Park first.” On May 25, Kissinger forwarded Rogers’s memorandum and draft letter to President Nixon under a covering memorandum with the recommendation that he sign the letter. The Department transmitted the text of Nixon’s letter in telegram 81354 to Seoul, May 27. (All ibid.)

2 See Document 57.

3 See Document 35.


59. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69𔃃/70. Top Secret Immediate Nodis.
Seoul, May 29, 1970, 1130Z.

2772. For Ambassador Brown. Ref: A. State 08135422. Dated May 27, it instructed Porter to inform Park about the M󈝼 and other defense matters. (Ibid.) B. Seoul 273333. Dated May 28, in it Porter wrote that he would suggest to Park that the Minister of Defense meet with General Michaelis about the M󈝼 and related issues. Porter also wrote that he would inform Park that Packard’s letter on the subject was coming. (Ibid.) State 082520.44. Dated May 28, it informed Porter that a letter concerning the M󈝼 from Packard to the Korean Minister of Defense was being pouched. (Ibid.)

1. President Park received me at 11:15 hours local today. Conversation lasted one hour and half. We were alone, at my request (except for interpreter).

2. He assented to my offer to read President Nixon’s letter of May 26.55. Document 58. After reading, Park asked me if it did not say what had been said before. I replied that it was essentially carefully considered reply to points he had raised and in my view we should work together in cooperative and forward-looking fashion. Park said that as far as proposals for strengthening ROK forces is concerned we can start to develop them any time, but he must know amount of program before he can judge whether he can take lead as we desire. Until he knows nature and extent of modernization he cannot agree to any withdrawals.

3. I said we understand his natural desire to know dimensions of what we can do. On other hand, we are asking him to support our approach to Congress and to his people so that we can get things under way and develop a program. Park replied we must understand his position. If he agreed to take initiative before knowing how much, when, etc., his people would ask him those questions and he could not answer. If he could say only vaguely that there would be adequate program and troops were being withdrawn, Korean people would feel unsafe and his position would be difficult. A year ago, Koreans had submitted program proposal.66. See footnote 2, Document 21. If that had been accepted it would now be possible to consider whether time frame for withdrawal could be changed from 1975 to earlier date. That program should be reviewed. From his point of view there are too many unknowns. It was not necessary to talk about amount of money involved as equipment is important aspect. He cannot take initiative on present basis. In his letter he had asked reconsideration of withdrawal until 1975, and if Korean program mentioned in his letter of April 1969 to President Nixon could be approved he could then consider changing date when some U.S. troops might depart.

4. I said we were both talking about substantial programs which over five-year period might cost billion dollars or more. He was right to say we should not be talking amounts of money but rather types and amount of material involved. We want to get down to real discussions with his people to determine exactly what is involved. It would first be necessary to brief Congress to get acceptance in principle for modernization program and if Park would assist by taking lead in suggesting some of our troops could leave it would, as letter pointed out, greatly add to Korea’s image before Congress and American people generally.

5. Park said we should sit down with Koreans and develop program before going to Congress. If we would do that it might be possible for troops to leave before 1975 (sic). I replied it seemed necessary to us to get principle accepted first by Congressional leadership rather than go and give them very large program on platter and say that’s it. It was best to leave to us procedures and psychological aspects of handling things in U.S. I continued that in view of his references to fact that his date for departure, 1975, might be subject to change and that troops “might leave” before then, I would like to clarify point. We were asking his support with Korean public and U.S. Congress for idea that some troops might leave in view of fact that substantial modernization program was envisaged. We were not asking permission for troops to leave, as there was no requirement on us in that sense. We were required to consult with him and that is what we are doing. Park said he understood that his agreement, or concurrence, is required before we can withdraw troops. I replied that obviously we could not and did not give even government as friendly as that of Korea control over movement of our troops, and that as there seemed to be some misunderstanding on that point it was just as well that it came up now. Consultation is required of us, but that is different matter, I said. (This part of conversation was, like rest, in even tones.)

6. I continued by saying we were faced with practical problem as to how to reply if and when congressional leadership inquired as to President Park’s attitude toward withdrawal of American troops. I suggested that in view of importance of giving Congress right impression, it would be appropriate for President Park to authorize statement to be used as necessary along these lines: “When President Park knows there will be an adequate modernization program and knows its dimensions he will be able to reassure his people in those circumstances that some American troops can be withdrawn.” Some such statement would be helpful to some degree even though it not as forthcoming as we would desire. After congressional approval in principle obtained, we could try to develop in detail substantial program which had been proposed to him. Park asked whether such statement would be made publicly or privately. I said that during initial period we would try to handle it as he desired. He reflected for few moments and said he didn’t want to authorize anything, but we could use sense of his views which was along lines of above-quoted suggestion. I said this purely my own suggestion and I could not say whether it would appear useful in Washington.

7. I said there was another point I wished to go over. Modernization program is result of USG desire to reassure ROKG and people of our continuing concern for their safety, even though we are withdrawing some troops. Program and withdrawal are therefore related but are not dependent one on the other. We wish to see program get underway when and as we withdraw, but each will have its own pace. Park did not respond to this aspect of things.

8. President then reviewed many of his earlier remarks on subject of need for American patience. It was true there had been improvement in military field, but that was true of enemy also. In economic field, work had barely been started and average national income is still only $200 per year. ROKs are carrying great national defense burden but by 1975 they hope to assume all of that burden over annual American MAP contribution of $150 million. On point of withdrawal Park thought that perhaps this does not seem as serious in United States as it does in Korea. At this critical moment Koreans hope for more U.S. patience.

9. I commented that these factors had been given our most careful attention as my President’s letter indicated. We are not contemplating anything so drastic that it would undermine confidence of ROK people. We are extremely mindful of proceeding in manner which will make it clear to them that powerful force will remain and that basic commitment is unchanged.

10. President Park then asked if our people could commence talks on modernization program. I replied that I thought Washington would wish to contact congressional leadership first, which would be done very soon. We could and would however make gesture at this time, which was to open talks on M󈝼 factory. Park said he was informed I was sitting on letter from Mr. Packard and asked why I had not delivered it. I said I did not have letter, but Mr. Packard would send one on subject shortly.77. Presumably a reference to telegram 82520 to Seoul. Park asked if M󈝼 would be considered part of modernization program. I replied that inevitably it must be so considered, though it would be handled somewhat differently from other parts of that program. He then inquired whether we would build M󈝼 factory if he maintained his opposition to troop withdrawals. I replied neither M󈝼 nor any other project would be made easier, especially with Congress, by his opposition.

11. He then said I had urged this matter be closely held but he was disturbed to hear this morning statements made by high-level American officials to effect American troops would be leaving Korea. What was explanation, he asked. I said I thought our officials, like some of his own, were reacting to pressures from Congress, Assembly and press. Comments on our side were no doubt intended to hold down pressures in U.S., while his Ministers were also commenting in manner calculated to do same thing here. I then read State/DOD response to inquiries on subject as related State 082211.88. Telegram 82211 to Seoul, May 28, provided the suggested responses for Porter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69𔃃/70)

12. President then asked again when our people could get together to discuss modernization. I replied I thought right after congressional leadership is briefed, but I would seek further comment from Washington. In meantime, there was M󈝼 and perhaps one or two other matters on which, as part of overall program, discussions could commence.

Porter

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69𔃃/70. Top Secret Immediate Nodis.

2 Dated May 27, it instructed Porter to inform Park about the M󈝼 and other defense matters. (Ibid.)

3 Dated May 28, in it Porter wrote that he would suggest to Park that the Minister of Defense meet with General Michaelis about the M󈝼 and related issues. Porter also wrote that he would inform Park that Packard’s letter on the subject was coming. (Ibid.)

4 Dated May 28, it informed Porter that a letter concerning the M󈝼 from Packard to the Korean Minister of Defense was being pouched. (Ibid.)

5 Document 58.

6 See footnote 2, Document 21.

7 Presumably a reference to telegram 82520 to Seoul.

8 Telegram 82211 to Seoul, May 28, provided the suggested responses for Porter. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69𔃃/70)
View Image
Page 154
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Persons
Brown, Winthrop G.Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972
Michaelis, John H.General, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Packard, DavidDeputy Secretary of Defense until December 13, 1971
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Porter, William J.Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Abbreviations & Terms
DODDepartment of Defense
MAPMilitary Assistance Program
M󈝼U.S. military field rifle
NSCNational Security Council
Nodisno distribution
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government
USGUnited States Government



61. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Top Secret Immediate Nodis.
Seoul, June 15, 1970, 1010Z.

3115. For Ambassador Brown. Prime Minister called me in today and handed me signed original English translation of letter from President Park to President Nixon dated June 15.22. The original letter is ibid., Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969?, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Letter reviews history of Korea since 1950, enemy intentions, and repeats much of Park’s comment already transmitted. Letter then continues:

“However, inasmuch as you are proposing to me a partial reduction of the United States forces in Korea in line with your policy of generally reducing United States troops stationed abroad, I think it is in the interests of both of our governments to express clearly and frankly my views and positions and problems related to such reduction.

“The United States forces in Korea serve as a most effective deterrent against the potential aggressors and also as an indispensable element of the defense posture in the case of an armed attack from the north. Any reduction should, therefore, be accompanied by positive measures of strengthening the Republic of Korea forces to offset the effect of such reduction lest it should result in weakening the deterrent or defense capability. It is to be added that major part, if not all, of such measures should be implemented in advance.

“As for the modernization of the Republic of Korea forces as an effective means of strengthening them, it is to be reminded that the ‘Counter Infiltrations/Guerrilla Forces Improvement Requirements’ and the ‘Republic of Korea Forces Development Objectives Plan’ were submitted to your government on January 9 and June 7, 1969, respectively.33. Neither paper was found. I have instructed my Minister of National Defense to integrate these two plans into a single five-year (1971?) overall modernization plan, which, I understand, is being submitted to your government through the Commander, United States Forces in Korea, as of this date.

“I think that consultations should be made on the requirements as well as the ways and means of implementing this overall and substantial modernization. Consultations should also be made on the problem of regular military assistance and on the question of whether it would be necessary to increase the level of the Republic of Korea forces. Furthermore, the ways and means of developing defense industries in Korea should also be explored. It is strongly hoped that firm assurances in advance will be made by your government with regard to these problems.

“As regards the United States forces in Korea, assuming any partial reduction should take place, problems concerning its size and timing as well as the maintenance of the present structure of the United States forces in Korea should be the subjects of consultation. At the same time, consideration should be given to the necessity of strengthening the disposition of naval and air forces of the United States in and around Korea.

“In case of reduction of the United States forces in Korea, there should also be measures of effective diplomatic assurance aimed at forestalling or eliminating its political and psychological adverse effects on the people of the Republic of Korea. Such measures would help to relieve the apprehensions of the Korean people as to their future security and, more importantly, to prevent the danger of irrevocable calamities which might be caused by miscalculation on the part of the potential aggressors, the North Korean and Chinese Communists, as to the the capability or determination of our two nations to take common measures to meet their aggression.

“The importance of fulfilling the treaty obligation of your government in the defense of the Republic of Korea is also pointed out in your letter. There should be a reaffirmation of the determination of the United States to take effective and prompt measures, including the dispatch and reinforcement of ground troops, in the case of renewed aggression in the Korean Peninsula. The potential aggressors should be given a clear and stern warning about such determination of the United States.

“The United States has consistently supported the objective of the United Nations in Korea to realize ‘a unified, independent and democratic Korea.’ And, it goes without saying that the mainstay of the United Nations forces, which constitute an indispensable factor for the maintenance of peace in the Korean Peninsula, consists of the United States forces in Korea. Accordingly, it should be reaffirmed that the partial reduction of the United States forces in Korea would in no way affect the role of the United Nations forces in Korea and that until such time as the above-mentioned objective of the United Nations in Korea is accomplished, the United States forces, which form the nucleus of the United Nations forces in Korea, will certainly continue to be stationed in Korea at a level of powerful and substantial strength.

“I consider it of utmost importance for our two governments to take diplomatic steps to arrange for a system of close and full consultations on the implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two countries and related matters.

“Mr. President, if and when we are able to reach a definite mutual accord through diplomatic negotiation and consultations in advance on the military, economic and diplomatic measures referred to above, such safeguards would be instrumental in seeking the understanding of the Korean people, who are so strongly opposed to any reduction of the United States forces in Korea. On my part, it would be impossible to persuade the Korean people to accept the partial withdrawal by the end of June 1971, as mentioned in your letter,44. Document 58. because of the unexpected shock it would give to them and the shortness of time involved. Apart from this point, if the above-mentioned accord be firmly reached, my government will then be prepared to have discussions with some flexibility in regard to its basic position, explained in my previous letter dated April 20, 1970,55. See Document 57. of opposing any reduction of the United States forces in Korea before the end of 1975.”

Copy has also been sent to Korean Ambassador in Washington who should have it in about two days, Prime Minister stated. Complete text by pouch.

Porter

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Top Secret Immediate Nodis.

2 The original letter is ibid., Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969?, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970.

3 Neither paper was found.

4 Document 58.

5 See Document 57.



64. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969?, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Secret. A typed note indicates the letter was pouched on July 9. On June 19, Rogers sent a draft of this letter to the President with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger forwarded a substantially revised draft to the President under a June 28 covering memorandum that summarized Park’s letter of June 15 and suggested modifications and subsequent actions. Kissinger stated that Park would probably modify his position of total opposition if the United States initiated a “major modernization program for ROK forces” before U.S. departure, which “might be as much as $2 billion or more,” and assured the ROK that the United States would “reinforce our units in the event of aggression.” Kissinger noted that Park “is now publicizing the issue in Korea in an attempt to block any withdrawal until after the Presidential election of May 1971.” Kissinger concluded: “I believe that we must not let Park feel that he can interfere with your decision by misuse of publicity on this issue,” and he recommended that the President sign the letter. On an undated memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, transmitting the June 28 memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “I feel sorry for Park.” (All ibid.)
Washington, July 7, 1970.

Dear President Park:

I have received and carefully considered your letter of June 1522. See Document 61. in which you comment further on my decision to withdraw 20,000 United States troops from Korea by the end of June 1971.

The United States commitment to the defense of Korea, embodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty between our Governments, was reaffirmed when we met last in California during August 1969.33. See Document 35. At that time we agreed that the military forces of Korea and those of the United States stationed in Korea must remain strong and alert. Most importantly, we reaffirmed our determination to meet armed attack against Korea in accordance with that Treaty.

As I said in my letter of May 26,44. Document 58. and as I have also stated publicly, the maintenance of treaty obligations is a fundamental principle of my policy toward Asia. In this you have my assurance in both word and deed. Not only will the forces remaining in Korea provide the powerful and substantial deterrent you seek, but the continued United States presence among them will also serve as the best possible demonstration to both friend and enemy of our commitment to Korea’s defense and security.

I am fully sympathetic, of course, to your position that any reduction of United States forces be accompanied by a strengthening of the Republic of Korea Forces. As you know from my letter, this is basic to my plan. The United States will provide, subject to Congressional approval, a compensatory increase in military assistance for Korea for the purpose of modernizing your military forces. To bring this about I intend to brief leaders of Congress on these plans as soon as possible in order to obtain their support so that modernization can begin.

It is my earnest desire, Mr. President, that we move forward together. I believe the time has now come for our representatives to sit down together and discuss my program and the necessary modernization of your military forces. The Republic of Korea Forces Development Objectives Plan has been very helpful in assisting our planning for Korean modernization requirements, and we shall look forward to receiving your Government’s five year overall modernization plan to which you refer in your letter. Simultaneous with such discussions, I hope you will find it possible to take the initiative in presenting my decision to your countrymen.

With best wishes55. The text of Nixon’s letter was transmitted in telegram 107000 to Seoul, July 6, for immediate delivery to President Park. In telegram 3559 from Seoul, July 9, Lathram commented on Korean press reports of Park’s reaction to anticipated U.S. troop cuts. Lathram concluded that “we speculate that ROKG at long last has accepted inevitable but still hopes through negotiation to secure prior modernization commitments and some postponement timing of reductions.” (Both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969?, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Secret. A typed note indicates the letter was pouched on July 9. On June 19, Rogers sent a draft of this letter to the President with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger forwarded a substantially revised draft to the President under a June 28 covering memorandum that summarized Park’s letter of June 15 and suggested modifications and subsequent actions. Kissinger stated that Park would probably modify his position of total opposition if the United States initiated a “major modernization program for ROK forces” before U.S. departure, which “might be as much as $2 billion or more,” and assured the ROK that the United States would “reinforce our units in the event of aggression.” Kissinger noted that Park “is now publicizing the issue in Korea in an attempt to block any withdrawal until after the Presidential election of May 1971.” Kissinger concluded: “I believe that we must not let Park feel that he can interfere with your decision by misuse of publicity on this issue,” and he recommended that the President sign the letter. On an undated memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, transmitting the June 28 memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “I feel sorry for Park.” (All ibid.)

2 See Document 61.

3 See Document 35.

4 Document 58.

5 The text of Nixon’s letter was transmitted in telegram 107000 to Seoul, July 6, for immediate delivery to President Park. In telegram 3559 from Seoul, July 9, Lathram commented on Korean press reports of Park’s reaction to anticipated U.S. troop cuts. Lathram concluded that “we speculate that ROKG at long last has accepted inevitable but still hopes through negotiation to secure prior modernization commitments and some postponement timing of reductions.” (Both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)


68. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret Priority Nodis.
Seoul, August 4, 1970, 0450Z.

4044. For Ambassador Brown. Pass DOD and CINCPAC for POLAD.

1. Summary. Park received Michaelis and me at 4:30 pm Monday. Interview lasted two hours. As we gradually increased pressure on him, his position on joint troop planning moved from adamant repetition of his earlier refusals to countenance reduction of U.S. troops or to plan jointly on that subject, to statement that he had instructed his Defense Minister to do no such planning until “a degree of satisfaction” had been achieved in modernization talks now underway.22. For a summary of the modernization talks, which began on March 22, see Document 88. Finally, he appeared to soften latter position somewhat by saying he had not yet received interim report of modernization group and he would reserve his opinion on joint planning on reductions until he had that, after which he would get in touch with us. As result of problems we spread before him he seemed more indecisive, albeit more truculent, as reality of U.S. determination to proceed with or without his cooperation became clearer to him. He reiterated all the “musts” and declared his “displeasure” frequently. At no point did he acknowledge U.S. gestures made at Honolulu. He excluded his Ministers from interview despite Prime Minister’s statement to me that he would be present. He had only two Blue House officials there, including interpreter.

2. I opened by saying we had requested interview for purpose of examining our positions and of ascertaining how we could cooperate during period ahead. I said problems are arising because of lack of joint planning. Further, we hope to keep public contention and difficulty, which would only complicate and endanger favorable consideration of modernization problem by Congress, to minimum. We were also hoping that clarifications we had provided at Honolulu had made it possible to deal with these matters. Modernization talks are under way and we believe they will produce useful picture of what is needed. Is it now possible to move ahead on joint planning on our troop reductions?

3. Park replied that there was no change in their attitude. His views had been made known to United States at Honolulu. Nothing could be done about troop reduction planning before achievement of results at modernization conference and before “assurances” concerning security could be given to Korean people. When those things are achieved joint consultation could begin. He understood U.S. problems, but there are similar or greater difficulties in Korea. He had received letters which indicated Korean people 100 per cent against reduction of U.S. troops. If reduction is to occur there must be “assurances that there will be no outbreak of war in Korea.” Unless there is some agreement of that kind he will not agree to reductions. He understands there are serious and sincere talks about modernization underway and he hopes they will provide conclusion which will enable general public to feel secure. Only then will he take part in reduction talks and only then will matters of size, timing, and actions to be taken after agreement, be discussed. He wanted to make clear at this point that ROKG will not participate in talks on reductions until such assurances are given.

3A. I then said that we regretted that there is no change in their willingness to talk with us and I would describe problems arising in connection with our decision to reduce number of our troops. Our planning, which we had unfortunately been compelled to do alone because ROKG felt it could not participate, provides for reduction of 5,000 spaces by December 1970, of 8,500 more at end of March 1971, and of 4,900 by June 30, 1971. As translation proceeded, Park closed his eyes and jiggled his knee as he does under stress, and ordered coffee.

4. Park repeated that he understood U.S. difficulties including congressional problem, but unless there is mutually acceptable conclusion of modernization talks, ROKG will not participate in talks. “If United States proceeds to reduce he will not object but he will not cooperate.” He continued: “Perhaps it would be said that ROK Govt is uncooperative and intransigent but same holds true for United States because ROKG was not consulted in advance of this decision and must have assurances.”

5. I replied that there was no approved plan on troop reductions when we asked ROKG to plan jointly with us. They felt unable to do that. Therefore we had to move in view of our national sentiment, policy, budgetary and manpower considerations. ROKG may have had good ideas but they would not present them in planning sessions. For example, for lack of joint planning there is real problem about disposition of equipment which may become available soon as result of reductions. What are we to do with it? We cannot let it deteriorate, and it is hard to imagine public reaction here or in U.S. if ROKG refusal to plan with us makes it necessary to send it elsewhere. This very unfortunate. List of equipment is impressive, there are hundreds of tanks for example, and much other equipment that would be of great value to ROKF.33. In telegram 3883 from Seoul, July 27, Porter informed Brown that he intended to urge Park to accept joint planning of U.S. troop reductions. Porter explained that he would use the rationale that without Park’s consent to joint planning, congressional agreement to giving the ROK leftover equipment could not be obtained. (Ibid.)

6. Park, now in more of thinking rather than declarative mood, said list included Corps equipment.

7. I repeated that we had to develop our planning unilaterally because we could get no Korean input. Korean thoughts would have been most useful but they would not participate. General Michaelis could answer his questions on military aspects of problem.

8. Park rather angrily said he had received initial official word of our intentions on March 27 and he regrets reaction of USG to his pleas for few years’ more time. He had time and time again asked for consideration of ROK security problems because next few years critical. But if situation in U.S. makes it difficult for USG to wait, he would not object provided ROK forces are strengthened to extent they are able to deter aggression and assurances about security are forthcoming along with his strengthened forces. He does not know what outcome of modernization talks will be. If they lack sincerity, if Korean requirements encounter U.S. attitude that they cannot be met, then it is his intention to object to troop reductions in Korea. But if U.S. pulls out forces as planned he can do nothing as U.S. forces are under U.S. control.

9. I said all this comes down to question of confidence. We have given every possible assurance at our highest level about our intention to modernize their forces, and we have reiterated our commitment to their security. Legally, it is impossible for us to do more than we have done. From our point of view Korean Govt seems to lack confidence in U.S. intentions and our statements, and we do not understand why.

10. Park then picked up word “impossible” and seemed to be trying to determine whether I said it was impossible for us to accept their demand for additional security assurance. I checked word with him and then said that if ROKG is asking for something more in way of commitment than is in treaty, it is impossible for us to exceed treaty limits. If ROKG is asking for renegotiation of treaty to provide additional assurances it is opinion of our govt that such renegotiation is practically impossible in present circumstances. Park replied that he never made that request, it came from Assembly.

11. Park went on to day that it may be true that there is lack of confidence and trust between our two countries, lack of U.S. confidence in Korea, and of Korea in U.S. He does not depend so much on Mutual Defense Treaty. When Korean war broke out there was no treaty but U.S. came with valuable and timely assistance. (He became somewhat worked up at this point.) On problem of confidence in each other he recalled that during meeting with President Nixon about year ago U.S. President explained his Doctrine and his intention to reduce forces abroad. After that explanation, President Nixon assured him Doctrine would not be applied to Korea but on contrary U.S. forces would be made stronger, and that this was expressed in effect in joint communiqué.44. See footnote 7, Document 35. Also at time of despatching ROK forces to Vietnam, General Beach’s letter declared that as long as Korean forces in Vietnam there would be no U.S. troop cut in Korea. At this, I looked at him inquiringly, but he avoided looking at me. He was excited and after moment’s reflection I decided to leave obvious challenge for another occasion, as it would not do to correct him before his Secretary General and his interpreter. He gave me no opportunity in any case to inject a correction. He went on rapidly, saying that time has come for Korea to develop her economy and her defense self-reliance, and he fully intended that his country would stand on her own feet but only thing required is our understanding that this could not be done in day or two.

12. He then declared that less than year after he had received U.S. assurances about no troop reduction, he was presented with U.S. plan for withdrawal. Korean people are keenly interested in reduction of forces and disposal of our equipment and how much will be made available. They are not sure of our intentions. Will there be more reductions next year?

13. Noting his uncertainty, I suggested that he might consider having some officers meet with General Michaelis’s staff and consider various problems arising from our force reduction and plan orderly arrangements for equipment, units, etc. which are needed. I added that we understand he seeking some kind of assurance but nature of what he is seeking is not clear to us. It appears to lie on diplomatic side, and we could explore what they have in mind while his people make practical arrangements with our military officers which would not necessarily imply that he had agreed to our force reductions.

14. Park said ROK Govt would do that when satisfactory conclusion can be drawn from modernization talks. He said he was in position of having instructed his Minister of Defense that no planning on troop reductions could take place until there is “satisfactory degree” of assurances from modernization talks.

15. Gen. Michaelis then explained procedures being followed by modernization committee to determine actual equipment and funding requirements, priorities and training lead times.

16. Gen. Michaelis and I pointed out that there is really no time for procedure he suggested (para 14). Problems of reductions and equipment we had mentioned would soon be upon us. What would be effect of shipping out our equipment, we asked again.

17. Park rejoined angrily that we were saying Korean delegates would go into joint troop reduction planning talks to listen only. I said that not case, they should meet with us, exchange ideas about orderly arrangements for units and equipment. We very much regretted absence of ROK ideas.

18. Park said statements of U.S. spokesmen about reduction indicated USG will go ahead. As far as he is concerned, if conclusion satisfactory “to a degree” can be drawn from modernization talks he would not object to discussion of troop reductions and would meet and talk with us.

19. I replied that it should be understood that in suggesting joint planning I did not imply there could be any change in our plan to reduce our force. I had only suggested joint exchange on absorption of equipment and arrangements for replacement units as practical aspect of problem, which Gen. Michaelis best qualified to discuss.

20. Park then asked Gen. Michaelis for details of our plan for reduction and was given outline of approved plan. Park inquired whether it is planned to take whole units or parts of units. Michaelis provided him with chart showing nature and pace of withdrawals.

21. Park then launched into expression of displeasure at U.S. unilateral planning, to which I rejoined again that it was necessary only because ROKs felt they could not join us. Park reiterated his “regret and displeasure” at U.S. action and stated again he would not participate until “satisfactory conclusion” could be drawn from modernization talks. He said that if U.S. troops were being moved elsewhere for emergency purposes then this hasty withdrawal would be understandable but that is not case and it is based only on U.S. domestic political problems, and ROK should be given more time. So far everything is on unilateral basis and U.S. is not respecting or listening to ROK wishes. U.S. troops are merely going home and withdrawal is not for any emergency purpose. What about NATO? Why aren’t troops being withdrawn from there?

22. I took this occasion to read to him Secretary’s remarks to Korean parliamentary delegation. Park said nothing except that North Koreans know all about ROK strength.

23. I then made statement to effect that essence of problem is that we must talk and plan jointly. Regardless of our views as to how each of us had proceeded, we can only encourage his people and avoid giving comfort to enemy by talking and planning together. He knows our system of govt. We had given him best assurances we can possibly give that we will provide adequate modernization and we had assured him commitment to ROK security remains unchanged. We do not understand why such assurances cannot be taken to ROK public. Our plans involve less than three per cent of main ROK/U.S. force and we have offered generous compensatory arrangements. Also we find it difficult to agree that only one side of problem, modernization, should be discussed. Both modernization and troop reduction planning must go forward together. Unless they do, modernization program may encounter obstacles in Congress. I would leave with him informal paper (ref State 121444 para two)55. Telegram 121444 to Seoul, July 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec. 70) which reflected views we had expressed.

24. Park sat a moment without responding. He then said he had not yet received interim report on modernization. Until he did he would reserve judgment on need to plan jointly with us, and will then get in touch with us. I said I hoped for reasons we had stated that would be soon.

25. I will comment later on long-term meaning for us, as I see it, of Park’s attitude. One interesting thing occurred after interview ended. As we were leaving his office, after making our farewell bows, I turned once again and looked back at him. Park was looking at paper outline which Michaelis left of approved plan for force reduction and for some reason he was smiling. This struck me as odd. There were certainly no smiles during our meeting.

26. Suggestions for near term handling of problem follow for your consideration.66. In telegram 4095 from Seoul, August 6, Porter added that “I am inclined to believe that it is best to let things simmer for awhile and avoid any reaction which would give Park and advisers reason to believe that their tough stand is paying off.” (Ibid.)

Porter

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret Priority Nodis.

2 For a summary of the modernization talks, which began on March 22, see Document 88.

3 In telegram 3883 from Seoul, July 27, Porter informed Brown that he intended to urge Park to accept joint planning of U.S. troop reductions. Porter explained that he would use the rationale that without Park’s consent to joint planning, congressional agreement to giving the ROK leftover equipment could not be obtained. (Ibid.)

4 See footnote 7, Document 35.

5 Telegram 121444 to Seoul, July 28. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec. 70)

6 In telegram 4095 from Seoul, August 6, Porter added that “I am inclined to believe that it is best to let things simmer for awhile and avoid any reaction which would give Park and advisers reason to believe that their tough stand is paying off.” (Ibid.)



70. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger signed the original, which was sent to the President on August 22. An attached August 19 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger alerted the latter to the Under Secretaries Committee recommendations.
Washington, August 22, 1970.

SUBJECT
Military Assistance for Korea
The Under Secretaries’ Committee has looked hard at the necessity for modernizing Korea’s Armed Forces and has concluded that within the limits of the $1.0 billion 5-year program (less the value of excess equipment which might be included) modernization would be limited largely to the ground forces. To provide a reasonable level of modernization for the ROK Air Force and Navy the Under Secretaries’ Committee believes an additional $500 million over the period would be needed.22. The Under Secretaries Committee’s recommendations were submitted to Nixon in an undated memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson. Johnson’s memorandum and an August 19 memorandum from Haig to Holdridge and Kennedy requesting them to “staff” Johnson’s memorandum are attached but not printed.

The NSDM?. Document 56. envisaged upgrading of ROK Air/Ground defense capabilities and improvement in Air Base facilities to permit rapid reintroduction of U.S. air power and reduce vulnerability to attack. However, only $71.8 million of investment in the ROK Air Force over the 5-year period was contemplated, and no investment funds were contemplated for modernizing the ROK Navy.

It is clear that a program of balanced force modernization with the ultimate objective of ROK military self-sufficiency over the next five years will involve a very high price tag. It is equally clear that a program focused primarily towards ROK ground force modernization, while considerably less expensive, will involve a continuing and more immediate requirement to provide U.S. air and naval reinforcements in the event of a North Korean attack.

While it is unlikely that the ROK Government will be able to support a militarily self-sufficient force from its own resources and thus will seek continued substantial military assistance from us for the indefinite future, the cost of increasing ROK naval and air capabilities would be less than that required to provide equivalent U.S. force capabilities in the area.

I believe that a modernization program for the Air Force and Navy is worth our support. This program cannot be achieved within the limits of the existing $1 billion program, and the $1.5 billion figure provides a reasonable add-on. (We may want to take a hard look at the specifics of the increases proposed for the Army, Navy and Air Force, however.)

I recommend therefore that you approve in principle a balanced force modernization program with a level of $1.5 billion for the period FY 71󈞷 comprising a combination of grant, MAP and excess equipment and supplies. The USC would be directed to develop detailed alternative force modernization programs.44. According to a September 2 backchannel telegram from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, President Nixon “approved a $1.5 billion level for balanced modernization of the ROK military, but adds that the upper limit of the funding authority should be held to $1.25 billion, with the balance of the program’s valuation to be provided from excess/long supply and matériel to be supplied to the ROK at no cost over the five year period.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

The USC also has recommended that you seek a FY 71 supplemental MAP appropriation of $150 million to support the Korea program but does not recommend when this request should be made. The Committee notes that additional funds also will be required for both economic and military assistance for Cambodia. Consideration will have to be given as to whether these requests and that for Korea should be combined.

The Committee does recommend, though, that the Vice President announce publicly during his visit to Seoul55. See footnote 2, Document 71 that the U.S. intends to seek a substantial supplemental appropriation for Korea force modernization this year. Ambassador Porter strongly supports this recommendation.

You have indicated that you do not want to request a supplemental before November. If the Vice President announces your intention to request a supplemental, it may tend to force your hand with the Congress and raise the question of the effect of Cambodian operations on our current MAP levels earlier than would otherwise be the case.

I recommend, therefore, that the Vice President be instructed not to announce or inform Korean officials that the U.S. intends to seek a supplemental. You will want the Vice President to make the point in general terms that we support the concept of modernization and will do all that we can subject to approval of the Congress to provide a balanced military assistance program capable of meeting ROK needs. General Michaelis would be informed of the total dimensions of our aid and would work out a one-year illustrative modernization program to show the Koreans and reassure them that their needs will indeed be met.66. According to the September 2 backchannel telegram from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, Porter was informed that “bearing in mind” the Vice-President’s visit, “COMUSK should inform MND he authorized to begin to discuss details force modernization program.”

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger signed the original, which was sent to the President on August 22. An attached August 19 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger alerted the latter to the Under Secretaries Committee recommendations.

2 The Under Secretaries Committee’s recommendations were submitted to Nixon in an undated memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson. Johnson’s memorandum and an August 19 memorandum from Haig to Holdridge and Kennedy requesting them to “staff” Johnson’s memorandum are attached but not printed.

3 Document 56.

4 According to a September 2 backchannel telegram from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, President Nixon “approved a $1.5 billion level for balanced modernization of the ROK military, but adds that the upper limit of the funding authority should be held to $1.25 billion, with the balance of the program’s valuation to be provided from excess/long supply and matériel to be supplied to the ROK at no cost over the five year period.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

5 See footnote 2, Document 71

6 According to the September 2 backchannel telegram from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, Porter was informed that “bearing in mind” the Vice-President’s visit, “COMUSK should inform MND he authorized to begin to discuss details force modernization program.”



Backchannel Telegram From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Top Secret Eyes Only. Sent to Lord for Kissinger in San Clemente where it was received at 4:55 a.m. on August 25.
Seoul, August 25, 1970, 0910Z.

692. Following message also sent to President from Vice President22. Nixon dispatched Agnew to Korea during the last week of August. Kissinger described Agnew’s mission in an August 22 memorandum to him: “Your presence will be a great asset in helping President Park, as well as the Korean people, appreciate the depth of our continued friendship and backing under the Nixon Doctrine. The ‘face’ Park will gain from your visit will make it easier for him to go along with our reductions and support them publicly, which we want him to do.” (Ibid., Box 406, Subject Files, Vice President’s Briefing Book, Republic of Korea, August 1970) via State channels. Please forward if necessary.

1. After six-hour meeting with Park today we came up with following two texts which I agreed to submit for your consideration. First text is my proposal to Koreans for public statement to Park which we would make to help him in dealing with public suspicion about possible further troop withdrawals. Latter proved to be much more abrasive issue than that of joint military planning for our force reduction. I believe he would accept this text if you feel agreeable to approving it:

Begin text: “The U.S. Government, through a long-range program of military and economic aid, will assist the Government of the ROK in its commendable effort to modernize and strengthen its defense forces.

“Until the modernization process is completed, the presence of U.S. troops in the ROK will be required. U.S. forces will be withdrawn only as ROK defensive capabilities improve.

“Evaluation of ROK defense capabilities shall be made from time to time by representatives of the United States and the ROK after full consultation. It is understood, however, that in the event those representatives cannot agree, U.S. reserves final control of its armed forces.” End text first statement.

ROKs may desire that final sentence not be published, in which case I recommend we try to accommodate them by confirming text of agreement, including that final sentence, by letter.

2. Following is text of proposal made by President Park which I said I would submit to you for consideration with the foregoing but which I could not in good conscience recommend to you:

Begin text: “President Park has no objection to U.S. force reduction of 20,000, provided ROK forces equipment is modernized, and national defense capability is increased, and provided there will be no further reduction of the level of remaining U.S. forces until such time as modernization program has been implemented and ROK force strength increased.” End second text.

3. Second text indicates Park’s determination to tie remaining U.S. forces to undetermined level of modernization program which I felt I could not agree to. Am hoping you can give these matters early attention to enable us if possible to reach conclusion before my departure tomorrow at 1300 hours Seoul time.33. In telegram 138266 to San Clemente, August 25, U. Alexis Johnson sent a draft reply for Agnew to Rogers and Kissinger which warned that the Koreans could take the view that modernization is a “never-ending process,” and reiterated that the reduction of 20,000 troops was not dependent upon completion of deliveries under the modernization program. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Top Secret Eyes Only. Sent to Lord for Kissinger in San Clemente where it was received at 4:55 a.m. on August 25.

2 Nixon dispatched Agnew to Korea during the last week of August. Kissinger described Agnew’s mission in an August 22 memorandum to him: “Your presence will be a great asset in helping President Park, as well as the Korean people, appreciate the depth of our continued friendship and backing under the Nixon Doctrine. The ‘face’ Park will gain from your visit will make it easier for him to go along with our reductions and support them publicly, which we want him to do.” (Ibid., Box 406, Subject Files, Vice President’s Briefing Book, Republic of Korea, August 1970)

3 In telegram 138266 to San Clemente, August 25, U. Alexis Johnson sent a draft reply for Agnew to Rogers and Kissinger which warned that the Koreans could take the view that modernization is a “never-ending process,” and reiterated that the reduction of 20,000 troops was not dependent upon completion of deliveries under the modernization program. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)


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75. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 15𔂿 KOR S. Confidential.
Seoul, November 3, 1970, 0942Z.

5782. From Ambassador. Subj: Korean Presidential Campaign.

1. Since ROK Assemblyman Kim Dae Jung won the nomination of the New Democratic Party (NDP) for the Presidency, he has been campaigning in manner that is causing considerable uneasiness among Democratic Republican Party (DRP), including latter’s leader, President Park.

2. Kim is attracting very large crowds in major cities, before whom he unhesitatingly discusses number of sensitive issues, domestic and foreign. He is forceful orator, and reports indicate that he can both effectively harangue crowds and deal persuasively with intellectual groups. He is challenging Park by name and issue.

3. He has brought about major outcry in govt circles by advocating elimination of Homeland Reserve (HR). While he did not mention fact specifically, he is of course aware that popular enthusiasm toward service in that body has waned due to favoritism on wide scale which enables sons of officials and others who are well connected to avoid reporting for drill sessions, which, moreover, are considered tedious by men who were drilling in same manner as recruits ten years ago. In coastal areas units put in more than twice as many duty hours as city dwellers, and their dislike for such duty is increased by fact their absence from area and fishing boat frequently brings economic loss for which they are not compensated.

4. Mr. Kim is doing his best also to get govt over barrel on local self-government issue, and he is reviving memories of fact that local elections were once promised by President Park and his party. DRP is in quandary as to how to handle that one because local elections would remove rigid control which party now exercises through system of appointive governors, mayors, county and district chiefs. System has proven hightly effective in both rewarding and punishing rural communities on basis their election performances.

5. Kim’s basic theme is simple. He does not deny Park’s achievements, but he declares that change is needed to straighten out political, economic and social inequities which he claims are developing in Korea. In addition to issues cited above, he has declared himself in favor of lowering voting age, raising investment in rural areas by twenty per cent, a graduated income-tax scale, for enhancement of women’s status through committee which would be under direct control of President, support for needy students and for eliminating that great bugaboo of Korean families, the college entrance examinations.

6. DRP has moved to curb Kim’s electioneering by having Central Election Management Committee, which it controls, declare that campaigning for presidency must be limited to period of forty days prior to actual election. During meeting with me last week at Kim’s request (memo pouched) I questioned him about effect of CEMC’s ruling. He said that he would ignore it, and he has done so up to now. DRP at this point is baffled, because CEMC ruling does not affect right of political parties to hold rallies. Persons are not supposed to proclaim their candidacy for presidency, but even if Kim observed that rule, no one can possibly misunderstand his words, his purpose, and his demeanor.

7. After my meeting with Kim, Prime Minister brought it up in conversation and asked my impressions of nominee. I said I found Kim interesting person who spoke in measured terms and who seemed to be clear-minded as well as determined. I added that I thought it would be interesting election. He inquired whether in my opinion there would be problem for President Park. I said I did not care to make judgment on that matter. PriMin then said that Mr. Kim was putting out reports to effect I supporting him and that I would help him go to United States. I commented there were two things about such reports, first being that they were without foundation, and secondly that I had heard them from several sources all of which, interestingly enough, were connected with DRP.

8. Minister of Defense then approached me and brought up subject of opposition candidate’s desire to eliminate Homeland Reserve, which Minister said must be maintained at all costs. I said that our opinion of value of Reserve had not changed, thought there were many things about way it was being developed which were having effect on public. Minister then said we would soon see what govt would do to equalize service for all elements of Reserve. I said I had no comment to make on that as it is Mr. Kim and not I who had been bothering him on subject.

9. President is said to have had some highly charged moments as he read Kim’s speeches. Opening para of that part of Kim’s speech to Seoul Corespondents Club on October 30 on “Korean Diplomacy in the 1970’s” reportedly had particularly pronounced effect on Park. At that point the NDP nominee said he believed talks with Kim Il Sung should be preceded by latter’s denunciation of aggression. Kim Dae Jung then continued: “At the same time, I am firmly opposed to creating this atmosphere of tension and horror, as evidenced in the policy of the present administration of President Park Chung Hee to prolong the life of one’s regime in the name of national security and anti-communism.” It is reliably reported that Park had to be peeled off the ceiling after that one. President has made no campaign move as yet. He is not noted for charisma, and would in any case be inhibited by his sense of personal dignity and local custom from engaging in direct debate with his opponent.

10. Kim is receiving strong support from his two erstwhile rivals for NDP nomination, Kim Young Sam and Lee Chul Sung, who are stumping with him. They are articulate trio, quite possibly better than anything majority party can field. Among many other things DRP is also annoyed because Kim Dae Jung’s given name “Dae Jung” literally means “large crowds” or “masses,” and DRP leaders are complaining that he uses his name much too frequently as he tells crowds that “day of masses has arrived.”

11. We will be exercising care as we observe developments to insure that neither side uses us for its purposes. It is obvious already that we are witnessing interesting developments which are likely to become even more so if Kim contines to draw crowds. (At Kwangju yesterday two hundred thousand persons came to hear him, and at Pusan several days ago he reportedly had from seventy-five to one hundred thousand.) DRP strategists are in some disarray, and their reported plan to stand on Park’s record may have to be greatly altered to deal with Kim’s promises, as Korean public generally is not overly enthralled by accounts of what party did for them yesterday.

12. We have en route to Dept comprehensive review of these developments and plan to continue frequent and complete coverage.22. In telegram 5804 from Seoul, November 4, Porter reported on the Korean Government and DRP reaction to nominee Kim Dae Jung and that Park asked the Prime Minister “to do something” about Kim. (Ibid.)

Porter

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL 15𔂿 KOR S. Confidential.

2 In telegram 5804 from Seoul, November 4, Porter reported on the Korean Government and DRP reaction to nominee Kim Dae Jung and that Park asked the Prime Minister “to do something” about Kim. (Ibid.)
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Persons
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung)Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung)Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung), Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the DPRK until December 28, 1972 President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) of the DPRK from December 28, 1972 and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Porter, William J.Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Abbreviations & Terms
DRPDemocratic Republican Party (Republic of Korea)
NDPNew Democratic Party (South Korea)
PriMinPrime Minister
RGrecord group
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
SOffice of the Secretary of State
govtgovernment


77. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Confidential. A November 9 covering note from Houdek to Kissinger reads: “The full State memo is well worth reading. It looks like Park has a real opponent on his hands and is in for a hotly-contested election.” Houdek recommended that “we should closely monitor this election” and obtain from CIA a more complete biography of Kim Dae Jung and an assessment of his election chances. Haig wrote at the bottom of the page: “Yes, and we’re helping defeat Park for a less reliable substitute.” Latimer forwarded a memorandum to R. Jack Smith, November 18, tasking the CIA with the request for a biography of Kim and an analysis of his prospects. (Ibid.) For a summary of the assessment, see Document 83.
Washington, November 6, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Korean Presidential Campaign
Although the presidential election in the Republic of Korea (ROK) will not be held until May, 1971, the candidate of the opposition New Democratic Party, Kim Tae-chung, has already emerged as a serious contender in the race against President Park Chung Hee. President Park is seeking a third term, the Constitution having been amended last year to remove the provision which limited the President to two terms in office.

In seeking re-election, Park can point to a solid record of achievement, particularly his role in the ROK’s remarkable economic growth. During his administration the ROK has taken giant strides toward stability, economic viability, and international acceptance. The President also enjoys the political advantages accruing to the strong, authoritarian chief of a state in which democratic institutions are only beginning to develop. He has a large measure of control over the media, a sizeable and active party organization, control of the armed forces as well as of extensive and well-endowed security organs.

Conversely, a long period in power has eroded the elan noted in his regime in earlier years, the corruption which he originally sought to stamp out has reappeared and may even have increased, and there is widespread impatience at the heavy hand of his security organs. Most of the population has benefited from economic growth, but disparities in income are excessive. The campaign to amend the Constitution, during which he made statements à la DeGaulle, offering the electorate a choice between himself and chaos, left a legacy of distrust and disappointment.

Park is now 53 years of age. Kim is 45, and the most vigorous opponent to face the President thus far. Kim is also able and intelligent, an excellent orator, skilled both at haranguing large crowds and establishing easy relationships with small groups of intellectuals. He offers an alternative, in contrast to previous candidates who could only oppose for opposition’s sake.

Since his nomination Kim has toured Korea, expounding his views to large—up to 200,000—crowds in the country’s major cities. He does not deny Park’s achievements, but declares that a change is needed to straighten out the political, economic and social inequities which he claims are developing in Korea. Specifically, he advocates elimination of the favoritism-riddled Homeland Reserve, the restoration of local self-government, the establishment of a graduated income tax, lowering of the voting age, and the raising of investment in rural areas by twenty percent. In foreign affairs, Kim accuses the President of exaggerating the North Korean threat to prolong the life of his own regime, asks for talks on reunification with Kim Il-song (but only after the latter renounces any aggressive intentions), and proposes that Korean security be guaranteed by the U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union and the CPR.

President Park has reportedly asked Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon to “do something” about Kim, and several leaders of the ruling Democratic-Republican Party (DRP) have urged the government to take strong action against Kim on the basis of alleged violations of the anti-communist laws (i.e. Kim’s remarks bearing on Korean security). Reluctant to make Kim a martyr, the ROKG has acted to squelch future publicity about Kim’s speeches, and has mounted a radio and TV campaign against him. The latter included a live TV-radio press conference in which Defense Minister Jung, supported by thirty leading Defense officials including the JCS chairman, denounced Kim’s call for abolition of the Homeland Reserve as “benefiting the enemy.”

If we have any experience with Korean elections, it is that they can be hotly contested, sensitive, and even disruptive to internal stability. As this one begins to take shape, it appears it will not be an exception.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Confidential. A November 9 covering note from Houdek to Kissinger reads: “The full State memo is well worth reading. It looks like Park has a real opponent on his hands and is in for a hotly-contested election.” Houdek recommended that “we should closely monitor this election” and obtain from CIA a more complete biography of Kim Dae Jung and an assessment of his election chances. Haig wrote at the bottom of the page: “Yes, and we’re helping defeat Park for a less reliable substitute.” Latimer forwarded a memorandum to R. Jack Smith, November 18, tasking the CIA with the request for a biography of Kim and an analysis of his prospects. (Ibid.) For a summary of the assessment, see Document 83.




83. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.
Washington, December 23, 1970.

SUBJECT
CIA Memorandum on the South Korean Elections
On November 18 you asked CIA for a memorandum on South Korean opposition candidate Kim Tae-chung’s challenge to President Park in the 1971 elections. The CIA response is attached (Tab A).22. Tab A is Intelligence Memorandum No. 1499/70, December 9, entitled “The 1971 South Korean Presidential Election” attached but not printed.

The main points in response to your request are as follows:

—The biography of Kim Tae-chung is at Tab B.33. Attached but not printed. The biography is an annex to Intelligence Memorandum No. 1499/70. He is an attractive, active, forty-five year old politician, a Roman Catholic, and does not speak English. He is described by U.S. officials who have dealt with him as more forthcoming and direct than most Korean politicians, a proven vote getter with a persuasive manner and an eloquent, oratorical style. Kim likes to be called the “Kennedy of Korea.”

—Despite the widespread favorable reaction to Kim’s opening campaign speeches, his prospects for victory next May appear at this time to be marginal at best. In comparison to President Park’s Democratic-Republican Party, the mostly conservative New Democrats are poorly organized and short of money. Moreover, Kim cannot count on even the unswerving support of all of his own party.

—The issue of U.S. troop reductions in Korea appears likely to have only a marginal impact on the election. President Park had opened himself to the charge that he created undue strains in relations with the Americans by his initial strong stand that any cut-back of U.S. troops in Korea at this time would be tantamount to inviting Pyongyang to resume open hostilities. The emotional impact of this issue has by now largely dissipated, however, and the talks on modernizing South Korean forces have helped to recreate an atmosphere of mutual cooperation.

—Kim cannot make too much of an issue of U.S. troop reductions without the risk of offending the nation’s 625,000-man military establishment. For Kim to insist that these reductions endanger the nation’s security would, at the very least, imply criticism of the country’s armed forces, and could expose him to charges of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.44. The CIA Intelligence Memorandum stated that the matter of U.S. troop reductions was not likely to be a major issue in the campaign for a variety of reasons, “but mainly because the views of the two parties on national security and foreign policy correspond rather closely.”

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

2 Tab A is Intelligence Memorandum No. 1499/70, December 9, entitled “The 1971 South Korean Presidential Election” attached but not printed.

3 Attached but not printed. The biography is an annex to Intelligence Memorandum No. 1499/70.

4 The CIA Intelligence Memorandum stated that the matter of U.S. troop reductions was not likely to be a major issue in the campaign for a variety of reasons, “but mainly because the views of the two parties on national security and foreign policy correspond rather closely.”
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Persons
Holdridge, John HerbertDirector, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969 member, National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from July 1969
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung)Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Kissinger, Henry A.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Abbreviations & Terms
CIACentral Intelligence Agency
NSCNational Security Council


81. Memorandum of Conversation11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted on December 7. The meeting was held at Kissinger’s office at the White House. This memorandum is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger recommending no further distribution “due to the sensitivity of the subject matter.”
Washington, December 2, 1970, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Kim Chong Pil, Republic of Korea
Assemblyman Chung Joo Yoon
Henry A. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT
Kim Chong Pil’s Remarks on US-Korea Relations
Dr. Kissinger warmly welcomed Mr. Kim, recalling their relationship while Mr. Kim was at Harvard. Mr. Kim, Dr. Kissinger noted, had been the only student he had ever had who had been accompanied by a bodyguard. (Assemblyman Chung Joo Yoon interjected to note that he, in fact, had been the one who had accompanied Mr. Kim.) Dr. Kissinger recalled, too, that he and Mr. Kim had been in Saigon at the same time on one occasion. Mr. Kim responded to the effect that he had hoped Dr. Kissinger might have been able to proceed to Seoul from Saigon. Dr. Kissinger expressed in turn the hope that he could go to Seoul in the not too distant future, to which Mr. Kim responded “the sooner the better.”

Mr. Kim stated that he would like to take this opportunity to ask Dr. Kissinger a number of frank questions—questions which were also in President Park Chong Hee’s mind. First, could Dr. Kissinger visualize in the foreseeable future any withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam, and if so, when, in what form, and what size? Dr. Kissinger declared that in principle he could see the possibility of a Korean withdrawal, for example in the case of a peace settlement. He could also imagine that if the South Vietnamese became strong enough to take over, then at some point the ROK troops could be reduced. He had no schedule in mind, except in the event that a peace settlement materialized, and was exercising no pressure. The question of ROK troop withdrawals was one that should be discussed confidentially between the two Governments.

Dr. Kissinger asked if he could ask Mr. Kim a question—were the Koreans satisfied with the discussions they were having with our Ambassador in Seoul? Mr. Kim replied that he was personally satisfied over the outcome of the negotiations with the U.S. Ambassador. He had met President Park before his departure, and President Park had not shown any unsatisfactory reactions. However, many Koreans had not had satisfactory feelings about the negotiations. On this, Dr. Kissinger remarked that if Mr. Kim’s President wanted to deal directly with our President on issues of extreme sensitivity such as the troops in Vietnam, President Park could always get in touch with him, Dr. Kissinger, through the Korean Ambassador here or through someone else the Koreans could trust. Mr. Kim promised after his return to tell this to President Park.

Mr. Kim went on to say that to be frank, with respect to the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea President Park had expressed displeasure when this announcement was first made because at the time of the San Francisco conference between the two Presidents there had been no mention of U.S. force reductions. Then, a sudden unilateral announcement concerning reductions had occurred. From the standpoint of the staff who assist President Park in preparing for discussions, there should be as much advance notice as possible so that they would be better able to help him out. Dr. Kissinger replied that what Mr. Kim had said was true however, at the time the two Presidents had met we had not known of the decision on the U.S. force reduction. It was not that we had tried to keep this matter from President Park. Mr. Kim indicated that President Park now understood the difficult decisions which the U.S. had to make. Of course, President Park had to deal with next year’s election, and the U.S. announcement had initially put the ROK Government in an embarrassing position, though the people now understood.

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Kim how President Park would do next year—Mr. Kim’s party had some experience in managing elections, hadn’t it? Mr. Kim acknowledged that he and his party did have some experience in this field, and might need to try managing the elections again. Dr. Kissinger humorously remarked that Mr. Kim must have learned some of this from Dr. Kissinger’s teachings, although the Koreans had a talent of their own.

Mr. Kim said that in view of changing international trends over the next four or five years, Korea might find itself in a more difficult position in coping with these changes and was looking over its policy decisions. For this reason he wanted to ask Dr. Kissinger’s counsel. Among the changes foreseen by the Koreans were China gaining a position in the UN, a continuation of the Chinese Communist threat, and a settlement in Vietnam. In its international position Korea had to face such changes. Its international security situation was a big issue, and under the changed circumstances the Koreans might need to explore new policy directions. Dr. Kissinger responded by asking in what way, and towards whom? Mr. Kim then spoke of an increased degree of flexibility on the international scene and an opening of doors, e.g. Chinese admission to the UN and a possible settlement in Vietnam. However, while some doors were opening more widely, the ROK position might become closed in so that it might some day be compelled to act against its will. Accordingly, the ROK had to ride over the changes and the waves on the international scene.

Dr. Kissinger asserted that he understood Mr. Kim’s point. We would try to consult with the Koreans better than had been the case on the troop withdrawal issue. Our President was not known for letting down his friends. Mr. Kim noted on the score of U.S. troop reductions that after 25 years of working together the Korean people might have gotten the feeling of being left in a vacuum. Still, they now understood the idea and accepted it. A more fundamental point, Dr. Kissinger declared, was that the Koreans didn’t want their country to be in an isolated condition with respect to the rest of Asia.

Mr. Kim agreed that the Koreans were concerned about being isolated from Asian society. The Chinese position was one of flexibility, with more and more recognition and the possibility of UN entry on the other hand, Korea was unable to have such flexibility because of basic positions which it had originally taken. Thus, if the world tide was changing and Korea remained as before, Korea needed to ask how it would be affected. Should it continue to maintain its basic positions? This is what he, Mr. Kim, had in mind in asking for Dr. Kissinger’s views.

Dr. Kissinger agreed that we were, in fact, in a transitional period. We had no illusions about China, which we knew was our enemy. However, we had two enemies, the USSR and China, which happened to be fighting with one another. Speaking quite frankly, we therefore were trying to see if we could use one enemy against the other. While we realized that China was not our friend, the tactical situation required us to see how we might use China in moves vis-à-vis the Soviets. In this, though, it was out of the question that we would sacrifice Korea to China. The Koreans were fortunate in not having the problem of how to deal with two enemy countries. We would not abandon Korea, which should not confuse our tactics with our strategy.

Mr. Kim referred again to the U.S. force reductions in Korea, observing that everyone in Korea understood that this meant a detachment of the U.S. commitment to support Korea and in effect the reestablishment of an Asian defense system. Dr. Kissinger responded by remarking that we had always thought the ROK would be better off by having its army modernized than by having U.S. forces present in Korea. Mr. Kim’s reply was that Korea had the problem of the North Korean threat, and needed to maintain big forces at all times. As President Park had said in his August 15 speech on reunification, the ROK was watching the negotiations between East and West Germany and might need to face up to the desirability of talking with North Korea. During the next four or five years, Korea would have to deal with problems such as these.

Dr. Kissinger declared that we were friends of the ROK, and would do what we could to support and strengthen it. Dr. Kissinger noted that he had the highest regard for President Park, and had high personal regard for Mr. Kim. Mr. Kim wondered if Dr. Kissinger had any words in mind for President Park, and Dr. Kissinger reiterated that if President Park wanted to be in direct touch with us he should send the Korean Ambassador or someone else whom he could trust to Dr. Kissinger. In this way we could maintain direct contact.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted on December 7. The meeting was held at Kissinger’s office at the White House. This memorandum is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger recommending no further distribution “due to the sensitivity of the subject matter.”

78. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Additional notations on the memorandum read: “Haig: FYI” and “Action: Smith/Holdridge.” Another notation on the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. In a memorandum to President Nixon, December 8, Kissinger summarized this memorandum for the President. The December 8 memorandum bears Haig’s initials and a notation that Nixon saw it. (Ibid.)
Washington, November 10, 1970.

SUBJECT
Koreans Abandon Efforts to Obtain Diplomatic Assurances Regarding U.S. Troop Reductions
President Park has agreed to a suggestion from Ambassador Porter that the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) set aside its request for new “diplomatic assurances” in regard to further reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. The ROK had earlier submitted an eight point “Agreed Minutes” paper22. See Document 74. to be issued jointly by both sides when our talks were completed. The most controversial point was a proposed requirement for “full prior consultation” in connection with future reductions, and a statement that we would take no actions contrary to the wishes of the Korean Government. We had informed the ROK both in Seoul and in Washington that their paper was unacceptable and that we could not grant the ROK such veto power over the deployment of our forces. We told them, however, that we would see value for both sides in a statement, either by President Park unilaterally or jointly with Ambassador Porter, that we had reached satisfactory agreement on both the extent and manner of troop reductions and on modernization. In this we would also reaffirm our treaty commitment. President Park has agreed to such a statement.

A draft statement is under discussion with the Department of Defense and we hope to send it to the White House for clearance very shortly.

In making his decision President Park was probably motivated by the need—for both domestic and diplomatic reasons—to show satisfactory results in his negotiations with us. His opponent in next May’s presidential election, Kim Tae-chung, has charged that the President has made a mess of relations with the Americans. Kim has also charged that the President has deliberately fostered an atmosphere of tension and fear, fear of North Korean aggression and fear of abandonment by the Americans, in his efforts to prolong the life of his regime. Park is very sensitive to both charges. He has probably realized that there is no chance that we will reconsider our positions and that further adamancy on his part could cost him heavily with both our Congress and the Korean electorate. Whatever the reasons for Park’s apparent acquiescence, the result is entirely favorable.

William P. Rogers

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Additional notations on the memorandum read: “Haig: FYI” and “Action: Smith/Holdridge.” Another notation on the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. In a memorandum to President Nixon, December 8, Kissinger summarized this memorandum for the President. The December 8 memorandum bears Haig’s initials and a notation that Nixon saw it. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 74.
View Image
Page 197
Page 198
Persons
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr.Colonel, Brigadier General in November 1969 Major General in March 1972 Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1969 until June 1970 Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970
Holdridge, John HerbertDirector, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969 member, National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from July 1969
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung)Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Kissinger, Henry A.Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Nixon, Richard M.President of the United States
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui)Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Porter, William J.Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Rogers, William P.Secretary of State
Smith, K. WayneDirector, Policy Analysis Branch, National Security Council, from 1971 until 1972
Abbreviations & Terms
FYIfor your information
NSCNational Security Council
ROKRepublic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKGRepublic of Korea Government


Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), and Others11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Presidential Recordings, Conversation 53𔃀. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation was held in the Cabinet Room between 9:34 and 10:45 a.m. Also attending were Kissinger, Stans, David Kennedy, Peterson, Shultz, and Flanigan. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
Washington, April 17, 1971.

Connally: I obviously don’t have the information, but I might, parenthetically, ask: what do we get for the one and a half billion that we’ve committed to, in terms of military preparedness of, of Korea? What if Korea—

[unclear exchange]

Connally: Every time I ask, every time we start talking about economic matters, everybody wants to keep the trade off in the economic field. When we talk about military matters, they’ve got nothing to give us in the military field. What do we get for it?

Johnson: Two—two things. We got, we got modernization of their forces—

Connally: What does that—?

Johnson: —which they needed, which they needed, and which was justified on its own merits. It was needed on its own merits. And secondly, we got the reduction of our, our—

Nixon: Reduction of our forces.

Johnson: —our forces the 20,000 forces that we drew out of there.

Nixon: Well, but—

Connally: Look, I understand, but we will have to have Korea’s consent to reduce our forces, you know.

[unclear exchange]

Connally: Now, if it’s in our interest, that’s fine. But we don’t have to have their unilateral consent.

Johnson: No, no—

Nixon: I—I think, I think John has got a point here. Let me say, Alex, that I do not go as far as some, and that I know, I know the diplomats have to take a different view, and you must argue it, always. But, believe me that it doesn’t—when it comes to linking, I’ll obey the linking. Military linkage, economic linkage, I’m for it, if it serves our overall interests. That’s really what’s it’s about—

Connally: That’s all I’m saying, Mr. President.

Nixon: Don’t compartmentalize it too much.

Johnson: [unclear]

Nixon: I think it’s very important, very important to try to get—if you can work it out on an economic basis, fine. But the, the [unclear] a little bit of linkage—what’s that?

Connally: May I suggest, Mr. President, that we ask Pete—that you ask Pete to do one other thing if it appears worth [doing]. Let’s see what [unclear] might lead to withdrawal. We approach this again from the standpoint of, “What can we give ‘em? What more can we give ‘em?” Let’s see what they already have that we can withdraw. Hong Kong? What, what can Hong Kong do for us, except send us textiles? Now, how important is this if we just maintain a, a great relationship with Hong Kong. Taiwan, they live at our sufferance, to be cold about it. Now, they’re our friends, and we want to support ‘em, but what can they do? Why do we argue with them if we can withdraw if they don’t go along with it? Korea’s the same way.

Nixon: They live at our sufferance.

Connally: Sure, they live at our sufferance. And all I’m saying is—I don’t want to be completely bull-faced, just about 90 percent—but let’s see what they’ve already got that we can take away from them if they don’t want to go. Just don’t get [unclear] and stand back, give ‘em something else.

Johnson: My point, Mr. President, is not that I oppose the linkage, as such, but I, I would be hopeful that we each accomplish this within the economic framework.

Connally: Good.

Kennedy: Alex, could I, could I respond to that?

Johnson: Sure.

Kennedy: I—I don’t think, I don’t think any of us would argue that if you could do it with as little as possible—

[unclear exchange]

Kennedy: —we should do it.

Johnson: Sure.

Kennedy: But, I, I do want to remind you of this chart. We are talking about 34 percent of their exports. We probably are talking about a society that is counting on this growth as part of their national, you know, forward planning. We’re talking about 45 percent growth, and we’re gonna try to talk them into accepting under—between 5 and 10 on a third of their exports. And I—my only view is that it’s gonna take [unclear].

Nixon: Five and ten, you mean—?

Kennedy: To meet the industry requirements. I mean, we’re gonna have to go from 45 down to 5. Is this right, Maury?

Stans: Yes, yes—

Kennedy: Somewhere between 5 and 10 [unclear]—

Stans: Five in some categories, ten on others—

Kennedy: And, so, all I’m trying to suggest is we’ve got quite a job to get—

Nixon: Now, now let’s [unclear]—I don’t—I want to be sure I understand what that is. You say that their growth is 45 now?

Kennedy: I’m saying that—

Nixon: Textiles are their exports. I understand this.

Kennedy: Yeah. Thirty-four percent of their exports are textiles—

Nixon: Right, exports—

Kennedy: They have been growing at 45 percent compounded. Commerce prepared these forms. We had six people working—

Nixon: Yeah. Sure, sure.

Kennedy: —and the industry position, now, is somewhere between 5 and 10 percent. And I simply—

Nixon: This is our industry, now?

[unclear exchange]

Kennedy: I mean, in order to make a deal that is, that is—

Stans: My point being—

Kennedy: —specific guidelines.

Stans: —in case you’re not aware of it, in our discussions with ‘em last year, they proposed a—an agreement on a 43 percent increase per year. Subsequently, they’ve gotten it to 30 percent, but that’s as low as they’ve ever gone, so—

Nixon: You mean the other countries?

Kennedy: Korea.

Nixon: Korea.

Stans: Korea.

Kennedy: Well, Koreans are tough partners.

Nixon: They all are.

Stans: Could I—?

Nixon: Koreans are tough.

Stans: Could I raise a point on the economic “carrots,” as you called ‘em? I would agree with Alex that if we could it would be great, but I’m not sure that these economic carrots are good enough, or that there aren’t some considerable risks in some of those that are on the charts. For example, to increase the allowances of cotton goods, and to put textiles under general preferences, these are things that could not be secret from the rest of the world. And if we put textiles under general preferences for Korea and Taiwan, I think we’d have trouble with South America and in Africa and in all the other countries that would want textiles under general preferences. So, we open up a can of worms there that could cause us a lot of trouble.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cabinet Room, Presidential Recordings, Conversation 53𔃀. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation was held in the Cabinet Room between 9:34 and 10:45 a.m. Also attending were Kissinger, Stans, David Kennedy, Peterson, Shultz, and Flanigan. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.


104. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State11. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL KOR N–KOR S. Confidential.
Seoul, August 31, 1971, 0909Z.

5309. Subj: Korean CIA Director’s Views on Red Cross Talks. Summary:ROKCIA Director says Red Cross talks designed (a) to show South Korean people ROKG ready to deal with humanitarian aspects of divided country (b) demonstrate that South can now deal from position of strength (c) open North to realities of situation in the South. His attitude reflected confidence, desire for Korea to play more active, positive role in Asian affairs.

1. ROKCIA Director Lee Hu Rak asked me at lunch if the reaction of the US Government towards the Red Cross talks at Panmunjom was favorable.22. In telegram 4729 from Seoul, August 7, Porter reported that Lee Hu Rak had informed him on August 6 that the President of the Korean Red Cross would hold a press conference on August 12 and announce a South Korean initiative for talks with North Korea on the subject of divided families. Porter reported that he had agreed that this initiative would have a good effect both at home and abroad but asked how they intended to get around ROK anti-Communist laws. Porter added that he found it interesting that only the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice had been sketchily informed and that he had assured Lee that his information would also be closely held by the U.S. Government. (Ibid.) I said that he had undoubtedly seen press reports of the Department’s spokesman’s comments welcoming the talks. I added that the Korean initiative was probably also seen as evidence of ROK maturity and self-confidence.

2. This observation produced a long and animated exposition of his strategy in getting the talks started now. The first and most obvious aspect, he said, was to respond to growing public pressure for some kind of contact with the North. The Korean people felt that their government had been an obstacle to the establishment of contacts. It was necessary to demonstrate that this was not so and to relieve the pressure by carefully controlled and regulated interchanges. He saw no prospect, however, that the talks would lead to unification. The ideological differences, he was convinced, were too strong to be overcome.

3. The second and less obvious aspect of his strategy was related, he said, to my comment on self-confidence. During his time as Ambassador to Japan and in his first months in office as CIA Director he said he had made a thorough study of North Korea and had reached the conclusion that in every significant field of comparison the South had passed the North and with each successive year would be building up an irreversible lead. A physical and psychological barrier was in the past necessary, but this was no longer the case. The balance had been tipped. The South, he said, has nothing to fear from peaceful competition, and contacts with the North will have two beneficial effects. They will show our own people that we can deal successfully with the North and secondly it will give us a chance to open the closed minds of our northern compatriots. The North Koreans are the victims of their own propaganda about the South, he continued. They think we are on the verge of economic and political collapse. The agents that we pick up are full of the most preposterous ideas about conditions in the South. Contacts and a flow of information northward will gradually undermine these illusions and bring pressure on the regime.

4. Comment:Lee’s comments during the two-hour conversation reflected confidence, self-assurance, and initiative. The needless opening formality of the question on the USG reaction to the talks was the only traditional instinctive clutch for the reassuring apron strings. The Nixon Doctrine, our troop reductions, the public response to Kim Tae Jung’s campaign, the announcement of the President’s Peking visit, have all been elements of a broad front pushing politically sensitive and responsive men like Lee and Kim Jong Pil to recognize the changing face of Asia. Lee was saying, almost in so many words, that Korea in the past was compelled by its poverty and backwardness to accept the role of pawn and victim that Korea today need not do so, and that it can play an active, positive, and to some degree an independent role.

Underhill

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970󈞵, POL KOR N–KOR S. Confidential.

2 In telegram 4729 from Seoul, August 7, Porter reported that Lee Hu Rak had informed him on August 6 that the President of the Korean Red Cross would hold a press conference on August 12 and announce a South Korean initiative for talks with North Korea on the subject of divided families. Porter reported that he had agreed that this initiative would have a good effect both at home and abroad but asked how they intended to get around ROK anti-Communist laws. Porter added that he found it interesting that only the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice had been sketchily informed and that he had assured Lee that his information would also be closely held by the U.S. Government. (Ibid.)